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Editorial Preface
In the Center for Company Law at Tilburg University, researchers investigate 
the functioning of business organisations from a business law and tax law 
perspective. The central focus point in their research is the question how to 
facilitate different types of entrepreneurial activities, while balancing between 
efficiency and fairness. Facilitating entrepreneurial activities requires an 
adequate and efficient legal infrastructure, in which company law, tax law, 
contract and property law as well as insolvency law take a prominent position. 
Financing business organisations and the legal infrastructure in which finan-
cial arrangements prosper is one of the main research themes of the Tilburg 
Center for Company Law.
The academic debate on finance until recently focused primarily on 
‘Western’ legal systems, paying only little attention to financial arrangements 
and techniques to finance business organisation in other legal systems, nota-
bly in the Islamic legal tradition. Western jurisdictions are more and more 
confronted with financial arrangements that are based on principles stem-
ming from Islamic Law, raising the question how these finance structures 
can be aligned with and fitted into, for example, the Dutch legal system. This 
may be problematic due to differences in legal approaches and legal culture. 
However, the study by Omar Salah on Islamic finance clearly demonstrates 
that this does not need to be the case, since he concludes that structures of 
Islamic finance portrayed in his study, are admissible under Dutch law. Vice 
versa, until now Islamic finance structures are often governed by English Law. 
This study shows that there are no serious legal impediments that Islamic 
finance contracts could be drafted under and governed by Dutch law.
The editors of the Center for Company Law Series highly recommend 
Omar Salah’s innovative book ‘Sukuh Structures: Legal Engineering under 
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This book is on Islamic finance, in particular on sukuk (Islamic securities), 
under Dutch private law. It has been written in order to obtain a PhD at Tilburg 
Law School, Tilburg University. Researching and writing this dissertation not 
only allows me to become a Doctor of Philosophy, but it has also given me a 
better understanding of the significance of becoming a Philosophiae Doctor in 
its original Greek meaning: love of wisdom.
The journey towards this love of wisdom started off in the final year of my 
law studies when I was writing my master’s thesis and working as a teaching 
and research assistant at the Property and Insolvency Law practice group of 
the Private Law Department. Professor Reinout Vriesendorp and Professor 
Reinout Wibier invited me to write a PhD proposal based on the subject of my 
master’s thesis: Islamic finance law. Back then I could not wait to become a 
practising lawyer. However, during the process of writing my master’s thesis I 
found both doing research and the topic of my master’s thesis fascinating. So 
I combined doctoral research with practising law. During the first two years 
of my doctoral programme (October 2009-August 2011), I was a PhD candi-
date at Tilburg University, while being affiliated with De Brauw Blackstone 
Westbroek. In the following two and half years of my doctoral programme 
(September 2011-February 2014), I worked as a lawyer (advocaat) at De Brauw 
Blackstone Westbroek and worked on my dissertation mainly in the evenings 
(or to put it more accurately, late nights/early mornings) and weekends. This 
book could not have been written without the support of many people, only a 
few of whom I am able to mention in this preface. This does not mean that the 
support of those unmentioned is not equally appreciated.
I would first like to thank my supervisors Professor Reinout Vriesendorp and 
Professor Reinout Wibier. Their supervision and guidance has been crucial. 
Both supervisors have been able to inspire me, motivate me, and guide me 
in the best way possible. I am extremely grateful to both of them. Although 
I do acknowledge that the time frame for writing this book was completely 
self-imposed, both supervisors knew how to ensure that I did not lose sight 
of it. During the first two years of the process, Professor Reinout Wibier used 
to ask me on a daily basis: “Is het boek al af? (“Is the book finished yet?”). He 
even made sure to remind me of this while he was visiting me in London in 
the summer of 2010 during my secondment with King & Spalding. After two 
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years, I continued my career at De Brauw Blackstone Westbroek. Within a 
few months, Professor Reinout Vriesendorp sent me a text message from a 
conference in Italy to announce that he would be joining De Brauw Blackstone 
Westbroek as well. In those subsequent two and half years, he reminded me 
almost on a daily basis what a relief it would be for me when I handed in 
my dissertation so that I could focus on my career as a lawyer. After having 
attended his lectures on property and insolvency law from the very first years 
of my law degree onwards, having worked with him as a teaching and research 
assistant as a young student, and writing a dissertation under his supervision, 
it was an honour to learn the very first skills as lawyer from him as well.
In this preface I also would like to make a confession. Although my official 
PhD programme was planned for 5 years combined with practising law, accord-
ing to my hidden agenda I had to write my dissertation in 2 years and join 
De Brauw Blackstone Westbroek afterwards. However, being too eager also 
has its downsides. As if writing a dissertation in two years was not ambitious 
enough, I was determined to experience the life of an academic at Tilburg 
University to the fullest. So I decided to give lectures at Tilburg University 
and guest lectures at Maastricht University and Leiden University, spend 
some time abroad as one would expect from a true academic in the field of 
international finance law, and speak at international conferences and publish 
extensively. Not surprisingly, I failed to submit my dissertation after those two 
years but my growth as an academic and as a person made sure that I did not 
regret that for a single moment.
I would like to thank my colleagues at Tilburg University who directly or indi-
rectly contributed to my dissertation. I thank Professor Theo Raaijmakers, 
Professor Eric Tjon Tjin Tai, Professor Bert van Schaick, Professors Maurits 
Barendrecht and Dr Gijs van Dijck for their involvement. I thank Dr Vanessa 
Mak, who I used to share an office with, for the valuable discussions. I would 
like to thank Professor Jan Vranken in particular for motivating me to start 
working on a PhD in the first place and for his continued involvement after-
wards. The unexpected and unannounced meetings and discussions with 
Professor Herman Schoordijk were inspirational and it is an honour to pub-
lish my dissertation in the Schoordijk Instituut Series which is named after 
him. I also would like to thank Tilburg Graduate Law School for teaching 
me how to conduct proper legal research. In addition, I thank the European 
Banking Center, in particular Professor Thorsten Beck, Professor Steven 
Onega and Professor Sylvester Eijffinger, for their involvement and discus-
sions on the subject. Finally, I thank Ineke Sijtsma, former English editor at 
Tilburg University, for her comments on very early drafts of the dissertation.
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In 2010, I worked as a Visiting Researcher at the University of Oxford thanks 
to Dr Vanessa Mak and Professor Stefan Vogenauer who welcomed me at the 
Institute of European and Comparative Law at the University of Oxford. I 
would like to thank Professor Louise Gullifer and Professor John Cartwright 
for the insightful discussions. In 2011, I worked as a Visiting Researcher at 
the University of Melbourne thanks to Professor Reinout Vriesendorp and 
Professor Ian Ramsay. I am grateful to Professor Abdullah Saeed for wel-
coming me as a Visiting Researcher at the National Centre of Excellence for 
Islamic Studies Australia at the University of Melbourne and for sharing his 
views on the subject of my dissertation. I also would like to thank Dr Paul 
Ali for the interesting discussions on international finance law. While being 
in Melbourne, I was invited by Dr Ishaq Bhatti to teach an Islamic Finance 
Professional Development Course on Islamic Finance at La Trobe University, 
who I would like to thank for his warm welcome and hospitality. Finally, I 
thank the Australia-Netherlands Research Collaboration which made the aca-
demic visit to Melbourne possible by granting me the PhD Overseas Travel 
Fellowship for the Australia-Netherlands Research Collaboration.
I thank Professor Abdullah Saeed and Professor Mohamed Ariff who invit-
ed me to speak at the ‘Foundation of Islamic Finance Series Conferences’ in 
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in 2011. I thank Professor Saadiah Mohamad from 
the Universiti Teknologi MARA (UiTM) for the discussions on Islamic finance 
and for her hospitality while I was in Malaysia. I also would like to thank 
Professor René Smits who invited me to speak at a seminar on ‘Legal Risks 
and Good Governance for Central Banks’ at the University of Cambridge 
in 2012 and for inspiring me from the very first day we met in The Hague. 
Furthermore, I thank Professor Jan Biemans (who I met as a colleague at De 
Brauw Blackstone Westbroek) for his support with regard to my dissertation.
In 2010, I was also on a secondment at the Middle East & Islamic Finance 
practice group of law firm King & Spalding in London. It was a pleasure to 
work alongside the lawyers of this firm who have great expertise in Islamic 
finance. I would like to thank Isam Salah, Jawad Ali and Mike Rainey for wel-
coming me to the firm. I would like to thank Kevin Conway, John Clay Taylor, 
Elizabeth Lyon and Asal Saghari for their hospitality and all the interesting 
matters we worked on during my secondment.
A special word of thanks goes to my law firm De Brauw Blackstone Westbroek 
for making this dissertation possible and for its continuous and unconditional 
support throughout the process. There are a few people who I would like to 
mention in particular. Sjoerd Eisma, Berend Crans, Niek Biegman and Ernest 
Meyer Swantée showed their support and involvement at an early stage and, 
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among other things, made the secondment with King & Spalding possible. 
Thanks goes to Marc Ynzonides (who has been my PhD mentor inside the 
firm) and Kees Peijster (who is my supervising principal (patroon)) for sup-
porting me since the day I joined the firm as a lawyer. I would like to thank 
Ruud Hermans and Berto Winters not only for their support with regard to 
my dissertation while I was with the Litigation and Arbitration practice group 
of the firm, but also for teaching me how to become a litigator. I am very 
grateful to Professor Martin van Olffen for his discussions on the corporate 
law aspects of my dissertation and for his comments on earlier drafts. I also 
thank Professor Harm-Jan de Kluiver for the discussions on the corporate 
law aspects of my dissertation. Furthermore, I would like to thank Stephen 
Machon, English editor at De Brauw Blackstone Westbroek, for his comments 
on my dissertation. Finally, I would like to thank the staff at the Business 
Support of De Brauw Blackstone Westbroek.
My master’s thesis which I defended on 29 September 2009 titled “Islamic 
Finance: Structuring Sukuk in the Netherlands” was a preamble to this book. 
It was awarded the Harry Honée Master’s Thesis Award 2008/2009. My mas-
ter’s thesis was also awarded the RIMO Master’s Thesis Award 2009/2010. 
I would like to thank Stichting Harry Honée Fonds and Vereniging RIMO for 
acknowledging my work back then and I hope that I can live up to any expecta-
tions raised after that with my dissertation.
I thank the members of my PhD Committee, Emeritus Professor Hans Visser, 
Professor Louise Gullifer, Professor Rieme-Jan Tjittes, Dr Paul Ali and Dr 
Vanessa Mak for reviewing my dissertation. I also thank Eleven International 
Publishing, part of Boom juridische uitgevers, for publishing my dissertation.
Most importantly, I would like to thank my family and close ones for their 
ongoing love, support, and understanding. The love, care, and guidance of my 
parents, Salahuddin Salah and Mashaal Salah-Najib, and my siblings, Khibar 
Salah, Lemar Salah, Lema Salah, and Maiwand Salah, are with me with at 
every step in life. To them I owe every achievement in life. I also would like to 
thank Nathalie Bruyn for her unconditional love and I hope that I will always 
be able to stand as firmly beside her as she has beside me.
I dedicate this book to my parents who taught me the true meaning of love, 
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1.1 Introduction to the Subject of the Study
Islamic finance gained much interest in both academia and practice in the 
first decade of the 21st century. In this study the possibilities for a specific 
Islamic finance product, sukuk, will be explored under Dutch private law.
1.1.1 Islamic Finance
Islamic finance as known today is a product of the 20th century. However, 
the practice of Islamic finance dates back to medieval times. Islamic finance 
contracts such as musharaka and mudarabah were discussed in detail by early 
scholars, such as Ibn Rushd, also known as Averroes.1 The centuries-old prac-
tice of Islamic finance fell into disuse during the period of European colonial 
empires.2 Modern-day Islamic finance arose after the independence of Muslim 
countries in the second half of the 20th century. Certainly, the renaissance of 
Islamic finance occurred in the Islamic world. It would, however, be inaccu-
rate to reach the conclusion that Islamic finance is only a product of Islamic 
jurisdictions. The United States of America and Europe, the United Kingdom 
in particular, have contributed extensively to the growth of the Islamic finance 
industry. As a result, Islamic finance is not an exotic form of finance but is 
part of a range of finance schemes in the international world of finance.
As a starting point, Islamic finance is similar to conventional finance. 
However, in addition to financial, accounting and tax considerations, Islamic 
finance has to meet the rules of Islamic law, the Shari’ah.3 In essence, all 
Islamic finance transactions should meet three Islamic law requirements: 
(i) the transactions cannot relate to haram activities (activities that are regarded 
1 Abu al-Walid Muhammad ibn Ahmad ibn Rushd (1126-1198) or in short Ibn Rushd – in the Medieval 
West known as Averroes – was a well-known judge (qadi), but also a philosopher and a physician. 
He was a master in law and jurisprudence, theology, philosophy, mathematics and the sciences of 
medicine. Ibn Rushd is regarded as one of the most important Islamic philosophers. For his work 
on Islamic finance contracts, see Ibn Rushd (Nyazee) 1996.
2 Vogel & Hayes 1998, pp. 4-5.
3 In this study, the terms ‘Islamic law’ and ‘Shari’ah’ are used as synonyms of each other. Another 
term used in the literature is ‘Islamic Shari’ah’ to stress that reference is made to Islamic law and 
not to any (other) law or set of rules. In this book the word ‘Shari’ah’ will always refer to Islamic law.
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immoral); (ii) the receipt and payment of riba (in short: interest) is forbidden 
and (iii) gharar (contractual uncertainty) should be avoided as much as pos-
sible. On the basis of these three Islamic finance principles, several Islamic 
finance contracts and Islamic finance products are structured. One such prod-
uct is sukuk.4
1.1.2 Sukuk
Sukuk are one of the most well-known Islamic finance products. Sukuk are 
Islamic securities. Conventional shares are regarded as Shari’ah-compliant 
financial instruments within Islamic finance law. However, conventional 
bonds are not Shari’ah-compliant mainly due to the payment of interest to 
bond holders. Furthermore, as a result of the prohibition of riba, the trade in 
debt claims is also prohibited under Islamic finance law. When bond hold-
ers trade conventional bonds in secondary markets, they trade in debt claims, 
which results in a violation of the ban on riba. As an answer to the need for a 
Shari’ah-compliant alternative to conventional bonds, sukuk entered the capi-
tal markets. This also explains the extensive use of the term ‘Islamic bonds’ 
when addressing sukuk.
The term ‘Islamic bond’ may, however, be misleading because sukuk differ 
from conventional bonds. The main differences between sukuk and conven-
tional bonds are: (i) a sukuk transaction cannot contain the payment of inter-
est; and (ii) sukuk holders must hold some degree of ownership in the under-
lying property of the sukuk transaction. Islamic finance contracts are used to 
generate profit in a sukuk transaction: revenues are realised through the use 
of partnerships (as a result of which the returns are not fixed, contrary to the 
payment of interest) or through the trade in tangible property (whereby money 
is not traded with money, contrary to the payment of interest). The profits 
realised are paid to sukuk holders as the periodical payments over the sukuk, 
instead of interest as is the case with conventional bonds. Furthermore, the 
sukuk holders hold some degree of ownership in the underlying tangible prop-
erty of the sukuk transaction according to Islamic finance rules. Consequently, 
while trading sukuk in secondary markets, they are deemed to be trading in 
the underlying tangible property, instead of (merely) trading in debt claims.
4 The word ‘sukuk’ is the plural of the Arabic word ‘sakk’, which means (financial) certificate. In Islamic 




1.2 Purpose and Relevance of the Study
The purpose of this study is to analyse the legal aspects of sukuk structures 
under Dutch private law. From a practical perspective, this study provides 
Dutch legal practice insight into the possibilities to issue sukuk under Dutch 
law. The sukuk market is showing an incredible growth. The Netherlands has 
not entered the sukuk market yet. A sukuk issuance under Dutch law might 
offer participants in the Dutch banking and finance practice opportunities 
to attract funding from a pool of investors, which is rather new to the Dutch 
banking and finance practice. From an academic perspective, this study pro-
vides an in-depth analysis of the legal structure of sukuk and its interaction 
with Dutch private law. Not only does this research illustrate how these two 
can interact, but studying the interaction of an Islamic finance instrument 
and Dutch law might also lead to a better understanding of the Islamic legal 
system and the Dutch legal system.
1.2.1 Growth of the Islamic Finance Industry and Sukuk Market
1.2.1.1 Islamic Finance Industry
The growth of the Islamic finance industry has been remarkable. The 1970s 
are generally taken as the starting point of the current Islamic finance market. 
In the last 40 years, the Islamic finance market has grown to a trillion-US-
dollar industry. In 2012, the actual global size of the Islamic finance industry 
was estimated to be USD 1.631 trillion, with an annual growth rate of 20.2% 
compared to 2011.5 One should not overlook the fact that it concerns a growth 
in times of economic turmoil. As appears from the growth figures, the Islamic 
finance industry was not directly affected by the financial crisis of 2007.6 It 
would, however, be naïve to expect that the Islamic finance industry was com-
pletely unaffected by a financial crisis as witnessed in 2007.7
It has also been argued that the use of Islamic finance could have avoided the 
financial crisis. The question to the exact impact of Islamic finance on the finan-
cial crisis is not dealt with in this study. Nonetheless, the question does illustrate 
5 Global Islamic Finance Report 2013, p. 35.
6 Global Islamic Finance Report 2011, p. 34.
7 The impact of the financial crisis of 2007 was felt throughout the world. So it was in Islamic coun-
tries and so it was in the Islamic finance market. For example, as a result of the financial crisis, a 
sukuk issued by real estate developer Nakheel had to be restructured, which caused disturbance in 
capital markets referred to as the ‘Dubai debt crisis’. For more on the Dubai debt crisis and the legal 
structure of the Nakheel sukuk, see Salah 2010b.
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the relevance of and the interest for Islamic finance both from an academic and 
societal perspective.8
In recent years, several European jurisdictions entered the Islamic finance 
market. The United Kingdom has made amendments to its laws since 2003 
to promote Islamic finance. As a result, London has taken a leading position 
in the world of Islamic finance. France proposed amendments to its laws to 
make the issuance of sukuk possible. Luxembourg is amending its tax laws 
and promoting the possibilities for Islamic finance products. Germany took 
a head start with the first Western sukuk issuance in 2004. The first Islamic 
private bank, the Faisal bank, was incorporated in 2006 in Switzerland. The 
Netherlands is, however, lagging behind these developments in the financial 
markets.
1.2.1.2 Sukuk Market
Within the Islamic finance market, the market for sukuk has been promis-
ing. The value of global aggregate sukuk for the period of January 1996 to 
September 2012 is estimated to be USD 396.4 billion.9 The sukuk market was 
at its most active between 2010 and 2012.10 In 2012, global sukuk issuance 
reached a record USD 144 billion.11 Initially, most sukuk were issued by (semi-)
governmental entities (referred to as sovereign issues). By 2008, however, 56% 
of all sukuk were issued by corporate entities (referred to as corporate issues).12 
In 2012, the number of corporate issues was still higher than the number of 
sovereign issues, but sovereign issues held an estimated 54% market share of 
amount issued.13
From a geographical perspective, Malaysia has taken the lead in the sukuk 
market, followed by the GCC countries, the United Arab Emirates in particu-
lar. Another important player is the United Kingdom. By September 2012, 42 
sukuk were listed on the London Stock Exchange, raising a total amount of 
USD 27 billion through sukuk issuance.14 The United Kingdom unveiled its 
plans to issue its first sukuk in 2014.15 In addition, there have also been some 
sukuk issues in other Western countries. The first sukuk issued in Europe 
8 For more on the impact of Islamic finance on the credit crunch and vice versa, see Wibier & Salah 
(Islamic Finance and the Influence of Religion on the Law) 2011, with further references to the 
literature.
9 Thomson Reuters Zawya Sukuk Perceptions and Forecast Study 2013, p. 58.
10 Ibid., p. 8.
11 Global Islamic Finance Report 2013, p. 38.
12 Global Islamic Finance Report 2011, p. 69. The percentage of 56 corporate issues corresponds with 
the estimations of the IIFM Sukuk Report on 30 June 2009, see IIFM Sukuk Report 2010, p. 16.
13 Thomson Reuters Zawya Sukuk Perceptions and Forecast Study 2013, p. 64.
14 Ibid., p. 69.
15 Watt, The Guardian, 29 October 2013.
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was the Saxony-Anhalt Sukuk which was issued by the German state Saxony-
Anhalt in 2004. In the United States of America, several sukuk have been 
issued so far, for example, a sukuk issued by General Electric in 2009.16
1.2.2 The Practice of Islamic Finance and the Netherlands
Historically, Dutch banks have contributed to the practice of Islamic finance. 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the Netherlands Trading Society 
(Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij) was allowed to establish itself in Jeddah, 
Saudi Arabia, to provide interest-free money-exchange services to pilgrims 
from Dutch Indonesia.17 The Netherlands Trading Society was one of the pre-
decessors of ABN AMRO. In 1977, ABN AMRO established the Saudi Hollandi 
Bank.18 Today, the Saudi Hollandi Bank is active in the field of Islamic finance 
with, for example, a sukuk issuance in 2009 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.19
In recent years, Dutch banks such as ING and ABN AMRO have offered 
Islamic finance products. These products were not offered in the Netherlands, 
but they were offered in Southeast Asia, in Malaysia in particular.20 In 2010, 
ABN AMRO moved its Middle East operations to the DIFC. Due to the impor-
tance of Islamic finance in this region, ABN AMRO was considering offering 
Islamic finance retail products in the United Arab Emirates. The activities 
discussed illustrate that Dutch banks have been active in the Islamic finance 
market outside the Netherlands.
When discussing the Islamic finance market in the Netherlands, a distinc-
tion should be made between the retail banking market and the investment 
banking market. Most of the discussions with regard to Islamic finance in the 
Netherlands have been focused on the retail banking market so far. Rabobank 
studied the potential demand for Islamic banking among households in the 
Netherlands. A study of the Dutch Central Bank (De Nederlandsche Bank) 
and of the Dutch financial services regulatory authority (Autoriteit Financiële 
Markten) on, inter alia, Islamic finance mortgages showed that there is a 
demand for Islamic finance in the Netherlands due to the growing Muslim 
16 For more on the legal structure of the sukuk issued by General Electric, see Rainey & Salah 2011, 
pp. 113-131.
17 Islamic Finance in Europe 2007, p. 2.
18 Saudi Hollandi Bank was established as a joint stock company by ABN AMRO. ABN AMRO is still 
holding 40% of the shares of Saudi Hollandi Bank. The remaining 60% of the shares are held by 
Saudi nationals. See Saudi Hollandi Bank, Annual Report 2012, pp. 8 & 71.
19 For a description of the structure of the sukuk issued by Saudi Hollandi Bank, see Salah 2010c, pp. 
507-517.
20 Islamic Banking and Finance: Insight on Possibilities for Europe 2009, p. 40.
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population.21 Several tax impediments, however, obstructed the emergence of 
an Islamic retail banking market in the Netherlands.22
The investment banking side has not received serious thought in the 
Netherlands yet. To a modest extent, there have been some activities on the 
Islamic investment banking side in the Netherlands: ABN AMRO and the 
Liechtensteinische Landesbank launched a structured investment product 
called LLB Top 20 Middle East Total Return Index Certificate in 2007 and 
Barclays launched three Amsterdam-listed Islamic investment products in 
2008.23 However, there have not been any other activities on the investment 
banking side yet. Most Dutch entities are unfamiliar with the Islamic invest-
ment banking market. Nonetheless, there seems to be a demand for Islamic 
finance in the Netherlands.24 In addition, Islamic finance products might be an 
attractive instrument to attract funding from Islamic jurisdictions. In 2009, 
Saudi Arabia expressed its intention to invest billions in the Netherlands.25 
Sukuk is a financial instrument that could attract or facilitate such funding.
In the Netherlands there has not been a sukuk issuance by a Dutch entity 
yet. The issuer of the German Saxony-Anhalt Sukuk mentioned above was a 
Dutch foundation (stichting) in 2004. The entire structure was, however, initi-
ated by the German state Saxony-Anhalt. Hence, the issuance is regarded as a 
German issuance. An interesting question is whether a Dutch governmental 
or corporate entity could raise money through the issuance of sukuk under 
Dutch law. To date, there has not been a study that deals with the possibilities 
for sukuk under Dutch law.26
1.2.3 Islamic Finance in the World of Academia
The practice of Islamic finance dates from medieval times and so do the very 
first studies dealing with Islamic finance contracts.27 With the emergence of 
Islamic finance in the second half of the 20th century, most of the work ini-
tially focused on Islamic economics and the concept of riba and zakat (a form 
21 DNB Report (Islamic Finance and Supervision: An Exploratory Analysis) 2008, pp. 21-24.
22 For more on these tax issues under Dutch law, see Sinke 2007; Kranenborg & Talal 2007, pp. 1259-
1267; Hooft & Muller 2008, pp. 624-632; Kranenborg & Sinke 2009a, pp. 770-779; Kranenborg & 
Sinke 2009b, pp. 5-13.
23 DNB Report (Islamic Finance and Supervision: An Exploratory Analysis) 2008, p. 24.
24 Ibid., pp. 21-24.
25 Daling, Het Financieele Dagblad, 6 October 2009.
26 The only study that deals with this question is Salah 2010a, which can be regarded as a preamble to 
this work.
27 Ibn Rushd, for example, discussed Islamic finance contracts in the 12th century, see Ibn Rushd 
(Nyazee) 1996. His work contains a compilation of the different schools of Islamic law, denoting 
that much was written on these contracts by Islamic scholars before his time.
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of alms).28 Islamic banking gained attention as a branch of Islamic economics. 
With the exception of some early works,29 most of the studies dealing with 
Islamic finance started to appear from the 1990s onwards. Certainly, Islamic 
finance is still a relatively new subject in the world of academia. Nonetheless, 
much has been written on the subject in the last 20 years.30
From an academic perspective, the focus of most of the studies has been on 
Shari’ah-related issues and on Islamic economic theories. In addition, several 
works appeared on the practice of Islamic finance in recent years.31 Although 
Islamic jurisprudence is discussed extensively in the literature, not much has 
been written on the legal aspects of Islamic finance, that is, on the interac-
tion of Islamic finance with the law of a jurisdiction that governs the Islamic 
finance contracts. Only some authors have contributed to the legal aspects of 
Islamic finance.32 Even more peculiar are studies dealing with sukuk. Even 
though the sukuk market’s incredible growth is proof of much activity in prac-
tice, not much has been written on sukuk in the literature.33 In the Dutch lit-
erature several studies have appeared on Islamic finance.34 The developments 
in the Netherlands are dissimilar to the developments in the rest of the world: 
Islamic finance has gained attention in academia, while it has not taken off in 
practice yet.
The focus of this study is on the legal structure of sukuk under Dutch law. 
Three aspects of Islamic finance that have not gained much attention in the 
literature are discussed: (i) the legal aspects of Islamic finance; (ii) sukuk; and 
(iii) the possibilities for sukuk under Dutch law. There seems to be an oppor-
tunity to contribute to the world of academia at the intersection of these three 
aspects because all three aspects have been underexposed in the literature.
28 See Rahman 1942; Ahmad 1947; Al-Sadr 1961; Mannan 1970; Udovitch 1970; Nur 1978; Mawdudi 
1979; Siddiqi 1981.
29 One of the most notably early works in the field of Islamic finance is Aghnides 1916. Another early 
study is Uzair 1955.
30 For some  of the most important works in the field of modern-day Islamic finance, see Saleh 1986; 
Saeed 1996; Vogel & Hayes 1998; Usmani 2002; El-Gamal 2006; Ayub 2007.
31 For some examples, see Thomas, Cox & Kraty 2005; Iqbal & Mirakhor 2006; Archer & Karim 2007; 
Hassan & Lewis 2007; Ali 2008.
32 For one of the few studies dealing with Islamic finance from a legal perspective, see Thani, Abdullah 
& Hassan 2003. Furthermore, some papers have been written on the legal aspects of Islamic 
finance, see McMillen 2007; McMillen 2008; Salah 2010b; Salah 2010c; Salah 2011c; Salah 2012.
33 There have been several papers on sukuk in literature, but an entire study on the subject is rather 
exceptional. The few complete studies on sukuk are Adam & Thomas 2004; Ariff, Iqbal & Mohamad 
2012.
34 Sinke 2007; Kranenborg & Talal 2007, pp. 1259-1267; Hooft & Muller 2008, pp. 624-632; Tjittes 2008, 
pp. 136-144; El-Idrissi 2008, pp. 39-42; Vine et al. 2008, pp. 414-423; Kranenborg & Sinke 2009a, 
pp.  770-779; Kranenborg & Sinke 2009b, pp. 5-13; Salah 2010a; Salah 2010d, pp. 271-272; Salah 
2010e, pp. 629-638; Wibier & Salah 2010, pp. 1738-1746; Salah 2011a; Salah 2011b, pp. 148-158.
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1.3 Research Question and Theoretical Framework
The research question of this study is
How can sukuk transactions be structured under Dutch private law and what 
Islamic and Dutch legal issues arise when structuring sukuk under Dutch 
 private law?
Before being able to answer this question, some sub-questions need to be 
answered. The following sub-questions are dealt with in this study:
1. What is Islamic law and in what way does it contribute to Islamic finance?
2. In what way have Islamic finance principles such as riba and gharar had an 
influence on Islamic finance contracts?
3. What are the Islamic finance rules for Islamic finance contracts?
4. What are the Islamic finance rules for sukuk and how are sukuk structures 
legally structured?
5. How is the ownership of the underlying property in a sukuk transaction 
transferred to sukuk holders under Islamic finance law?
6. How can sukuk structures be structured under Dutch property, contract, 
corporate and bankruptcy law?
7. In what way can the Islamic finance requirement that the ownership of the 
underlying property in a sukuk transaction should be transferred to sukuk 
holders be met under Dutch property law?
Islamic finance is based on Islamic law. The first sub-question deals with Islamic 
law and Islamic jurisprudence. After discussing Islamic law, I will elaborate on 
Islamic finance principles such as riba and gharar. These principles impact the 
rules of Islamic private law, that is, Islamic property and contract law. Within 
Islamic finance, nominate Islamic finance contracts are used. Islamic finance 
principles (such as riba and gharar) and the rules of Islamic private law deter-
mine the rules applicable to Islamic finance contracts (sub-questions 2 and 3).
The Islamic finance contracts are, in turn, used to structure sukuk. Sub-
question 4 deals with the legal structure of sukuk transactions and the Islamic 
finance rules that should be taken into consideration while structuring sukuk. 
I will discuss the legal structure of different types of sukuk. Before being able 
to assess sukuk structures under Dutch law, I will also assess how the owner-
ship of the underlying property in a sukuk transaction is transferred to sukuk 
holders under Islamic finance law (sub-question 5).
Finally, I will assess the sukuk structures discussed in this study under 
Dutch law (sub-questions 6 and 7). I will assess whether, and if so how, 
the Islamic finance rules for sukuk can be respected under Dutch property, 
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contract, corporate and bankruptcy law (sub-question 6). I will in particular 
focus on whether, and if so how, the Islamic finance requirement that the 
ownership of the underlying property in a sukuk transaction should be trans-
ferred to sukuk holders can be met under Dutch property law (sub-question 7). 
It should be noted that my assessment under Dutch law is limited to Dutch 
private law. Dutch private law aspects are discussed with a main focus on 
property, contract, bankruptcy and corporate law. Dutch tax law is not dealt 
with in this study.35 Regulatory issues and private international law are not 
discussed either in this study.
I acknowledge that private international law issues may arise in legal prac-
tice while structuring sukuk, sukuk being an international financial instru-
ment. I also acknowledge that in practice sukuk documentation is often 
governed by English law. In this study, however, I would like to explore the 
possibilities for sukuk under Dutch law. Therefore, the starting point of each 
sukuk structure is the hypothetical situation where a Dutch legal entity initi-
ates a sukuk transaction through the use of underlying property located in the 
Netherlands, in which all transaction documents are governed by Dutch law.
1.4 Methods of Research
Before being able to assess sukuk under Dutch law, the Islamic basis for 
sukuk and its implementation in practice should be discussed. With regard 
to the Islamic basis for sukuk, I have mainly studied secondary sources on 
Islamic law and on the development of Islamic jurisprudence. Most of the 
original sources are in the Arabic language and due to a language barrier, 
English translations of these sources have been studied. In addition, being a 
Netherlands trained lawyer I lack the qualifications to interpret the original 
sources as a religious scholar. Therefore, reference to the religious texts has 
been kept to a minimum.
In this study I have discussed the Islamic requirements for Islamic finance 
as legal rules. Where ‘translation’ of the religious requirements into legal 
rules was required, I have made a modest attempt to do so. I, however, do not 
claim to have the religious qualifications to answer religious questions. After 
having made a ‘translation’ of the religious requirements into legal rules, I 
have treated Islamic law as a system of rules. While doing this, I have focused 
35 Dutch tax law has an economic approach towards finance transactions (whereby the economic 
substance of a transaction prevails over its formal legal structure). Therefore, Dutch tax law does 
not seem to raise major issues while structuring sukuk in the Netherlands. For more on the tax law 
aspects of sukuk under Dutch law, see Rozendal & Westhoff (Islamitisch bankieren: Van religieuze 
principes naar financiële transactiestructuren) 2011; Muller (Islamitisch bankieren: Van religieuze princ-
ipes naar financiële transactiestructuren) 2011.
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on Islamic jurisprudence with regard to Islamic property, contract, corporate 
and finance law.
Where reference is made to the practice of sukuk structures, such refer-
ence is based on an analysis of prospectuses and offering circulars of sukuk. 
The selection of these documents is based on: (i) the type of sukuk structure; 
and (ii) the geographical location of the entity that initiated the sukuk issu-
ance. As far as (i) is concerned, there are different types of sukuk structures. 
For the purposes of this book, the sukuk al-musharaka, the sukuk al-murabaha 
and the sukuk al-ijarah have been assessed. In practice, the sukuk al-murabaha 
has been used least so far.36 Furthermore, offering circulars of the sukuk al-
murabaha are usually not publicly available, since such sukuk are often private 
placements.37 Therefore, I have not been able to include offering circulars of 
the sukuk al-murabaha while referring to the practice of sukuk. The offering 
circulars studied in this book are those of the sukuk al-ijarah and the sukuk 
al-musharaka. The offering circulars of both types of sukuk have been includ-
ed in this study to provide a representative understanding of the practice of 
sukuk. As far as the geographical location of the entity that initiated the sukuk 
issuance is concerned as referred to under (ii), the country of issuance may 
have impact on the structure of the sukuk issued. The religious texts have been 
interpreted differently by Islamic scholars in different countries. The most 
notable differences in the interpretation of the religious texts are between the 
Islamic scholars located in Malaysia and the Islamic scholars located in the 
Middle East. Therefore, offering circulars from both regions have been ana-
lysed in this book in order to ensure that possible deviations in interpretations 
are included while addressing the practice of sukuk.
A dogmatic legal approach is used for the largest part of this study. The 
focus of this study is on the possibilities of sukuk under Dutch private law. 
While analysing the possibilities for sukuk under Dutch law, a dogmatic legal 
method is used to conduct legal research: Dutch codes, case law, legislative 
history and other sources of law have been studied.
36 IIFM Sukuk Report 2010, p. 25. Some examples are the sukuk al-murabaha issued by Arcapita Bank 
and the sukuk al-murabaha issued by the Saudi Bin Ladin Group in 2010. For more on the Arcapita 
Bank sukuk al-murabaha, see Ayub 2007, pp. 405-406; Clifford Chance DIFC Sukuk Guidebook 2009, 
p. 46. For more on the Saudi Bin Ladin Group sukuk al-murabaha, see Carey, Bloomberg, 17 July 2010; 
AMEinfo, AMEinfo.com, 17 July 2010; Arab News, ArabNews.com, 17 July 2010. The publicly available 
information and literature do not provide much information about the details and the underlying 
transactions of the issued sukuk al-murabaha, see Ayub 2005, p. 362.
37 In case of the Saudi Bin Ladin Group sukuk al-murabaha, for example, it was a private placement to 
Saudi investors, see Carey, Bloomberg, 17 July 2010.
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1.5 Organisation of this Book
In order to understand Islamic finance and Islamic finance products, it is 
essential to have a basic understanding of Islamic law. Therefore, the next 
chapter (Chapter 2) deals with Islamic law, its main sources and the develop-
ment of Islamic jurisprudence. In that chapter, I will discuss how the two 
most important Islamic finance principles (riba and gharar) were developed in 
Islamic jurisprudence and how these principles have formed Islamic private 
law: these principles provide the religious requirements upon which Islamic 
private law was drawn by Islamic scholars.
The most important Islamic finance contracts will be discussed in Chapter 
3. Riba and gharar and the rules of Islamic private law determine the rules 
applicable to Islamic finance contracts. I will describe the Islamic finance 
rules applicable to these contracts. The Islamic finance contracts discussed 
in Chapter 3 are used to structure sukuk. Hence, discussing the applicable 
Shari’ah rules for these contracts also determines the framework for sukuk.
In Chapter 4, different sukuk structures will be addressed. The chapter 
commences with a description of the history of sukuk. Next, the main charac-
teristics of sukuk and its Shari’ah framework will be analysed. In this chapter I 
will describe how the ownership of the underlying property in a sukuk transac-
tion is transferred to sukuk holders under Islamic finance law. The legal struc-
tures of the three most important sukuk transactions (the sukuk al-musharaka, 
the sukuk al-murabaha and the sukuk al-ijarah) are outlined. By formulating 
the Islamic finance rules applicable to each structure, I will create a theoreti-
cal framework for the legal structure of the three sukuk transactions discussed 
in this chapter.
In the following chapter, Chapter 5, the main body of each sukuk structure 
is dealt with separately under Dutch law. Sukuk are issued by the application of 
the Islamic finance contracts discussed in Chapter 3 (such as the contracts of 
musharaka, murabaha or ijarah, which lead to the qualification of the structure 
as sukuk al-musharaka, sukuk al-murabaha or sukuk al-ijarah). In this chapter, 
I will also assess the application of those Islamic finance contracts in each 
sukuk structure under Dutch law. With regard to the sukuk al-musharaka, I 
will assess the incorporation of a musharaka stock company under Dutch cor-
porate law. With regard to the sukuk al-murabaha and the sukuk al-ijarah, I will 
assess the contract of murabaha respectively the contract of ijarah as used in 
the sukuk al-murabaha respectively the sukuk al-ijarah under Dutch contract 
law and Dutch property law.
In Chapter 6, I will discuss the rights of the sukuk holders. I will assess in 
what way the sukuk holders acquire the ownership of the underlying property 
in each of the three addressed sukuk structures under Dutch property law. In 
this chapter, I will also assess the rights of the sukuk holders in each addressed 
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sukuk structure under Dutch bankruptcy law. In closing, a summary and the 
conclusions of this study will be presented in Chapter 7.
13
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In this chapter I discuss the development of Islamic law. I will elaborate on 
what Islamic law is and how Islamic legal rules are formulated by Shari’ah 
scholars. This occurs through Islamic jurisprudence. Within Islamic jurispru-
dence, two principles of Islamic finance have been formulated and developed 
further: riba and gharar. These two Islamic finance principles form the back-
bone of Islamic finance. On the basis of these principles, Shari’ah scholars 
have formulated the specific rules of, what I would like to call, Islamic private 
law. The Islamic finance principles and the rules of Islamic private law deter-
mine the structure of Islamic finance contracts, which, in turn, are used to 
structure sukuk.
2.1 Islamic Law and Jurisprudence
Islamic law within the meaning of Islamic finance is not codified law; it does 
not refer to the black-letter law of any jurisdiction. It refers to a set of rules 
that derived from religious texts. Islamic law and Shari’ah are often used as 
synonyms. From an Islamic perspective, law is regarded to be the command 
of God and the function of Islamic jurisprudence is to discover and formulate 
the terms of that divine command.38 Shari’ah means ‘the way’ or ‘the path to 
the water source’, since it leads mankind to the essence of life.39 The Shari’ah 
has been defined as a guide to ethics, but it might be more appropriate to refer 
to it as the canon law of Islam.40
Islamic law is codified in the legislation of certain jurisdictions, either through 
incorporation in their acts or as a source of law upon which courts can base their 
rulings. In these jurisdictions, Islamic law is codified in black-letter law. As a 
result of such codification, the national legal system of that specific jurisdiction is 
influenced by Islamic law and vice versa. In the context of Islamic finance, refer-
ence to these jurisdictions is not made when Islamic law is addressed.
38 Coulson 1964, p. 75; Hasan (Studies in Islamic Law, Religion and Society) 1989, p. 49; Bannerman 
1988, p. 31.
39 Dien 2004, pp. 35-36; Doi 1984, p. 2.
40 Fyzee 1974, pp. 14-17.
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2.1.1 Sources of Islamic Law
There are two primary sources of Islamic law: the Qur’an and sunnah. In addi-
tion, there are three secondary sources of Islamic law: ijma’, qiyas and ijtihad.
2.1.1.1 Qur’an
The first source of Islamic law is the holy book of the religion, the Qur’an. 
The Qur’an is divided into 114 chapters and each chapter consists of several 
verses, with a total of 6,666 verses.41 Of all these verses, only 500 verses have 
a legal connotation.42 All the other verses contain moral recommendations 
from which broad principles have been deduced.43 The Qur’an is the revealed 
word of God presenting the Islamic beliefs in general form, suitable to chang-
ing circumstances in all times and places.44 It could be regarded as a source of 
inspiration for legislation.45 The primary purpose of the Qur’an is to lay down 
a way of life, which regulates the relationship between humans and humans 
(mu’amalat) and between humans and God (‘ibadat).46
2.1.1.2 Sunnah
The second source of Islamic law is sunnah. Sunnah refers to the practices 
of the Prophet Muhammad, being representative for normative behaviour.47 
Since the principles of Islam as written in the Qur’an were revealed in general 
form, it was the role of the Prophet Muhammad to carry the message and 
elaborate on it.48 The concrete details of sunnah are described in specific had-
ith. Hadith is the narrative of a particular occurrence, while sunnah is the rule 
deduced from the practice of the Prophet.49
2.1.1.3 Ijma’
When the Qur’an and sunnah do not provide an answer to a question, the 
consensus of the majority of the Shari’ah scholars is accepted as a source of 
Islamic law. The consensus of the majority of Islamic scholars is called ijma’. 
Although preferably ijma’ refers to the consensus of the entire community 
(consensus of the umma), practicality and pragmatism lead to the acceptance 
41 Doi 1984, pp. 21-22; Juynboll 1930, pp. 7-8.
42 Doi 1984, p. 36; Bannerman 1988, p. 34; Fyzee 1974, pp. 19-20.
43 Bannerman 1988, p. 34.
44 Ibid.; Hasan (Studies in Islamic Law, Religion and Society) 1989, p. 59.
45 Cf. Hasan (Studies in Islamic Law, Religion and Society) 1989, p. 58.
46 Burton 1990, pp. 9-10; Hasan (Studies in Islamic Law, Religion and Society) 1989, pp. 57-58.
47 Hallaq 2009a, pp. 16-19; Dien 2004, p. 38; Fyzee 1974, p. 20; Hasan (Studies in Islamic Law, Religion 
and Society) 1989, pp. 61-62; Pearl 1979, p. 4.
48 Dien 2004, p. 38; Hallaq 2009a, pp. 16-19; Bannerman 1988, p. 34.
49 Fyzee 1974, p. 20.
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of ijma’ as the consensus of the learned in the Islamic community (consensus 
of the ulema).50
There are two forms of ijma’: historical ijma’ and contemporary ijma’.51 
Historical ijma’ has been documented in the fiqh books throughout ages.52 
To reach contemporary ijma’ on newly arising issues in society, discussions 
should commence, for example, through conferences where all Shari’ah schol-
ars are invited in order to contribute to the process of ijma’.53 The existence 
of an official authority is essential to reach full contemporary ijma’.54 Within 
Islamic finance law, the AAOIFI is an authority that aims to reach contempo-
rary ijma’. In the next chapter, the contributions of the AAOIFI to the develop-
ment of Islamic finance law will be discussed.55
2.1.1.4 Qiyas
In cases where no consensus can be reached, the reasoning of a single Shari’ah 
scholar based on analogy may be accepted as a source of law. Qiyas refers to 
legal analogy, whereby the solution of one case is assimilated and applied to 
a similar case that has no solution.56 The legal reasoning by analogy must, 
however, be based on the Qur’an, sunnah or ijma’.57 Qiyas is regarded to consist 
of four elements: (i) a new case that requires a solution; (ii) an original case 
for which there is a solution in the revealed texts (the Qur’an or sunnah) or by 
consensus (ijma’); (iii) the attribute common to both cases (also referred to as 
the ratio legis, i.e. the true spirit of the law); and (iv) the solution for the original 
case that should be transposed to the new case.58
2.1.1.5 Ijtihad
Several Shari’ah scholars also acknowledge ijtihad as a secondary source of 
Islamic law, after ijma’ and qiyas. Ijtihad means ‘an effort’ and refers to the 
effort of an individual to arrive at an individual judgement.59 Ijtihad is the 
use of one’s logical reasoning and common sense to deduce the true meaning 
of a legal rule in Islamic law.60 In the tenth century, several Islamic scholars 
50 Bannerman 1988, p. 37; Juynboll 1930, p. 38; Hasan (Studies in Islamic Law, Religion and Society) 
1989, p. 67; Fyzee 1974, p. 20.
51 Dien 2004, pp. 46-48; Bannerman 1988, pp. 37; Juynboll 1930, p. 38.
52 Dien 2004, pp. 46-48.
53 Bannerman 1988, p. 37; Juynboll 1930, p. 38; Dien 2004, pp. 46-48; Hallaq 1997, pp. 75-81; Abdal-
Haqq (Understanding Islamic Law: From classical to contemporary) 2006, pp. 17-18.
54 Dien 2004, pp. 46-48; Hallaq 1997, pp. 75-81.
55 See Chapter 3.
56 Dien 2004, pp. 51-53; Doi 1984, p. 70; Bannerman 1988, p. 38; Hallaq 1997, p. 83.
57 Doi 1984, p. 70.
58 Hallaq 2009a, pp. 22-23; Hallaq 1997, p. 83; Aghnides 1916, pp. 67-88.
59 Pearl 1979, p. 14; Doi 1984, p. 78; Dien 2004, pp. 51-53; Weiss 1978, pp. 199-200.
60 Doi 1984, p. 78; Bannerman 1988, p. 38; Pearl 1979, p. 14.
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reached the conclusion that the exercise of ijtihad had exhausted itself and that 
from then on the doors of independent reasoning were closed.61 No one would 
have the necessary qualifications for independent reasoning on Islamic law 
anymore.62 However, recent studies have shown that the doors of ijtihad were 
never closed, that is, that the exercise of ijtihad continued.63
Through a study of the efforts of the different schools of law over centuries, it 
becomes clear that after the times indicated as the closing of ijtihad, the Shari’ah 
scholars continued to perform ijtihad. The use of ijtihad was tacitly approved 
during these centuries. This provides a solid argument for the continuity of the 
practice of ijtihad.64
The Islamic scholar who practises ijtihad is called mujtahid: the interpreter 
who discovers the law, since he does not invent new rules but formulates rules 
that are already present in the revealed texts.65 Every mujtahid can exercise 
ijtihad and no one knows which mujtahid is correct. This is expressed in the 
Islamic maxim ‘every mujtahid is correct’.66 As a result, religious texts are 
interpreted differently by Shari’ah scholars. This has led to inconsistencies 
within Islamic law. At the same time, it has led to development of Islamic law 
and Islamic jurisprudence, since there was room for different interpretations.
2.1.2 Islamic Jurisprudence
Islamic jurisprudence is referred to as fiqh. The purpose of the science of fiqh 
is to discover the true meaning of the objects of Islamic law, the maqasad al-
Shari’ah. The most prominent goals of Islamic law are the protection of life, 
mind, offspring, private property and religion.67 Within commercial transac-
tions, the protection of private property should be held in high regard.
Fiqh can be divided into usul al-fiqh and furu al-fiqh. Usul al-fiqh is proce-
dural Islamic law. It refers to the ‘roots of Islamic jurisprudence’, that is, the 
main sources of Islamic law.68 Shari’ah scholars study the sources of Islamic 
61 Weiss 1978, pp. 199-200; Pearl 1979, pp. 14-15.
62 The position which is taken from then on is that of taqlid (imitation) practised by the muqallid (the 
imitator). Taqlid refers to the acceptance of an Islamic rule, not on the basis of evidence drawn 
directly from the sources, but on the authority of other Shari’ah scholars. See Weiss 1978, pp. 199-
200; Pearl 1979, pp. 14-15.
63 Hallaq 1984, pp. 3-41, with further references to other sources.
64 See Hallaq 1984, pp. 3-41.
65 Weiss 1978, pp. 199-200.
66 Hallaq 2009a, p. 27.
67 Hallaq 2009a, pp. 24-25; Hallaq 1997, p. 89.
68 Juynboll 1930, pp. 32-44; Masud (Studies in Islamic Law, Religion and Society) 1989, pp. 32-33; 
Coulson 1964, pp. 75-76; Hallaq 1997, pp. 30-35; Burton 1990, pp. 15-17.
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law and contribute to Islamic jurisprudence as discussed in the previous sub-
section.69 Furu al-fiqh is substantive Islamic law.70 Since Islamic law is not 
codified, these legal rules are discussed and developed in fiqh books, that is, 
doctrine.71 The Islamic finance principles and the rules of Islamic private law, 
as discussed in Sections 2.2 and 2.3 of this chapter, are substantive rules of 
Islamic law.
The contributions of the Shari’ah scholars throughout the ages have result-
ed in the establishment of different fiqh schools of Islamic law: the madhahib.72 
There is no hierarchy between the different schools of Islamic law. As the 
maxim ‘every mujtahid is correct’ illustrates, each school of law may be correct 
and there is not one single correct interpretation of Islam.73 Therefore, there 
has been much divergence in the interpretation of Islamic law. For example, 
with regard to Islamic finance law, the practice of Islamic finance in Malaysia 
differs from the practice of Islamic finance in Middle Eastern countries due to 
different interpretations of Islamic finance law by different madhahib.
Due to the hardship to study all fiqh books in order to answer a specific 
question, Islamic law provides the possibility to acquire a legal advice from 
a Shari’ah scholar.74 Such advice is called a fatwa: a legal opinion issued by a 
Shari’ah scholar in response to a question posed by an individual.75 Contrary 
to a binding judgment of a judge (qadi), a fatwa issued by a Shari’ah scholar is 
a non-binding legal opinion.76 Within Islamic finance transactions, Shari’ah 
scholars are consulted for a fatwa on the Shari’ah compliance of a transaction. 
A fatwa is issued by a board of Shari’ah scholars. Such board of (often three) 
Shari’ah scholars is referred to as the Shari’ah supervisory board. Once the 
Shari’ah supervisory board has accepted a transaction as Shari’ah-compliant 
in its fatwa, the product can be offered as an Islamic finance product. Shari’ah 
supervisory boards may have different interpretations of Islamic finance law, 
depending on the madhahib they adhere to, resulting in divergence within the 
practice of Islamic finance.
69 See Section 2.1.1 of this chapter.
70 Hallaq 1997, pp. 153-161; Fyzee 1974, p. 23; Masud, Messick & Powers (Islamic Legal Interpretation: 
Muftis and Their Fatwas) 1996, p. 4.
71 Juynboll 1930, pp. 26-29.
72 Ibid., p. 18. There are two main divisions in Islam: Sunni and Shi’a. Four Sunni schools of Islamic law 
are: Hanafi’, Maliki, Shafi’i and Hanbali. Three Shi’a schools of Islamic law are: Ithna ‘Ashari, Isma’ili 
and Zaydi.
73 See Section 2.1.1.5 of this chapter.
74 Juynboll 1930, pp. 29-32.
75 Masud, Messick & Powers (Islamic Legal Interpretation: Muftis and their Fatwas) 1996, p. 4; Juynboll 
1930, pp. 29-32.
76 Masud, Messick & Powers (Islamic Legal Interpretation: Muftis and their Fatwas) 1996, p. 3.
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2.2 Islamic Finance Principles
Through a study of the sources of Islamic law, Shari’ah scholars formulate 
Islamic principles. According to a general principle of Islamic law, all activ-
ities are permissible unless there is an explicit prohibition in the religious 
texts. Within Islamic law, there is a general and explicit prohibition of engage-
ment in haram activities. Haram means illegal under Islamic law and refers to 
immoral activities. It is the opposite of halal, which means legal under Islamic 
law. With regard to Islamic finance, haram activities are investments in 
immoral industries such as the arms, drugs, alcohol, gambling, prostitution 
and pornography industry. As a prerequisite to all transactions, investments 
in and activities relating to industries that are considered haram are forbid-
den. Furthermore, there are two Islamic principles that specifically relate to 
Islamic finance: (i) the prohibition of riba; and (ii) the avoidance of gharar. In 
what follows, these two principles will be discussed in more detail.
2.2.1 Riba
Riba is often divided into three different forms: the riba al-jahiliyya, the riba 
al-fadl and the riba al-nasi’a.77 In fiqh literature there has been much debate 
on the interpretation of riba. The predominant view within fiqh is that any 
increase charged over the principal in a loan transaction is riba. According to 
a dissenting view, the prohibition of riba relates to the exploitation of the eco-
nomically disadvantaged in society, whether the exploitation is in the form of 
interest or any other form of profit made in a transaction.78 The contemporary 
Islamic finance industry is built upon the majority view of the Shari’ah schol-
ars that all forms of interest are prohibited by the prohibition of riba. Without 
engaging in the religious discussions, I will take this view as my starting 
point while discussing the legal aspects of Islamic finance in the following 
chapters. Before doing so, this view needs to be elaborated further.
One of the most discussed verses of the Qur’an with regard to riba is verse 
2:275, according to which God has permitted trade, but prohibited riba:
77 Riba al-jahiliyya refers to riba that was charged during the pre-Islamic period in Arabia. When a 
creditor could not repay his debts at maturity, the debt was doubled and redoubled. This resulted in 
inhuman practices. See Ibn Rushd (Nyazee) 1996, p. 158; Saleh 1986, pp. 13-14; El-Gamal 2006, pp. 
49-50. Riba al-fadl refers to an excess of one of the counter values in an on-the-spot transaction. This 
form of riba is also referred to as riba by way of excess. Riba al-nasi’a, also known as riba by way of 
deferment, refers to riba charged when delivery of one of the counter values is delayed in a transac-
tion. This form of riba is often compared with conventional interest. For more on the different forms 
of riba, see Saeed 1996, pp. 17-40.
78 For a discussion of both views and further references to ( fiqh) literature, see Saeed 1996, pp. 17-40.
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Those who devour [riba] will not stand except as stand one whom the Evil 
one by his touch [h]ath driven to madness. That is because they say: ‘Trade is 
like [riba]’, but Allah hath permitted trade and forbidden [riba]. Those who 
after receiving direction from their Lord, desist, shall be pardoned for the 
past; their case is for Allah (to judge); but those who repeat ([the] offence) are 
companions of the Fire: They will abide therein (for ever).79
The Shari’ah scholars who support the view that all forms of interest are pro-
hibited by the prohibition of riba argue that riba is contrasted in this verse with 
profit resulting from a sale transaction. Therefore, they say, all forms of inter-
est are prohibited, while profit made through sale transactions is permissible. 
Under the rules of Shari’ah, granting a loan is considered an act of charity.80 It 
is improper to make profit on a loan by charging interest to the borrower. This 
does not mean that making profit itself is forbidden within Islam. Quite the 
contrary: Islamic law encourages circulation of wealth, investment and prof-
it.81 Profit must, however, be made through trade and other similar activities. 
A return on investment is only justified when the investor takes a commer-
cial risk. Lending money does not qualify as a commercial risk because the 
risk of non-repayment (poor debtor creditworthiness, for example) is deemed 
insufficient to warrant charging interest.82 Profitability requires taking a real 
commercial risk. As a result, the concept of profit-and-loss-sharing is extreme-
ly important in Islamic finance. Financiers generally do not receive interest 
on the funds they provide, but instead participate in the project to the extent 
that they share in any profits or losses made. The profit-and-loss-sharing ele-
ment of Islamic finance is particularly noticeable in Islamic finance contracts 
such as musharaka and mudarabah. Both Islamic finance contracts will be 
discussed in the next chapter.83
The prohibition of riba reaches even further. Shari’ah-compliant transac-
tions preclude making money with money. Money itself may not be a source of 
profit, because money has no intrinsic value within Islam.84 The ultimate pur-
pose of money is to help fulfil basic needs, such as food, clothes and shelter. 
In this approach money must be seen (and used) only as a means of exchange, 
not as a basic need in itself.85 This position is at the heart of the bay’ al-dayn 
79 Qur’an 2:275 , translation of the Qur’an by Yusuf Ali.
80 Moghul & Ahmed 2003, p. 168.
81 Qur’an 4:29; 2:275.
82 Cf. Hanif 2008, p. 10.
83 See Section 3.1 of Chapter 3.
84 Islamic law does not reject the time value of money. For more on the time value of money within 
Islamic finance, see El-Gamal 2000a, pp. 4-5 & 34-36.
85 There are several hadith on the use of money. For a discussion of these hadith, see El-Gamal 2000a, 
pp. 2-4; Jabbar 2009a, pp. 23-32.
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doctrine, that is, the trade in claims.86 Most Shari’ah scholars agree that the 
prohibition of riba extends to a prohibition of the trade in claims because trad-
ing in claims is similar to the forbidden use of money as a source of profit.87 
This does not mean that claims cannot be transferred at all. Claims can be 
transferred, but only at face value, since any increase or decrease would resem-
ble the forbidden riba.
Concluding, it is permissible to make profit, but the realised profit cannot 
be interest. The decisive feature for this distinction is the asset that is the sub-
ject matter of the transaction: profit is made through trade in tangible prop-
erty, while interest is a form of profit generated through trade in money (intan-
gible property). Furthermore, profitability requires taking a real commercial 
risk from an Islamic perspective and, consequently, there is an emphasis on 
the concept of profit-and-loss-sharing within Islamic finance.
2.2.2 Gharar
The second Islamic finance principle is that gharar should be avoided as much 
as possible within Islamic finance transactions. Gharar is literally translated 
as ‘uncertainty’ or ‘risk’.88 It refers to contractual uncertainty within Islamic 
finance transactions.
The concept of gharar originates from the Qur’anic verse 2:219, which pro-
hibits gambling:
They ask thee concerning wine and gambling. Say: ‘In them is great sin, and 
some profit, for men; but the sin is greater than the profit’. They ask thee how 
much they are to spend; [say]: ‘What is beyond your needs’. Thus doth Allah 
[make] clear to you His [signs]: In order that ye may consider.89
The concept of gharar is further explained in several hadith, giving more sub-
stance to the aim to avoid gharar. Based upon those hadith, specific rules for 
Islamic contract law have been formulated.90 An example of a hadith dealing 
with uncertainty is the following:
86 Usmani 2002, pp. 100-101.
87 The Shari’ah scholars in Malaysia, on the contrary, do not agree with the view that the riba prohi-
bition extends to the trade in claims. They allow claims to be traded (bay’ al-dayn), see Securities 
Commission Shariah Advisory Council 2006, p. 19.
88 Saleh 1986, p. 3; Vogel & Hayes 1998, pp. 87-88; El-Gamal 2000a, pp. 6-8; El-Gamal 2000b, pp. 4-6; 
El-Gamal 2006, pp. 59-60; Ayub 2007, pp. 57-61; Hamoudi 2008, pp. 441-442.
89 Qur’an 2:219, translation of the Qur’an by Yusuf Ali.
90 See Section 2.3 of this chapter.
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Narrated Ibn Umar:
The Prophet said, ‘[h]e who buys foodstuff should not sell it till he has 
 received it’”. 91
On the basis of this hadith, for example, Shari’ah scholars have argued that 
due to the presence of gharar, one cannot sell property before he has received 
it. This is elaborated further within Islamic private law.92 Before discussing 
the rules of Islamic private law, I will discuss the essence of gharar and its 
impact on Islamic finance contracts.
According to the principle of gharar, excessive uncertainty in contracts 
must be avoided as much as possible.93 Islamic law recognises that it is unre-
alistic to completely rule out uncertainty in transactions. In other words, not 
all uncertainty leads to an invalid contract. A contract is invalidated under 
Islamic law due to gharar if the essentials of a contract remain unspecified. 
The gharar doctrine aims to avoid information asymmetry on the essential 
elements of a contract between contracting parties, which could otherwise 
arise if the essential elements of the transaction are not stipulated in the con-
tract. A contract is invalid on the grounds of gharar, if:94
1. the contract is reciprocal, that is, it creates obligations for all contracting 
parties;
2. the gharar relates to the essential elements of the contract, such as the 
price, the delivery, the quality and the quantity of the subject matter of the 
contract;
3. the gharar with regard to the essential elements of the contract is major and 
excessive; and
4. there is no need in society that cannot be met otherwise than through the 
use of major gharar with regard to the essential elements of the contract.
As a result of the gharar doctrine, qimar (gambling) and mayseer (speculation) 
are also discouraged within Islamic law.95 Both words are used identically in 
the Arabic language.96 Qimar and mayseer pertain to yields that depend solely 
on luck or chance, such as gambling. Excessive speculation and gambling are 
prohibited in transactions because profits achieved through them cannot be 
91 Sahih Bukhari, Volume 3, Book 34 on Sales and Trade, Number 343, translated by M.M. Khan.
92 See Section 2.3 of this chapter.
93 Qur’an 2:90; 2:91.
94 Ibn Rushd (Nyazee) 1996, pp. 179-187; Saleh 1986, pp. 52-55; El-Gamal 2006, pp. 58-59; Ayub 2007, 
pp. 57-61; Hamoudi 2008, pp. 441-442; Fadeel (Islamic Finance: Innovation and Growth) 2002, p. 91.
95 Gambling is directly prohibited in the Qur’an. See Qur’an 2:219; 5:90; 5:91.
96 Ayub 2007, p. 61.
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justified. Yet ordinary entrepreneurial risks are not included in this ban. In 
this context, conventional derivative contracts are considered to contain ele-
ments that are akin to speculation and could be prohibited on grounds of 
qimar and mayseer.97
2.2.3 Riba and Gharar in the Light of the Special Contracts of the Dutch Civil 
Code
The prohibition of riba and the avoidance of gharar are less peculiar to Dutch 
law than one might think at first glance. The Netherlands has not been unfa-
miliar with the prohibition of charging interest. As a matter of fact, in order 
to avoid charging interest, a special contract was codified in the former DCC: 
the contract of perpetual interest (overeenkomst van gevestigde of altijddurende 
rente). The former DCC also had a special contract of gaming and betting (over-
eenkomst van spel en weddenschap), dealing with uncertainty in contracts. In 
the light of the principles of riba and gharar, both contracts, which have been 
transferred to the current book 7A DCC, will be discussed in this subsection.
The contract of perpetual interest is a contract whereby a party lends a prin-
cipal which will not be recovered against payment of interest.98 The contract 
dates back from a time when the Catholic Church had a powerful position 
in Dutch society and did not allow the creation of wealth without productive 
effort.99 Therefore, charging interest on a loan was forbidden and considered 
to be a sin. As a result, the contract of perpetual interest was introduced in 
practice. The reasoning was such that money was transferred to the ‘borrow-
er’, who from then on ‘owned’ the money. In consideration for the ‘transfer’, 
the ‘borrower’ would pay perpetual interest to the ‘lender’. However, since 
there was no loan (over which interest had to be paid), this contract was appar-
ently permissible. This does not mean that the principal was not paid back and 
interest was paid until the end of days: the ‘borrower’ was allowed to pay back 
the principal, after which the contract would come to an end.100
Can the contract of perpetual interest be used to structure Islamic finance 
transactions under Dutch law? The roots of the contract of perpetual interest 
relate to a religious prohibition of interest. The contract has this in common 
with Islamic finance transactions, where interest is not permitted either due 
to the prohibition of riba. The rationale for the prohibition of interest in the 
Netherlands is also comparable to the rationale for the prohibition of riba in 
Islamic finance: in both cases, making money without any productive effort 
97 Hanif 2008, p. 10.
98 See Art. 7A:1807 DCC.
99 See Asser/Van Schaick 2012 (7-VIII*), no. 262.
100 See Art. 7A:1808 (1) DCC. See also Asser/Van Schaick 2012 (7-VIII*), no. 264.
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is discouraged. Nonetheless, the contract of perpetual interest is in conflict 
with the prohibition of riba. The payment of money for the use of money is 
impermissible as such due to the prohibition of riba. Therefore, the contract 
of perpetual interest cannot be used to structure Islamic finance transactions.
Another special contract that deserves closer consideration is the contract 
of gaming and betting in book 7A DCC. The contract of gaming and betting 
falls under the aleatory contracts (kansovereenkomsten) under Dutch law. There 
is no definition of the contract of gaming and betting in book 7A DCC. In 
literature the contract has been defined as an aleatory contract that makes the 
chances of parties to profit and loss dependent on an uncertain event, to which 
the parties have no or only different interests before the conclusion of the 
contract.101 No material distinction is made between gaming and betting.102 
According to Articles 7A:1825 and 7A:1828 DCC, the obligations arising from 
such contract are not enforceable. The parties to the contract cannot contractu-
ally agree otherwise because the provisions applicable to the contract of gam-
ing and betting are mandatory law.103 The prevailing view is that the obliga-
tions are natural obligations (natuurlijke verbintenissen) within the meaning 
of Article 6:3 DCC, that is, obligations that cannot be enforced by law.104 The 
obligations of the contract of gaming and betting are not enforceable because 
the contract is regarded as being contrary to good morals, having addictive fea-
tures and having no contribution to society.105 Other contracts with an exces-
sive speculative character may also fall within the scope of the rules applicable 
to the contract of gaming and betting.106
The contract of gaming and betting and its legal regime under Dutch law 
show similarities to the principle of gharar under Islamic law. The principle 
of gharar, however, reaches further than a sole prescript on the avoidance of 
uncertainty or the invalidation of contracts with excessive speculative char-
acteristics. The principle of gharar has determined the substance of Islamic 
contract law. Based on the principle of gharar, concrete rules of Islamic private 
law have been formulated. In the next section, these rules will be discussed.
101 See Asser/Van Schaick 2012 (7-VIII*), no. 280.
102 See Dutch Supreme Court 9 June 1899, W 7296.
103 Art. 7A:1827 DCC.
104 See Asser/Van Schaick 2012 (7-VIII*), no. 289. See Wessels 1988.
105 See Asser/Van Schaick 2012 (7-VIII*), no. 288.
106 See Asser/Van Schaick 2012 (7-VIII*), no. 283, with further references to other sources.
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2.3 Islamic Private Law
Shari’ah scholars have formulated specific rules of Islamic private law based 
on the principles of riba and gharar. Ibn Rushd107 clarified the importance of 
riba and gharar for Islamic private law by saying that the invalidity of contracts 
can have four legal causes:
1. the prohibition of the property itself under Islamic law;
2. riba;
3. gharar; or
4. conditions that lead to one of 2 or 3 or both of them.108
The first legal cause refers to property that is haram. For example, a sale 
contract pursuant to which alcohol is sold is invalid under Islamic law. The 
following three legal causes that invalidate a contract under Islamic law relate 
to riba and gharar. As appears from the enumeration of Ibn Rushd, the legal 
validity of a contract is mainly determined by riba and gharar under Islamic 
private law.
As with most areas of Islamic law, Islamic private law is documented in 
fiqh books, since there has not been a complete codification of Islamic law. The 
rules of Islamic private law can be divided into rules of Islamic property law 
and rules of Islamic contract law. Islamic property law and Islamic contract 
law form the foundation of Islamic finance law and, therefore, determine the 
contents of Islamic finance contracts.
The Mecelle was one of the first attempts to codify parts of Islamic private law. It 
was the civil code of the Ottoman Empire during the 19th and the beginning of the 
20th century. The Mecelle is, however, not in force anymore and is not consulted 
for Islamic finance transactions.
2.3.1 Islamic Property Law
Under Islamic property law, property is called mal. It is defined as a corporeal 
object, the ayn.109 Ayn refers to an existing thing that can be subject to human 
control and that can be determined.110 Everything that is not ayn is referred to 
107 Ibn Rushd (1126-1198), also known as Averroes, was a well-known judge, philosopher and physician. 
See Chapter 1.
108 Ibn Rushd (Nyazee) 1996, p. 155.
109 Ibid., pp. 154-155; Schacht 1964, p. 134; Vogel & Hayes 1998, pp. 94-95. Cf. El-Gamal 2006, p. 36; Doi 
1984, p. 356; Juynboll 1930, pp. 269-271; Ibrahim 2008, p. 689.
110 Ibn Rushd (Nyazee) 1996, pp. 154-155; Juynboll 1930, p. 268; Vogel & Hayes 1998, pp. 94-95.
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as dayn.111 Dayn literally means ‘debt’ and it can refer to an obligation (either 
to perform an act or to pay money).112 The restriction of property to corporeal 
objects under Islamic property law can be explained through a study of the 
prohibition of riba.113 The trade in claims (bay’ al-dayn) is subject to specific 
rules because it resembles the forbidden riba: in monetary terms, a claim is 
comparable to money. As a result of the prohibition of riba, the trade of dayn 
for dayn (e.g. payment of cash for a claim) should always occur at face value.114 
The general rules of Islamic property law do not apply. The scope of Islamic 
property law is, thus, limited only to corporeal objects (ayn).
The most important right on property is the right of ownership. The right 
of ownership is called milk. It refers to the complete and exclusive right to dis-
pose of property with the exclusion of other parties.115 The owner of property 
is called malik.116 Under Islamic property law, an agreement suffices for the 
transfer of the right of ownership of property.117 The legal consequence of a 
validly concluded contract that intends to transfer the right of ownership of 
property to the transferee is the immediate transfer of the right of ownership 
from the transferor to the transferee.118 Hence, Islamic law has a consensual 
system whereby the transfer of the right of ownership occurs by virtue of the 
contract itself, as opposed to legal systems where the transfer of the right of 
ownership requires delivery of the property, as is the case under Dutch law.119
2.3.2 Islamic Contract Law
A contract is called aqd under Islamic law. Islamic contract law requires 
mutual consent to conclude a contract. The contracting parties must intend 
to enter into the contract.120 The parties show their intention through declara-
tions: offer (idjab) and acceptance (qaboel).121 The Qur’an explicitly encourages 
111 Vogel & Hayes 1998, pp. 94-95 & 114-115; Ibn Rushd (Nyazee) 1996, pp. 154-155; Schacht 1964, p. 
134; Juynboll 1930, p. 268.
112 Ibn Rushd (Nyazee) 1996, pp. 154-155; Vogel & Hayes 1998, pp. 94-95 & 114-115.
113 See Section 2.2.1 of this chapter.
114 For more on this, see Ibn Rushd (Nyazee) 1996, pp. 154-155; Vogel & Hayes 1998, pp. 114-124.
115 Schacht 1964, pp. 134-136; Vogel & Hayes 1998, pp. 94-95; Juynboll 1930, p. 266; Doi 1984, p. 356; 
Hallaq 2009b, pp. 296-297.
116 Schacht 1964, pp. 134-136; Vogel & Hayes 1998, pp. 94-95; Juynboll 1930, p. 266.
117 Juynboll 1930, p. 268; Van Bakelen (Recht van de Islam 3: Teksten van het op 21 juni 1985 te Leiden 
gehouden 3e symposium) 1985, p. 49. Also cf. Schacht 1964, pp. 140-142.
118 Coulson 1984, pp. 19-20; Hassan 2002, pp. 285-287; Vogel & Hayes 1998, pp. 94-95; Juynboll 1930, 
p. 268; Van Bakelen (Recht van de Islam 3: Teksten van het op 21 juni 1985 te Leiden gehouden 3e 
symposium) 1985, p. 49. Also cf. Schacht 1964, pp. 140-142; Doi 1984, p. 358.
119 Art. 3:84 (1) DCC.
120 Vogel & Hayes 1998, pp. 59-61; El-Gamal 2006, pp. 42-44; Usmani 2002, p. 38; Moghul & Ahmed 
2003, pp. 165-168; Baillie 1850, pp. 1-2.
121 Ibn Rushd (Nyazee) 1996, pp. 204-206; Schacht 1964, p. 145; Juynboll 1930, pp. 267-269; Van 
Bakelen (Recht van de Islam 3: Teksten van het op 21 juni 1985 te Leiden gehouden 3e symposium) 
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 parties to write down their obligations.122 Contracts can also be concluded 
orally under Islamic contract law, since there is no strict requirement to write 
down the parties’ respective obligations.123
Islamic law does not have a general theory of contracts. It contains spe-
cific rules for various nominate contracts.124 A study of the nominate contracts 
illustrates that the rules for the contract of sale (bay’) are the closest one could 
get to a general theory of contract law. The contract of sale is used by Islamic 
scholars as the prototype contract on the analogy (qiyas) of which all other con-
tracts are drawn.125 I will next discuss the Islamic rules for the contract of sale.
On the basis of an analysis of the requirements for a valid contract of sale 
in Islamic jurisprudence, I have formulated nine rules that should be respect-
ed in order to conclude a valid contract of sale.126 These rules are formulated 
by Shari’ah scholars through a study of the general prohibition on engaging 
in haram activities and the two principles of riba and gharar. I divide the nine 
rules for a valid contract of sale into three categories: (i) there are four rules 
that relate to the subject matter of the sale; (ii) there are two rules that relate to 
the legal position of the seller; and (iii) there are three rules that relate to the 
terms and conditions of the contract of sale.
The four rules that relate to the subject matter of the sale are:
I. the subject matter of the sale cannot be a haram property;
II. the subject matter of the sale must be a property of value;
III. the subject matter of the sale must be specifically stipulated in the contract 
of sale; and
IV. the subject matter of the sale must exist at the time of the sale.
These rules are mainly formulated to respect the principle of gharar, except 
the first rule that aims to avoid the trade in haram property. The property sold 
should be a property of value and it should be specifically identified, that is, 
its quality, quantity and its characteristic features should be stipulated in the 
contract in order to avoid gharar. Under Islamic contract law it is, furthermore, 
1985, pp. 49-50; Doi 1984, pp. 356-358; Moghul & Ahmed 2003, pp. 165-168; Hassan 2002, pp. 257-
262; Thomas (Structuring Islamic Finance Transactions) 2005, p. 24; Baillie 1850, pp. 1-2.
122 Qur’an 2:282.
123 Juynboll 1930, pp. 269-270; Van Bakelen (Recht van de Islam 3: Teksten van het op 21 juni 1985 te 
Leiden gehouden 3e symposium) 1985, p. 50; Moghul & Ahmed 2003, pp. 165-168; Thomas 2005, 
p. 24.
124 Vogel & Hayes 1998, pp. 97-98; Hassan 2002, pp. 282-285; Buang 2004, pp. 171-174.
125 Vogel & Hayes 1998, pp. 97-98; Schacht 1964, pp. 151-152.
126 See Ibn Rushd (Nyazee) 1996, pp. 179-192; Usmani 2002, pp. 38-40; El-Gamal 2006, pp. 42-43; 
Moghul & Ahmed 2003, pp. 165-168; Ibrahim 2008, pp. 690-691; Vogel & Hayes 1998, pp. 101-
105; Thomas (Structuring Islamic Finance Transactions) 2005, pp. 25-27; Visser 2009, pp. 75-79; 
Obaidullah 2005, pp. 29-30; Baillie 1850, pp. 4 & 29-30; Coulson 1984, pp. 19-21; Kamali 2000, 
pp. 99-103; Schacht 1964, p. 138; Ayub 2007, pp. 57-61; Zahraa & Mahmor 2002, pp. 379-397.
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not permitted to sell property that has not come into existence yet due to the 
uncertainty regarding its existence.
The two rules that relate to the legal position of the seller are:
V. the seller must have the right of ownership of the property at the time of 
entering into the contract of sale; and
VI. the property must be in the possession of the seller at the time of entering 
into the contract of sale.
These two rules are also formulated on the basis of gharar. In Subsection 2.2.2 
of this chapter, reference was made to a hadith, according to which the Prophet 
Muhammad said that a person cannot sell foodstuff until he has received it. 
On the basis of such hadith, Shari’ah scholars formulated the rules that a seller 
should have the right of ownership of a property and that that property must 
be in his possession at the time of entering into the contract of sale.
Finally, there are three rules that relate to the conditions in the contract of 
sale:
VII. the delivery of the property must be certain between the contracting 
parties (the delivery should not be made dependent upon a(n) (future) 
event) and stipulated in the contract of sale;
VIII. the sale price must be stipulated in the contract of sale; and
IX. the contract of sale must not be made contingent upon another transac-
tion unless it has a direct link with the contract of sale according to the 
usage of trade.
These three rules are, once again, formulated on the basis of gharar. A valid 
contract of sale is concluded under Islamic contract law after all the above for-
mulated nine rules are met: the nine rules are cumulative requirements for a 
valid contract of sale.
The legal consequence of a valid contract of sale is the immediate transfer 
of the right of ownership of property from the seller to the buyer. Therefore, 
it is not possible to conclude a contract of sale where the parties intend to 
transfer the right of ownership of property at a future date, i.e. a future sale 
contract.127 Alternatively, a wa’d is used in Islamic finance transactions. A wa’d 
is a binding promise.128 Binding promises fulfil an important role, next to con-
tracts, under Islamic contract law. A promisor can promise to sell property at 
a future date to his counterparty. At the future date, the parties have to enter 
into a new contract of sale to effect the sale. From an Islamic law perspective, 
127 The contracts of salam and istisna’ both form an exception to the impermissibility of future sale 
contracts. Both contracts are discussed in the next chapter. See Section 3.2 of Chapter 3.
128 Usmani 2002, pp. 49-52; Vogel & Hayes 1998, pp. 125-128; Visser 2009, pp. 75-79.
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the promise of wa’d is binding on the promisor and it is legally enforceable in 
court.129 It has the same legal effect as a contract with the unilateral obligation 
to transfer a property at a future date in many jurisdictions.
2.3.3 Comparison between Islamic Private Law and Dutch Private Law
There are three similarities when Islamic private law and Dutch private law 
are compared with each other. First, both legal systems require offer and 
acceptance for the conclusion of a contract.130 Second, according to both legal 
systems, the contracting parties must reach agreement on the essentials of a 
contract. Islamic contract law provides an enumeration of those essentials.131 
Dutch law does not provide such strict enumeration. The required essential 
elements depend on the type of contract that is concluded under Dutch law. 
For example, an essential element of the contract of sale under Dutch law is 
agreement on the property that is the subject matter of the contract,132 but the 
price does not have to be certain.133 Third, both legal systems require that the 
stipulated obligations of the contracting parties are determinable.134 In a con-
tract of sale, for example, the subject matter of the sale should be sufficiently 
determinable under both Islamic and Dutch contract law.135 Where Islamic 
contract law requires the subject matter to be specifically identified, Dutch 
contract law requires that it is sufficiently determinable. It seems that Islamic 
contract law requires for a more specific determinability of the subject matter 
of the contract of sale than Dutch contract law.
Comparing these two legal systems also brings two differences to the sur-
face. The first difference relates to the definition of property. Property (mal) is 
restricted to corporeal objects under Islamic property law. This differs from 
Dutch property law, where property (goederen) is defined as all tangible prop-
erties (zaken) and all patrimonial rights (vermogensrechten).136 The definition 
of mal under Islamic property law mainly resembles the definition of tangible 
129 The International Islamic Fiqh Academy of the Organization of the Islamic Conference issued a 
fatwa in which it ruled that a promise is binding on the promisor and it should be legally enforceable 
in court in case of a murabaha contract, see OIC Islamic Fiqh Academy, Res. No. 40-41 (2/5 & 3/5) 
1988. For discussions on the legal enforceability of the promise of wa’d, see Usmani 2002, pp. 49-52; 
Vogel & Hayes 1998, pp. 125-128; Visser 2009, pp. 75-79; Al-Masri 2002, pp. 29-32; Laldin 2009, pp. 
1-2.
130 See Section 2.3.2 of this chapter; see Art. 6:217 DCC.
131 See Section 2.3.2 of this chapter, see Asser/Hartkamp & Sieburgh 2010 (6-III*), no. 96.
132 See Art. 7:1 DCC.
133 See Art. 7:4 DCC. Before the introduction of the DCC in 1992, the price had to be certain, see Arts. 
1494 and 1501 former DCC.
134 See Art. 6:227 DCC.
135 See Rule III of Islamic contract law under Section 2.3.2 of this chapter; see Art. 7:1 DCC in conjunc-
tion with 6:227 DCC.
136 Art. 3:1 DCC.
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property under Dutch property law, that is, corporeal objects susceptible of 
human control.137 Patrimonial rights under Dutch property law mainly resem-
ble dayn (claims) under Islamic property law.138 Hence, from a Dutch law per-
spective, one should be aware that Islamic property law only deals with mov-
able property (roerende zaken) and immovable property (onroerende zaken).
The second difference relates to the transfer of the right of ownership of 
property. Islamic property law does not require the delivery of property in 
order to transfer the right of ownership of property to the transferee. Only a 
contract suffices to transfer the right of ownership of property. Dutch property 
law, however, requires delivery of the property in order to transfer its right 
of ownership.139 Otherwise, the transferee does not become the owner of the 
property.
However, the significance of the delivery of property for Islamic private law 
appears from the rules of Islamic contract law. The above formulated rule VII 
of Islamic contract law states that the delivery of property should be certain: 
the contracting parties should stipulate when and how the property is deliv-
ered. Furthermore, according to rule VI, property cannot be sold if the trans-
feror does not have its possession. A transferee can acquire the right of own-
ership of property by virtue of contract without delivery of the property. He, 
however, cannot dispose of the property until he has acquired its possession. 
This stresses the importance of the delivery of property. The transferee can 
dispose of the property once the property has been delivered to him. Hence, 
his right of ownership becomes effective towards third parties after delivery 
of the property to him.
Furthermore, Rules IV and V of Islamic contract law deserve attention. 
According to these rules, it is not possible to sell non-existing or not-yet-owned 
property under Islamic private law. Not respecting these rules results in an 
invalid contract of sale and, consequently, the right of ownership of the prop-
erty is not transferred. Although it is possible to sell non-existing or not-yet-
owned property under Dutch law, it is not possible to transfer the right of 
ownership of such property.140 In essence, both legal systems do not allow 
the transfer of the right of ownership of future property, that is, property not 
owned by the transferor at the moment of the transfer, even though both legal 
137 See Art. 3:2 DCC.
138 See Art. 3:6 DCC.
139 Art. 3:84 (1) DCC.
140 Art. 3:97 (1) DCC allows the delivery in advance of future property. The right of ownership of future 
property is, however, not transferred to the transferee due to Art. 3:84 (1) DCC, until the trans-
feror has acquired its right of ownership, more specifically its right to dispose of the property 
(beschikkingsbevoegdheid).
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systems differ significantly with regard to the way in which this fact can be 
explained.
2.4 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter I discussed the development of Islamic law and Islamic juris-
prudence. Throughout ages, Shari’ah scholars have studied the sources of 
Islamic law to formulate rules for new arising challenges in society. Even 
today, Shari’ah scholars are consulted for Islamic finance transactions to 
provide their approval for a structure. With regard to Islamic finance, two 
principles should be taken into account: the prohibition of riba and the avoid-
ance of gharar. These two Islamic finance principles have also determined the 
specific rules of Islamic private law. For example, due to the prohibition of 
riba, the concept of property is restricted to tangible property under Islamic 
property law. The rules of Islamic private law, in turn, determine the contents 
of Islamic finance contracts. In the next chapter I will discuss these Islamic 
finance contracts.
31
3 Islamic Finance Contracts
Based on the Islamic finance principles and rules of Islamic private law that 
were discussed in the previous chapter, nominate contracts have been devel-
oped under Islamic law from the Middle Ages onwards. With the emergence 
of Islamic finance during the second half of the 20th century, Islamic scholars 
revisited the nominate contracts to use them as building blocks for Islamic 
finance transactions.141 There was already much written on the nominate con-
tracts, so the foundation of Islamic finance law already existed. However, the 
application of these contracts to new transactions required the creation of a 
new set of rules.
Initially, there was divergence in the formulation of the rules of Islamic 
finance law due to differences in interpretation of the religious texts. The 
Islamic finance industry was in need of harmonisation of the Shari’ah rules. 
A breakthrough in this process was the issuance of the Shari’ah Standards 
of the AAOIFI. The AAOIFI issues various international standards, such as 
Accounting Standards, Auditing Standards, Governance Standards, Ethics 
Standards and Shari’ah Standards, with the purpose of harmonising the 
Islamic finance industry. In this research, the AAOIFI Shari’ah Standards are 
used to determine the substance of Islamic finance law.
The AAOIFI Shari’ah Standards are the product of contemporary ijma’. 
Shari’ah scholars gathered to discuss these rules and the AAOIFI as an author-
itative institution adopted the rules. The Shari’ah Standards were discussed 
and adopted in several meetings during the first decade of the 21st century. In 
2007, the full text of the first set of Shari’ah Standards was compiled. Ijma’ is 
a source of Islamic law and gives the AAOIFI Shari’ah Standards legitimacy 
from an Islamic law perspective. I will use the AAOIFI Shari’ah Standards in 
this study to discuss the rules of Islamic finance law.
I do acknowledge that there is still no full ijma’ on the AAOIFI Shari’ah Standards 
because some Shari’ah scholars do not agree with the interpretations of the reli-
gious texts by the AAOIFI Shari’ah Board. The Shari’ah Advisory Council of the 
Malaysian Securities Commission, for example, has a different interpretation of 
some of the religious texts. Nonetheless, I use the AAOIFI Shari’ah Standards 
141 DeLorenzo & McMillen (Islamic Finance: The Regulatory Challenge) 2007, pp. 143-145; McMillen 
2006, p. 147.
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to determine Islamic finance law for two reasons. First, the AAOIFI Shari’ah 
Standards are one of the few compiled sets of rules on Islamic finance law. Other 
Shari’ah scholars have provided fatwa on an ad hoc basis, but they do not provide a 
complete systemised overview of the rules of Islamic finance law. The abovemen-
tioned Shari’ah Advisory Council of the Malaysian Securities Commission is one 
of the few examples of other institutions that also provided a complete systemised 
overview of the rules of Islamic finance law. However – and this bring me at my 
second reason to use the AAOIFI Shari’ah Standards in this research – the Shari’ah 
Board of the AAOIFI consists of more than 20 members, representing all four 
schools of Islamic law (madhahib), issuing standards for the international mar-
ket, while the Shari’ah Advisory Council of the Malaysian Securities Commission 
consists of eight members, mainly using interpretations of the Shafi’i school of 
Islamic law, focusing on the Malaysian market.
Traditionally, Islamic finance was based on partnership contracts. These 
partnership contracts are regarded as the most Shari’ah-compliant forms of 
finance because both profits and losses realised with the invested money are 
shared between the partners.142 Contrary to the payment of interest, the return 
is not fixed in these agreements. Consequently, losses will be borne by all 
partners, but when the investment yields higher returns, the profits will also 
be distributed among all partners. These contracts are regarded as (Islamic) 
equity finance. In Section 3.1 of this chapter I discuss the partnership con-
tracts called musharaka and mudarabah.
While the partnership contracts provided a Shari’ah-compliant alternative 
for equity finance, a Shari’ah-compliant alternative for debt finance was ini-
tially lacking. Shari’ah scholars revisited traditional sale contracts and leasing 
contracts to assess whether they could be used as finance contracts. Islamic 
sale and leasing contracts were used to structure finance transactions. These 
forms of Islamic finance contracts were permitted by way of exception. Islamic 
debt finance has the distinguishing element that it is always asset-backed: 
within an Islamic finance transaction there must always be a direct link to a 
tangible property due to the prohibition of riba (as opposed to conventional 
finance where money can be traded for money).143 In the following sections I 
discuss sale contracts such as murabaha, salam and istisna’ (Section 3.2) and 
leasing contracts such as ijarah and ijarah wa-iqtina (Section 3.3).
Shari’ah scholars revisited traditional sale and leasing contracts to use 
them as finance contracts so that they could stay close to what already existed 
in Islamic jurisprudence, since much was already written on these contracts 
142 Usmani 2002, p. xv.
143 Ibid., pp. xiv-xvii.
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in fiqh books. As discussed in Chapter 1, during the period of European colo-
nial empires the development of Islamic jurisprudence came to a standstill 
because the laws of the European colonial empires replaced Islamic law in 
most of the colonised jurisdictions.144 After the emergence of Islamic finance 
in the second half of the 20th century, Shari’ah scholars tried to develop new 
rules, while adhering to what already existed in Islamic jurisprudence.
3.1 Partnership Contracts: Musharaka and Mudarabah
The most well-known partnership contracts are the musharaka and the 
mudarabah. The musharaka is a form of partnership where all partners con-
tribute capital to the partnership and all partners have an equal right to the 
management of the partnership. It is often referred to as an Islamic joint 
venture.
The muzara’a, musaqa and mugharasa are forms of partnership contracts that 
can be used for the agricultural sector. Due to resemblance in their main char-
acteristics to a musharaka, these contracts will not be discussed in further detail. 
Furthermore, the contract of wakalah, although originally a contract of agency 
instead of a partnership contract, shows many resemblances with partnership con-
tracts such as the musharaka and the mudarabah. The most important difference is 
that the agent receives a fixed agency fee in a wakalah contract, instead of (part of) 
the realised profits. The wakalah is also not discussed in futher detail.
In the mudarabah contract one partner participates through the contribution 
of capital without having any responsibilities for the management of the part-
nership (the silent partner), while the other partner participates through his 
labour and expertise and is responsible for the management of the partner-
ship. The mudarabah contract is in essence comparable to a Dutch limited 
partnership (commanditaire vennootschap) with general partners (beherende 
vennoten) and silent partners (commanditaire vennoten).
The contract of mudarabah, also referred to as muqaradah or qirad, shows many 
similarities to the medieval commenda contract used in Italy. Some academics 
have argued that the commenda contract originated from the Islamic mudarabah 
contract.145 If that were to be the case, then the mudarabah contract may have indi-
rectly contributed to the development of the Dutch limited partnership because 
144 See Section 1.1.1 of Chapter 1.
145 See Udovitch 1962; Udovitch 1970; Udovitch (Islam and the trade of Asia: A Colloquium) 1970; Pryor 
1977; Cizakca 1996.
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the Italian commenda contract is generally regarded as a main source of the Dutch 
limited partnership.
The Islamic finance rules for both musharaka and mudarabah will be dis-
cussed in more detail below (Subsections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2). As a starting point, 
these partnerships are in contractual form. In the last subsection of this sec-
tion the possibility to give the musharaka legal personality will be discussed 
(Subsection 3.1.3).
3.1.1 Musharaka
The word musharaka originally derived from the Arabic word shirkah, which 
means ‘sharing’.146 The term shirkah has a much wider scope than mushara-
ka; musharaka is only a specific form of shirkah.147 Within the terminology 
of Islamic jurisprudence, shirkah has been divided into two categories: the 
shirkat al-milk (literally ‘sharing in ownership’) and the shirkat al-aqd (literally 
‘sharing by contract’).148 Shirkat al-milk refers to joint ownership of property by 
at least two persons.149 Shirkat al-aqd refers to a partnership in business effect-
ed through a contract.150 The term musharaka refers only to the shirkat al-aqd.
The shirkat al-aqd is further divided into three categories: the shirkat al-
wujooh (partnership based on good reputation in the market), the shirkat 
al-amal (partnership based on services) and the shirkat al-inan (partnership 
based on capital investment).151 Figure 1 provides an overview of the different 
forms of shirkah. Within Islamic finance, the musharaka is often structured as 
the shirkat al-inan. Therefore, in this research the musharaka will be explained 
through a study of the shirkat al-inan. AAOIFI SS 12 is used to discuss the 
Islamic finance rules for musharaka.
146 Usmani 2002, p. 5; Thomas & Thofeek (Structuring Islamic Finance Transactions) 2005, p. 53; 
Elfakhani, Zbib & Ahmed (Handbook of Islamic Banking) 2007, p. 120; Rammal 2004, p. 3.
147 Usmani 2002, pp. 5-6; Iqbal & Mirakhor 2006, pp. 91-93.
148 Usmani 2002, pp. 5-6; Thani, Abdullah & Hassan 2003, pp. 53-54; Jabbar 2009b, pp. 178-179.
149 Usmani 2002, pp. 5-6; Thomas & Thofeek (Structuring Islamic Finance Transactions) 2005, p. 53; 
Elfakhani, Zbib & Ahmed (Handbook of Islamic Banking) 2007, p. 120; Thani, Abdullah & Hassan 
2003, pp. 53-54; Jabbar 2009b, pp. 178-179.
150 Ibid.
151 Usmani 2002, pp. 5-6; Thomas & Thofeek (Structuring Islamic Finance Transactions) 2005, p. 53; 
Thani, Abdullah & Hassan 2003, pp. 53-54; Jabbar 2009b, pp. 178-179.
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Figure 1 Overview of legal forms of shirkah
A musharaka can be created by parties through a contract or through the 
incorporation of a stock company (kapitaalvennootschap).152 It can be concluded 
with non-Muslims and conventional banks, as long as the partnership does 
not serve non–Shari’ah-compliant purposes.153 The objects of the musharaka 
should be clearly defi ned in either the musharaka contract or the articles of 
association of the musharaka, depending on whether the musharaka is cre-
ated by the conclusion of a contract or through the incorporation of a stock 
company.154
Each partner (sharik) contributes capital to the musharaka.155 The musharaka 
contract should have a clause specifying the manner of profi t-sharing between 
the partners.156 The manner of profi t-sharing should be such that the partners 
will receive a percentage of the actual profi t.157 They are not allowed to receive 
a lump sum or a percentage of their invested capital.158 One of the cornerstones 
152 For more on the musharaka as a stock company, see Section 3.1.3 of this chapter.
153 Arts. 3/1/1/2 and 3/1/1/3 AAOIFI SS 12.
154 Art. 3/1/1/1 AAOIFI SS 12.
155 Art. 3/1/2/1 AAOIFI SS 12. According to this article, the capital contribution can be in cash and/
or in kind. There has been debate in the fi qh literature on the nature of the capital invested in the 
musharaka, but the contemporary Islamic scholars agreed that capital contribution both in cash and 
in kind are permissible, see Usmani 2002, pp. 8-10.
156 Art. 3/1/5/1 AAOIFI SS 12.
157 Ibid.
158 Arts. 3/1/5/1 and 3/1/5/8 AAOIFI SS 12.
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of the musharaka contract is its profit-and-loss-sharing characteristic.159 Any 
clause that may result in a violation of the principle of profit-and-loss-sharing 
renders the entire musharaka contract void under Islamic finance law.160
As a starting point, all partners have an equal right to the management of 
the musharaka.161 The partners can also appoint a third party or one of the part-
ners as the manager of the musharaka.162 If one of the partners is appointed 
as the manager, he may receive a greater share of the profit than the profit he 
would have received based solely on his share in the partnership.163
The liability of the partners of the musharaka can be divided into the inter-
nal liability of the partners and their external liability. Their internal liabil-
ity relates to the question whether the partners are liable towards each other. 
The external liability of the partners of the musharaka deals with the question 
whether the partners can be held personally liable by creditors of the mush-
araka for debts of the musharaka that remain unrecovered from the patrimony 
of the musharaka. Internally, the partners are not liable to each other (not even 
when they have contractually agreed thereto), except in the case of miscon-
duct, negligence or breach of contract.164 Externally, however, the liability of 
the partners is not limited to the amount of their investment in the mush-
araka. The partners are personally liable commensurate with the proportion 
of their investment for all the debts of the musharaka.165
Each partner has the right to terminate the musharaka contract at any time, 
after giving notice to the other partners.166 The partners can also agree that the 
partnership comes to an end if the agreed upon time or the specified goal of 
the musharaka is reached.167 When the partnership is liquidated: (i) the liqui-
dation expenses will be paid first; (ii) followed by the financial liabilities of the 
partnership; (iii) after which the assets of the musharaka can be distributed pro 
rata among the partners.168
159 In the previous chapter I discussed the importance of profit-and-loss-sharing in Islamic finance 
transactions as a result of the prohibition of riba, see Section 2.2.1 of Chapter 2.
160 Art. 3/1/5/7 AAOIFI SS 12. The article only refers to profit-sharing, but due to the prohibition of riba, 
it seems more appropriate to me that both profit- and loss-sharing are meant to be covered by this 
article.
161 Art. 3/1/3/1 AAOIFI SS 12.
162 Arts. 3/1/3/2 and 3/1/3/3 AAOIFI SS 12.
163 Art. 3/1/3/4 AAOIFI SS 12.
164 Arts. 3/1/4/1 and 3/1/4/2 AAOIFI SS 12. A third party may provide a guarantee to make up a loss of 
the capital of (one of) the partners under certain conditions, see Art. 3/1/4/3 AAOIFI SS 12.
165 AAOIFI SS 12 does not explicitly discuss the liability of the partners towards third parties, the so 
called external liability of the partners of the musharaka. The external liability of the partners of the 
musharaka has been discussed in the Islamic finance literature. See Usmani 2002, pp. 12-13; Thani, 
Abdullah & Hassan 2003, pp. 54-56; Visser 2009, pp. 55-57.
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3.1.2 Mudarabah
AAOIFI SS 13 discusses the Shari’ah rules applicable to the mudarabah con-
tract. As a starting point, the musharaka contract and the mudarabah contract 
show many similarities and the rules discussed above are similar for the 
mudarabah contract. Like a musharaka contract, profits will be distributed 
among the partners based upon an agreed percentage of the actual profit.169
Just like in a musharaka contract, the manner of profit-sharing must be specified 
at the conclusion of the mudarabaha contract,170 one of the partners cannot earn an 
additional fee,171 and it is not possible to fix the distributed profit by agreeing on a 
lump sum or a percentage of the invested capital.172
There are, however, also differences between the musharaka contract and the 
mudarabaha contract. In a mudarabah contract the capital investment is solely 
from a capital provider (rab al-maal) and the entrepreneur who provides his 
labour (mudarib) has the sole right to management, unlike a musharaka con-
tract where all partners provide capital and in principle have an equal right 
to management.173 Furthermore, unlike a musharaka contract, in a mudara-
bah contract the rab al-maal bears the losses because the mudarib does not 
invest anything.174 The mudarib, nonetheless, bears the loss of his time, effort 
and labour in the partnership.175 In addition, the mudarib is personally liable 
for losses caused by his negligence, misconduct or breach of the mudarabah 
contract.176
It is also possible for the mudarib to invest in the mudarabah. Once the mudarib 
does so, the mudarabah automatically converts into a combination of the mush-
araka and the mudarabah: the mudarib becomes a partner of his funds (there is a 
musharaka with the rab al-maal with regard to the funds of the mudarib); and he 
remains a mudarib of the funds of the rab al-maal (there is a mudarabah with the 
rab al-maal with regard to the funds of the rab al-maal).177
169 Art. 8/1 AAOIFI SS 13.
170 Arts. 8/1 and 8/3 AAOIFI SS 13.
171 Art. 8/2 AAOIFI SS 12.
172 Art. 8/5 AAOIFI SS 13.
173 Art. 2 AAOIFI SS 13.
174 Art. 8/7 AAOIFI SS 13.
175 AAOIFI SS 13 does not explicitly refer to the losses of the mudarib, but this point has been discussed 
in the Islamic finance literature. See Obaidullah 2005, pp. 60; Visser 2009, pp. 54-55; Usmani 2002, 
pp. 13; Thani, Abdullah & Hassan 2003, pp. 50-52.
176 Art. 4/4 AAOIFI SS 13. See also Art. 8/7 AAOIFI SS 13.
177 Art. 8/9 AAOIFI SS 13.
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3.1.3 Musharaka and Mudarabah as Modern Day Corporations
An interesting question is whether the musharaka or mudarabah can be incor-
porated as a modern day corporation. There has been debate on the Shari’ah 
compliance of modern day corporations such as stock companies.178 This 
debate has revolved mainly around two concepts: (i) the concept of legal per-
sonality of corporations; and (ii) the concept of limited liability of shareholders 
of corporations.179 Both concepts were new to Islamic law. Initially, there had 
been questions on their Shari’ah compliance due to the possibility of abuse 
of these concepts through exploitation of creditors of corporations.180 The 
acceptance of legal personality of a corporate body means that it can engage 
in transactions as an independent party having legal capacity, sue parties and 
be sued and incur its own debts. If the liability of this corporate body exceeds 
its assets and the corporate body is declared bankrupt, the creditors may lose 
considerable amounts of their claims.181 Since the liability of the shareholders 
is limited to their investment, upon liquidation, the creditors of the corporate 
body in principle will have no recourse against those shareholders.
After much debate in the fiqh literature, the International Islamic Fiqh 
Academy accepted the concept of legal personality of corporations and the 
concept of limited liability of shareholders of corporations in a resolution 
( fatwa) on financial markets.182 The AAOIFI also accepted both concepts in 
AAOIFI SS 12.183 The ruling of the AAOIFI is mainly based on the fatwa of the 
International Islamic Fiqh Academy on financial markets.184 The main argu-
ment of the International Islamic Fiqh Academy to accept the limited liability 
of shareholders was that the creditors of a stock company have knowledge of 
the limited liability of the shareholders and such awareness on the part of the 
creditors precludes deception.185
AAOIFI SS 12 defines a stock company as a company the capital of which 
is partitioned into equal units of tradable shares, whereby the liability of 
each shareholder is limited to his share in the capital.186 The shareholders 
are regarded as the co-owners of the stock company. All general rules for the 
musharaka as discussed above are applicable to stock companies, except that 
178 This debate is discussed in the following works: Nyazee 1997; Nyazee 1998; Ur Rahman 2010; Foster 
2010a; Foster 2010b.
179 Nyazee 1997; Nyazee 1998; Ur Rahman 2010; Foster 2010b, p. 283-288; Usmani 2002, pp. 103-109.
180 Thomas & Thofeek (Structuring Islamic Finance Transactions) 2005, p. 46; Usmani 2002, pp. 103-109.
181 Usmani 2002, pp. 103-109.
182 OIC Islamic Fiqh Academy, Res. No. 63 (1/7) 1992.
183 Art. 4 ff. AAOIFI SS 12.
184 See App. B AAOIFI SS 12.
185 OIC Islamic Fiqh Academy, Res. No. 63 (1/7) 1992.
186 Art. 4/1/1/1 AAOIFI SS 12.
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(as appears from its definition): (i) the liability of the partners is limited to 
their share in the capital of the stock company; and (ii) the stock company has 
legal personality.187 Furthermore, there are additional Shari’ah rules for stock 
companies. In addition to AAOIFI SS 12, AAOIFI SS 21 provides rules applica-
ble to shares of corporations.
Most of the rules for a Shari’ah-compliant stock company confirm that a Shari’ah-
compliant stock company can function in the same way as a conventional stock 
company: e.g. the stock company can issue new shares,188 shareholders can sell 
their shares,189 and shareholders can pledge their shares.190 In this study I will only 
focus on the rules that deviate from a conventional stock company and that must 
be observed to ensure the Shari’ah compliance of a stock company.
The rules that must be observed to ensure the Shari’ah compliance of a stock 
company are:
1. a shareholder cannot go short, i.e. sell shares that he does not own yet;191
2. a shareholder cannot purchase shares using interest-based loans;192
3. the stock company cannot issue preference shares, i.e. shares that provide 
shareholders special financial rights that give them priority when profits 
are distributed;193 and
4. it is only permissible to trade in shares of a stock company (a) if the main 
activities of the stock company pertain to tangible properties (as opposed 
to intangible properties) and (b) the value of the tangible properties and 
the services of the stock company is not less than 30% of its total assets 
value.194
All four rules relate to riba and gharar. The first rule that bans short selling 
relates to gharar: in order to avoid uncertainty with regard to the delivery of a 
property, a seller is not allowed to sell a property that he does not own yet. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, this is one of the basic rules of Islamic contract law.195
187 Arts. 4/1/1/1 and 4/1/1/2 AAOIFI SS 12. Another difference between the musharaka contract and the 
musharaka as a stock company is that the latter cannot be unilaterally terminated by one party or a 
minority of its shareholders, see Arts. 4/1/1/1, 4/1/2/1 and 4/1/2/9 AAOIFI SS 12.
188 Art. 4/1/2/3 AAOIFI SS 12.
189 Art. 4/1/2/10 AAOIFI SS 12.
190 Art. 4/1/2/11 AAOIFI SS 12.
191 Art. 4/1/2/7 AAOIFI SS 12; see also Art. 3/6 AAOIFI SS 21.
192 Art. 4/1/2/6 AAOIFI SS 12; see also Art. 3/5 AAOIFI SS 21.
193 Art. 4/1/2/14 AAOIFI SS 12; see also Art. 2/6 AAOIFI SS 21.
194 Art. 3/19 AAOIFI SS 21. It is only permissible to trade in the shares of a stock company that has only 
intangible properties if the rules for trading in debt claims are taken into account. In essence, this 
means that the sale must be on-the-spot and for equal values, see Art. 3/18 AAOIFI SS 21.
195 See Section 2.3.2 of Chapter 2.
40
3  Islamic Finance Contracts
The other three rules relate to the prohibition of riba. First, a shareholder 
cannot purchase shares using interest-based loans because of the payment of 
interest. Second, the issuance of preference shares is not allowed because it 
violates the concept of profit-and-loss-sharing.196 Priority shares are, however, 
permissible because they do not violate the concept of profit-and-loss-shar-
ing.197 The holders of priority shares have special controlling rights, but they 
do not have special financial rights. Third, trading in shares of a stock com-
pany is only permissible (a) if the main activities of the stock company pertain 
to tangible properties and (b) the value of the tangible properties and the ser-
vices of the stock company is not less than 30% of its total assets value. Islamic 
scholars argue that if the value of the tangible properties and the services of 
the stock company is less than 30% of its total assets value, the main activities 
of the stock company do not pertain to tangible properties, even though this 
may have been stipulated in its objects clause.198 Shareholders are deemed 
the owners of the assets of a stock company under Islamic finance law. When 
selling their shares, they essentially trade the assets of the stock company. 
These two requirements ensure that they mainly trade in tangible proper-
ties when selling their shares. Otherwise, the shareholders will be trading in 
intangible properties (bay’ al-dayn), which results in a violation of the prohibi-
tion of riba.199 Strictly speaking, services are not tangible properties, but they 
are added to the percentage of tangible properties if the main activities of the 
stock company pertain to tangible properties.
3.2 Sale Contracts: Murabaha, Salam and Istisna’
In this paragraph the three sale-based Islamic finance contracts will be 
discussed. The murabaha contract will be addressed first, followed by the con-
tracts of salam and istisna.’
3.2.1 Murabaha
The murabaha contract is one of the most frequently used contracts within 
Islamic finance. According to estimates, 80% of all Islamic finance trans-
actions are structured through murabaha.200 Traditionally, the contract of 
murabaha was a contract of sale with the remarkable feature that the seller 
196 Making profit is justified when a commercial risk is taken under Islamic law, see Section 2.2.1 of 
Chapter 2.
197 Art. 4/1/2/14 AAOIFI SS 12; see also Art. 2/6 AAOIFI SS 21.
198 See App. B AAOIFI SS 12.
199 See Section 2.2.1 of Chapter 2.
200 Elfakhani, Zbib & Ahmed (Handbook of Islamic Banking) 2007, p. 119.
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disclosed the cost price of the property and the profit mark-up.201 It was not 
a contract of finance. Shari’ah scholars agreed on the use of the contract of 
murabaha for funding purposes by way of exception. Therefore, strict condi-
tions apply to the contract of murabaha when it is used for funding purposes. 
AAOIFI SS 8 provides these rules.
In the literature and practice, the contract of murabaha and the contract of tawarruq 
are often used interchangeably. However, one has to make a distinction between 
murabaha and tawarruq (often referred to as a reverse murabaha or commodity 
murabaha). In a tawarruq contract the party who is in need of funding purchases 
a tangible property from a financier on a deferred payment basis. The price is 
often higher than the real value of the tangible property. Next, the party who is in 
need of funding sells the tangible property to a third party for a lower price (the 
real value of the tangible property) and this purchase price provides him money 
instantly.202 In 2009, the International Islamic Fiqh Academy issued a fatwa in 
which it expressly stated that the tawarruq is not permissible from a Shari’ah per-
spective.203 The AAOIFI also issued a new Shari’ah Standard on tawarruq in 2010, 
reaching the same conclusion as the Islamic Fiqh Academy.204
Murabaha can be used only for asset finance purposes.205 Murabaha cannot 
be used in cases where funding is required for other purposes, such as fund-
ing to repay debts of creditors such as suppliers, funding to pay the salary of 
employees or funding for costs of maintenance of equipment. A party that 
requires funding to purchase a tangible property can enter into a murabaha 
transaction with a financier. The financier purchases the tangible property 
and sells it onwards with a profit mark-up to the party that wishes to purchase 
the tangible property. The latter can pay the purchase price in instalments to 
the financier. The party from whom the tangible property is bought by the 
financier should be a third party. It cannot be the ultimate buyer of the tangible 
property.206 Otherwise, the transaction results in a sale and buy-back transac-
tion between the financier and the party requiring funding. Such sale and 
buy-back transaction is called bay’ al-inah.207 It is not a murabaha transaction. 
201 Thani, Abdullah & Hassan 2003, p. 57; Usmani 2002, p. 37; Elfakhani, Zbib & Ahmed (Handbook 
of Islamic Banking) 2007, p. 119; Visser 2009, p. 58; Iqbal & Mirakhor 2006, p. 87; Thomas et al. 
(Structuring Islamic Finance Transactions) 2005a, p. 60.
202 For more on tawarruq, see Visser 2009, p. 58; Iqbal & Mirakhor 2006, p. 91; Cox & Thomas 
(Structuring Islamic Finance Transactions) 2005, pp. 174-175.
203 See OIC Islamic Fiqh Academy, Res. No. 179 (19/5) 2009.
204 See Khan 2009, pp. 17-22.
205 Iqbal & Mirakhor 2006, p. 89; Visser 2009, pp. 57-58; Usmani 2002, p. 42.
206 Art. 2/2/3 AAOIFI SS 8.
207 Usmani 2002, p. 43; Visser 2009, p. 69; Thomas et al. (Structuring Islamic Finance Transactions) 
2005a, pp. 70-73.
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The bay’ al-inah is impermissible according to most Islamic scholars because 
it resembles an interest-bearing loan in their view, which violates the ban on 
riba.208 Hence, murabaha consists of two sales between three different parties: 
first there is a sale between the third-party seller and the financier, followed by 
a resale between the financier and the ultimate buyer.
The profit mark-up in murabaha transactions used to be based on interest rates 
such as LIBOR and EURIBOR. Although there had been much criticism on this 
point from a Shari’ah perspective, the use of interest rates such as LIBOR and 
EURIBOR was accepted within contemporary Islamic finance because such inter-
est rates only functioned as a benchmark.209 The Islamic finance industry was 
looking for a long time for an alternative benchmark. At the end of 2011, the IIBR 
was introduced as a Shari’ah-compliant benchmark for Islamic finance transac-
tions such as the murabaha.210
The purchase price (cost price and profit mark-up), the periods of the instalments, 
and the due date of the payment should be fixed at the moment of the conclusion of 
the murabaha contract. Once the purchase price has been fixed, it cannot increase 
or decrease anymore because any increase or decrease would be in conflict with 
the prohibition of riba.
The rules of Islamic contract law must be respected throughout the trans-
action.211 The third-party seller must be the owner of the tangible property 
and the tangible property must be in his possession before he enters into the 
contract of sale with the financier. The legal consequence of a valid contract of 
sale between the third-party seller and the financier is the immediate transfer 
of the right of ownership of the tangible property from the third-party seller 
to the financier. Next, the financier as the owner of the tangible property can 
enter into the second contract of sale with the ultimate buyer, provided that 
the tangible property has also been brought under the possession of the finan-
cier.212 In the previous chapter I discussed that under Islamic law a transferee 
(the financier) can become the owner of a tangible property without the tangi-
ble property being delivered to him by the transferor (the third-party seller).213 
However, the financier can only dispose of the tangible property after delivery 
208 The Shari’ah scholars in Malaysia are, however, an exception to the group of Shari’ah scholars pro-
hibiting the bay’ al-inah. In Malaysia the bay’ al-inah is accepted, see Securities Commission Shariah 
Advisory Council 2006, pp. 20-22.
209 Art. 4/6 AAOIFI SS 8.
210 See IIBR Page on Thomson Reuters; Salah Interview 2011.
211 See Section 2.3.2 of Chapter 2.
212 Art. 3/1/1 AAOIFI SS 8.
213 See Section 2.3.2 of Chapter 2.
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to him. In the murabaha transaction the financier should, therefore, also have 
possession of the tangible property before he enters into the second contract 
of sale with the ultimate buyer.214
The ultimate buyer pays the purchase price (cost price and profit mark-up) 
to the financier in instalments. The financier may require security to secure 
the instalment payments from the ultimate buyer. The legal consequence of 
a valid contract of sale is the immediate transfer of the right of ownership. 
Therefore, it is not permissible to stipulate that the right of ownership of the 
tangible property will not be transferred to the ultimate buyer until full pay-
ment of the purchase price.215 However, the ultimate buyer can provide the 
financier a security right to secure the instalment payments.216 The security 
right can only be created once a claim on the ultimate buyer has come into 
existence.217 Under Islamic law, a security right can only be granted by the 
owner of a tangible property.218 If the security right is granted over the tangi-
ble property that is the subject matter of the murabaha transaction, a ‘fiduci-
ary pledge’ can be created.219 Under Islamic finance law, the term ‘fiduciary 
pledge’ in a murabaha transaction refers to a security right that is created on 
a tangible property that is transferred by the financier to the ultimate buyer, 
whereby the security right for the financier is created from the outset of the 
transfer of the tangible property.
Furthermore, the parties are permitted to stipulate that the instalments 
become due and payable before their originally agreed due date in the event 
of default of or delay in an instalment payment.220 The parties can also stipu-
late a penalty clause in the murabaha contract, pursuant to which a penalty is 
charged in the event of default of an instalment payment, provided that the 
financier pays that amount to a charity.221 However, the parties cannot stipu-
late that a rebate will be given to the ultimate buyer in the event of early pay-
ment of the purchase price by the ultimate buyer to the financier.222
The murabaha contract is accepted as Shari’ah-compliant for two reasons. 
First, the financier acquires the ownership of the tangible property and bears 
the risks attached to ownership during the period that he owns the tangi-
ble property.223 This risk justifies the profit of the financier from a Shari’ah 
214 Art. 3/2/1 AAOIFI SS 8.
215 Art. 5/4 AAOIFI SS 8.
216 Art. 5/2 AAOIFI SS 8.
217 Usmani 2002, pp. 52-54; Thani, Abdullah & Hassan 2003, pp. 59-61.
218 Ibid; Iqbal & Mirakhor 2006, p. 89.
219 Art. 5/2 AAOIFI SS 8.
220 Art. 5/1 AAOIFI SS 8.
221 Art. 5/6 AAOIFI SS 8.
222 Art. 5/9 AAOIFI SS 8.
223 Art. 3/2/2 AAOIFI SS 8.
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perspective because of its profit-and-loss-sharing characteristic. In practice, 
however, both transfers (between the third-party seller and the financier and 
between the financier and the ultimate buyer) occur simultaneously, mitigat-
ing the addressed risk.224 Nonetheless, Shari’ah scholars have accepted this 
structure as Shari’ah-compliant, regardless of how long the financier owns the 
tangible property. Second, the contracting parties directly trade in a tangible 
property, making this structure asset-backed. They do not trade in intangi-
ble properties: the parties to the murabaha do not trade money with money, 
but they trade money with a tangible property in both transfers (between the 
third-party seller and the financier and between the financier and the ultimate 
buyer). Consequently, the prohibition of riba is respected.
3.2.2 Salam
In the previous chapter I discussed that future sale contracts are invalid under 
Islamic private law.225 There are two exceptions to this rule: the contract of 
salam and the contract of istisna.’
If a party wishes to sell something he does not own yet, he can enter into 
a contract of salam. Pursuant to the contract of salam, a seller undertakes to 
transfer the right of ownership of a specified and determined tangible prop-
erty to a buyer at a future specified date in exchange for full payment at the 
moment of the conclusion of the contract. The seller will receive the required 
financing and the buyer will probably purchase the tangible property at a low-
er price than he would have paid in a spot sale. While the price is paid in full, 
the transfer of the right of ownership of the tangible property is deferred.226 
This contract seems to be the mirror image of the contract of murabaha.227
Since the contract of salam is allowed by way of exception, strict rules must 
be met to ensure its Shari’ah compliance. These rules are documented in 
AAOIFI SS 10. In this paragraph I will summarise three essential rules. First, 
the contract of salam can only be effected for the sale of fungible goods.228 
Second, the exact date of the transfer of the right of ownership of the goods 
must be determined.229 Third, the price must be paid in full at the time of the 
conclusion of the contract.230
224 Thani, Abdullah & Hassan 2003, p. 58.
225 See Section 2.3 of Chapter 2.
226 Iqbal & Mirakhor 2006, p. 83; Usmani 2002, p. 84; Thani, Abdullah & Hassan 2003, p. 40.
227 Thomas et al. (Structuring Islamic Finance Transactions) 2005c, p. 94.
228 Art. 3/2/1 AAOIFI SS 10.
229 Art. 3/2/9 AAOIFI SS 10.
230 Art. 3/1/3 AAOIFI SS 10.
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When the contract of salam is used as a finance contract, parallel contracts 
of salam are used. A financier enters into a contract of salam with a party 
who requires funding. The financier will pay the amount at that moment so 
that the party acquires funding. The financier will, however, not be interested 
in the fungible goods that will be transferred to him at a future date. The 
financier, therefore, enters into a second contract of salam with a third party.231 
This parallel contract of salam allows the financier to sell the fungible goods 
to a third party without having acquired their right of ownership yet. The 
purchase price of the fungible goods in the parallel contract of salam will be 
higher than the purchase price of the fungible goods in the initial contract 
of salam (and the difference between the purchase prices is the profit that 
the financier makes in this transaction) because the second contract of salam 
will often be for a shorter period.232 A strict rule for funding through the use 
of parallel salam is that the second contract of salam must not be conditioned 
upon the first contract of salam.233
3.2.3 Istisna’
Another future sale contract that is permitted by way of exception under 
Islamic law is the contract of istisna’. Under this contract, the seller will manu-
facture and deliver a specified tangible property to the buyer at a future date.234 
The applicable Shari’ah rules for the contract of istisna’ are documented in 
AAOIFI SS 11. There are two important rules. First, the contract of istisna’ can 
only be effected on commodities that require manufacturing.235 Second, the 
purchase price of the commodities must be fixed by the parties.236 Unlike the 
contract of salam, the full price does not have to be paid in advance: it may be 
paid in advance, but can also be paid at the end of the period or in instalments 
as the manufacturing proceeds.237
The contract of istisna’ is often compared to the contract of ijarah. The distin-
guishing feature between the contract of istisna’ and the contract of ijarah is that 
231 The financier is not permitted to sell the fungible goods back to the initial seller because that will 
result in a sale and buy-back transaction, the so-called bay’al-inah. The bay’ al-inah is prohibited due 
to its resemblance to riba, see Section 3.2.1 of this chapter.
232 Obaidullah 2005, pp. 96-97; Elfakhani, Zbib & Ahmed (Handbook of Islamic Banking) 2007, p. 120; 
Usmani 2002, pp. 86-88; Thani, Abdullah & Hassan 2003, pp. 42-44; Visser 2009, p. 61; Thomas et 
al. (Structuring Islamic Finance Transactions) 2005c, pp. 94-96.
233 Art. 6/3 AAOIFI SS 10. See also Rule IX of Section 2.3.2 of Chapter 2.
234 Obaidullah 2005, p. 99; Usmani 2002, pp. 88-89; Thani, Abdullah & Hassan 2003, pp. 42-44; Visser 
2009, p. 62.
235 Art. 3/1/1 AAOIFI SS 11.
236 Art. 3/2/1 AAOIFI SS 11.
237 Art. 3/2/2 AAOIFI SS 11.
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within the contract of istisna’ the product is manufactured with the materials of 
the manufacturer. If the materials belong to the buyer, then the manufacturer is 
only providing his services to manufacture the product for the buyer through a 
contract of ijarah. If the materials belong to the manufacturer, a contract of istisna’ 
is concluded.238
The contract of istisna’ can be adopted for project financing purposes. A 
financier can enter into a contract of istisna’ with a client, pursuant to which 
the financier is obliged to deliver to the client at a future date a product that 
needs to be manufactured. The client is obliged to pay the financier (possibly 
in instalments).239 The financier will not manufacture this product himself. 
The financier will enter into a parallel contract of istisna’ with a third party, 
being a manufacturer or contractor.240 The financier pays the manufacturer or 
contractor (possibly instantly). The manufacturer or contractor transfers the 
product to the financier after it has been manufactured. The financier then 
transfers it to his client. The profit of the financier is the difference between 
the prices of the two istisna’ contracts.241 The parallel contract of istisna’ cannot 
be conditioned upon the initial contract of istisna’.242
3.3 Leasing Contracts: Ijarah and Ijarah wa-Iqtina
3.3.1 Ijarah
There are two Shari’ah-compliant leasing contracts: the ijarah and the ijarah 
wa-iqtina (also referred to as the ijarah muntahia bittamleek). AAOIFI SS 9 con-
tains the rules applicable to Shari’ah-compliant leasing contracts. Pursuant to 
a contract of ijarah, the manfaa (right of use) of a tangible property is trans-
ferred to a party in consideration of payment. Originally, the contract of ijarah 
was a rental agreement.243 Like the contracts of sale (murabaha, salam and 
istisna’), the contract of ijarah has been accepted as a finance contract by way 
of exception.
238 See Usmani 2002, pp. 89-90. Also cf. Iqbal & Mirakhor 2006, p. 86; Klarmann 2004, p. 63.
239 Usmani 2002, pp. 90-91; Thani, Abdullah & Hassan 2003, pp. 42-44.
240 Thomas & Kraty (Structuring Islamic Finance Transactions) 2005, pp. 102-104; Usmani 2002, 
pp. 90-91; Thani, Abdullah & Hassan 2003, pp. 42-44; Klarmann 2004, p. 64.
241 Thomas & Kraty (Structuring Islamic Finance Transactions) 2005, pp. 103-104; Usmani 2002, 
pp. 90-91; Thani, Abdullah & Hassan 2003, pp. 42-44; Klarmann 2004, pp. 63-64.
242 Art. 7/4 AAOIFI SS 11.
243 Within conventional finance, leasing contracts are often used as finance instruments for tax rea-
sons. Similarly, within Islamic finance, ijarah contracts are used as finance instruments, but for 
reasons of Shari’ah compliance (instead of tax reasons). See Usmani 2002, p. 69; Kamali 2007, 
p. 8; Visser 2009, p. 60; Zaher & Hassan 2001, p. 160; Thani, Abdullah & Hassan 2003, pp. 44-46; 
Thomas et al. (Structuring Islamic Finance Transactions) 2005b, p. 77.
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The contract of ijarah is a contract whereby the owner (lessor) of a tangible 
property provides the right of use of that tangible property to another per-
son (lessee) for an agreed period at an agreed price.244 The most significant 
requirement for a valid ijarah contract is that the right of ownership of the tan-
gible property remains with the lessor.245 As a result of this prerequisite, there 
are two additional conditions for a valid ijarah contract under Islamic finance 
law. First, the lessor must bear all the liabilities emerging from the ownership 
of the tangible property, such as taxes referable to the tangible property.246 
The lessee should bear liabilities arising from the use of the tangible prop-
erty, such as the electricity bill in the case of lease of a machine that runs on 
electricity.247 Second, the lessor must also bear all the risks associated with the 
ownership of the tangible property, such as the risk that the tangible property 
burns down. The lessee should bear the risks associated with the use of the 
tangible property.248 The lessee is also liable to the lessor for damages to the 
leased property as a result of misuse or negligence on his behalf.249
With regard to the terms and conditions of the ijarah contract, three condi-
tions must be determined and stipulated in the ijarah contract under Islamic 
finance law. First, the tangible property must be identified and determined 
in the ijarah contract.250 Second, the lease period must be certain and stipu-
lated in unambiguous terms.251 The lease period commences on the date of 
the delivery of the tangible property to the lessee, regardless of whether the 
lessee starts using the tangible property or not and regardless of the date of 
the conclusion of the ijarah contract. Thus, the ijarah contract can be entered 
into for the lease of a tangible property at a future date. Third, the rental must 
be determined for the complete lease period.252 The contracting parties have 
the freedom to determine the rental according to their wishes.
As with murabaha contracts, the use of interest rates such as LIBOR and EURIBOR 
are also accepted in ijarah contracts. Unlike murabaha contracts, interest rates are 
not only permissible as a benchmark according to which the price is fixed, but 
they can also be used as a floating rental in an ijarah contract.253 In case of floating 
244 Iqbal & Mirakhor 2006, pp. 84-85; Thani, Abdullah & Hassan 2003, pp. 46-48; Usmani 2002, 
pp. 70-71; Visser 2009, pp. 60; Thomas et al. (Structuring Islamic Finance Transactions) 2005b, p. 78.
245 Art. 3/1 AAOIFI SS 9. The lessee of a tangible property is allowed to sub-lease the leased property 
to the lessor or a third party under Islamic finance law, see Arts. 3/3 and 3/4 AAOIFI SS 9.
246 Arts. 5/1/5 and 5/1/7 AAOIFI SS 9.
247 Arts. 5/1/6 and 5/1/7 AAOIFI SS 9.
248 Art. 5/1/8 AAOIFI SS 9.
249 Ibid.
250 Art. 5/1/1 AAOIFI SS 9.
251 Art. 4/1/2 AAOIFI SS 9.
252 Art. 5/2 AAOIFI SS 9.
253 Art. 5/2/3 AAOIFI SS 9.
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rental, it is necessary that the amount of the rental of the first period is speci-
fied and that the rental for the remaining periods is subject to a minimum and 
maximum ceiling.254 Shari’ah scholars have argued that the use of interest rates in 
ijarah contracts does not mean that interest is charged because the distinguishing 
element between an ijarah contract and an interest-bearing loan is not the amount 
paid to the lessor. The distinguishing element is that the ownership of the tangible 
property and its associated risks remain with the lessor: in case of destruction of 
the tangible property (after which the lessee cannot benefit from it anymore) the 
lessee is not bound to pay rental nor will the lessor receive rental, while in the case 
of an interest-bearing loan the lender will receive interest.255 Nonetheless, with 
the introduction of the Islamic benchmark IIBR at the end of 2011, an alternative 
benchmark has been introduced in the Islamic finance market to replace interest 
rates such as LIBOR and EURIBOR in Islamic finance transactions such as the 
ijarah.
3.3.2 Ijarah wa-Iqtina
The ijarah wa-iqtina is a leasing arrangement that consists of an ijarah con-
tract and an additional binding promise of the lessor to the lessee, pursuant to 
which the lessor promises to transfer the ownership of the tangible property 
to the lessee at the end of the lease period. The ijarah wa-iqtina shows similari-
ties to a conventional financial lease.
Three rules should be observed while structuring an ijarah wa-iqtina. 
First, the contract of ijarah grants the lessee solely the right of use of a tangible 
property. The transfer of the right of ownership of the tangible property is not 
possible with such contract.256 A separate contract of sale must be entered into 
between the parties in order to transfer the right of ownership.257 The legal 
consequence of a validly concluded contract of sale is the immediate transfer 
of the right of ownership, so the contract of sale must be concluded at the time 
when the parties wish to transfer the right of ownership of the tangible prop-
erty (often at the end of the lease period). Second, the ijarah contract cannot 
contain any conditions with regard to the contract of sale because of the rule 
of Islamic contract law that a transaction cannot be conditioned upon another 
transaction.258 Third, in order to provide the lessee certainty that the lessor 
will enter into the contract of sale at the end of the lease period, the lessor 
can promise to sell the tangible property or give it as a gift after the last lease 
254 Art. 5/2/3 AAOIFI SS 9.
255 See Iqbal & Mirakhor 2006, pp. 84-85; Usmani 2002, pp. 75-77.
256 Art. 8/3 AAOIFI SS 9.
257 Arts. 8/1 and 8/3 AAOIFI SS 9.
258 See Rule IX of Section 2.3.2 of Chapter 2.
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payment.259 Such binding promise is called a wa’d.260 The binding promise 
cannot be a bilateral promise because that will result in a future sale contract. 
A future sale contract is invalid under Islamic contract law.261
3.4 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter Islamic finance contracts were discussed. The rules of Islamic 
private law, as described in the previous chapter, determine the framework for 
the rules applicable to Islamic finance contracts. The contracts can be divided 
into three categories: equity-based, sale-based and lease-based.
The prototype equity-based Islamic finance contract is the musharaka. The 
musharaka is a partnership, whereby all partners contribute capital to the part-
nership and all partners have an equal right to its management (unless one 
of them is appointed as manager). The profits of the partnership are shared 
according to an agreed upon percentage of the actual profit and losses are 
borne by the partners commensurate with the proportion of their investment. 
The musharaka can also be created through the incorporation of a musharak 
stock company.
The prototype sale-based Islamic finance transaction is the murabaha, 
where a tangible property is sold and transferred by a third-party seller to the 
financier, followed by its resale and transfer by the financier to the ultimate 
buyer. The purchase price of the second sale consists of the cost price of the 
tangible property (i.e. the sale price of the first sale) and a profit mark-up. The 
ultimate buyer can pay the purchase price in instalments to the financier.
The ijarah contract is the prototype lease-based Islamic finance contract. 
Pursuant to the ijarah contract, the owner of a tangible property (lessor) leases 
it to another party (lessee) for an agreed period at an agreed price. The lessor 
bears the risks and liabilities attached to the ownership of the tangible prop-
erty, while the lessee bears the risks and liabilities that are attached to its use.
Sukuk transactions are structured on the basis of the Islamic finance con-
tracts that were discussed in this chapter. For the structuring of sukuk in the 
next chapter, I will focus on the prototype contract of each category: the mush-
araka, the murabaha and the ijarah.
259 Art. 8/1 AAOIFI SS 9.
260 The wa’d is discussed in more detail in Section 2.3.2 of Chapter 2.




In this chapter I create a legal framework for sukuk structures that should be 
taken into consideration when structuring sukuk under Dutch private law as 
will be discussed in the subsequent chapters. Before doing so, an understand-
ing of sukuk is required. I will discuss the origins of sukuk and its position as 
Islamic securities in financial markets.262 Next, I will discuss a securitisation 
process called tawreeq. The ownership of the underlying property in a sukuk 
transaction is transferred to the sukuk holders through the use of tawreeq. 
Each sukuk transaction is structured on the basis of one of the Islamic finance 
contracts that were discussed in Chapter 3. I will discuss the legal structure of 
three types of sukuk: the sukuk al-musharaka, the sukuk al-murabaha and the 
sukuk al-ijarah. Based on the Islamic finance rules for tawreeq and based on 
the Islamic finance rules applicable to the underlying Islamic finance contract, 
I formulate rules that determine the legal framework of each sukuk structure.
4.1 Sukuk: History and Characteristics
4.1.1 Origins of Sukuk in the Middle Ages
The Arabic word sukuk is the plural of the word sakk, meaning ‘certificate’ or 
‘order of payment’.263 The Muslim societies of the Middle Ages used sukuk 
as papers representing financial obligations arising from trade and other 
commercial activities.264 Sukuk were written vows to pay for goods when the 
goods were delivered. They were used to avoid money having to be transported 
across dangerous terrain.265
There is documentary evidence for the use of sukuk during the Middle 
Ages. Such written instruments are encountered frequently in genizah doc-
uments.266 Genizah documents are documents that were stored in Middle 
Eastern mosques and synagogues because the word ‘God’ was written either 
262 See also Saeed & Salah 2012; Saeed & Salah 2014, pp. 45-47.
263 Khan 2003, p. 163; Hasan & Irfan (Euromoney Encyclopedia of Debt Finance) 2006, p. 125.
264 Adam & Thomas 2004, pp. 42-44; Adam & Thomas (Islamic Asset Management: Forming the Future 
for Shari’a-Compliant Investment Strategies) 2004, pp. 73-75; Clifford Chance DIFC Sukuk Guidebook 
2009, p. 9; Khan 2003, p. 163.
265 Adam & Thomas 2004, pp. 42-44; Vallely, The Independent, 11 March 2006.
266 Udovitch (The Dawn of Modern Banking) 1979, pp. 268-274.
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in Arabic or Hebrew. Therefore, the merchants of the Middle Ages were reluc-
tant to destroy such documents. The Cairo genizah documents contain frag-
ments that indicate the existence of sukuk in the 12th century, and these mon-
ey orders are remarkably similar in form to modern cheques.267 They state the 
sum to be paid, the order, the date and the name of the issuer.268
During the third century, banks in Persia and other territories in the Persian 
Empire also issued letters of credit known as sakk. Hence, it is mentioned that 
the Arabic word ‘sakk’ derived from the Persian language.269 However, the first 
evidence of sakk dates from the Middle Ages.
As a result of the global trade during the Islamic Golden Age,270 sukuk were 
transported across several countries and spread throughout the world. The 
Jewish merchants from the Muslim world transmitted such sukuk to Europe.271 
An interesting outcome of the trade and transport of sukuk is that it func-
tioned as a source of inspiration for the modern day cheque, which was first 
used in the United Kingdom.272 The word ‘cheque’ is derived from the Arabic 
word ‘sakk’.273
4.1.2 Sukuk: Islamic Securities in Financial Markets
Today, sukuk are known as financial instruments that are traded in capital 
markets. The entire concept of financial markets is based on the trade in 
tradable papers that represent financial rights represented by those papers. 
Usually, securities are divided into shares and bonds. Sukuk are Islamic secu-
rities with rather distinctive features.
267 Taylor-Schechter Genizah Research Unit (History in Fragments: A Genizah Centenary Exhibition).
268 See genizah document T-S Ar.30.184 at the Taylor-Schechter Genizah Research Unit (History in 
Fragments: A Genizah Centenary Exhibition).
269 See Wright, Sunday Mirror, 22 February 2009; Markels, U.S. News, 7 April 2008.
270 The Islamic Golden Age refers to a period of time from the eighth century until the 13th century that 
is marked by contributions of the Islamic world to scientific knowledge, cultural arts, civilisation, 
commerce and architecture.
271 Braudel 1973, p. 817.
272 English banks started using cheques around the 17th and 18th century in order to counteract the issu-
ance monopoly of the Bank of England. See De Vroede 1981, p. 3; Geisweit van der Netten 1892, p. 5.
273 See Heck 2006, pp. 217-218; Udovitch (The Dawn of Modern Banking) 1979, pp. 268-274; Udovitch 
(The Dictionary of the Middle Ages, Vol. 12) 1989, pp. 105-108. The United Kingdom-based educa-
tional project and exhibition exploring the Muslim contributions to building the foundations of 
Modern Civilisation, called ‘1001 Inventions: Discover the Muslim Heritage in Our World’, also 
addressed that the word ‘cheque’ comes from ‘sakk’. See 1001 Inventions: Discover the Muslim 
Heritage in Our World; Vallely, The Independent, 11 March 2006.
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Conventional shares are generally accepted as Shari’ah-complaint under 
Islamic finance law.274 From an Islamic finance law perspective, shares are 
deemed evidence of the ownership of shareholders in the assets of a com-
pany.275 Conventional bonds, on the other hand, are impermissible under 
Islamic finance law due to the presence of riba.276 The prohibition of riba pro-
vides two grounds based upon which conventional bonds are impermissible: 
(i) the prohibition of interest; and (ii) the prohibition of the trade in intangible 
properties (bay’ al-dayn). In essence, a conventional bond is an interest-based 
loan: the bond holders lend an amount (principal) to the issuer, the issuer 
pays periodic interest to the bond holders and the issuer pays the principal to 
the bond holders at maturity. A conventional bond represents a debt claim on 
the issuer. First, the payment of interest, which is the source of the periodic 
payments in a conventional bond, violates the prohibition of riba. Second, the 
trade in conventional bonds in secondary markets, leading to a trade in debt 
claims, results in a violation of the prohibition of riba due to the doctrine of 
the bay’ al-dayn.
Sukuk are the Shari’ah substitute for conventional bonds.277 Sukuk are cer-
tificates that give sukuk holders financial rights and obligations represented by 
those certificates.278 The financial rights embodied in sukuk are the returns 
stated in the terms and conditions of the sukuk.279 The returns are generat-
ed with underlying Shari’ah-compliant transactions. These transactions are 
structured through the use of the Islamic finance contracts that were dis-
cussed in Chapter 3.280 The returns are paid to the sukuk holders. Since the 
profits generated with the Islamic finance contracts are in line with Islamic 
law and do not include interest, the use of those contracts ensures that interest 
payments are avoided in sukuk transactions. As a result, the prohibition of riba 
is respected. This is a first distinction between sukuk and conventional bonds.
Another difference between sukuk and conventional bonds is that sukuk 
should represent the proportionate share of each sukuk holder in the owner-
ship of the underlying property that has been made available for investment 
in the sukuk transaction.281 The trading of sukuk is subject to the Shari’ah rules 
that govern the trading of the underlying property that the sukuk represents.282 
The prohibition of the bay’ al-dayn leads to the requirement that sukuk holders 
274 See AAOIFI SS 21; OIC Islamic Fiqh Academy, Res. No. 63 (1/7) 1992.
275 Art. 2/8 AAOIFI SS 21.
276 Art. 5 AAOIFI SS 21.
277 Art. 6 AAOIFI SS 21.
278 Art. 4/1 AAOIFI SS 17.
279 Art. 4/5 AAOIFI SS 17.
280 Art. 4/3 AAOIFI SS 17. Also cf. Art. 5/1/1 AAOIFI SS 17.
281 See Art. 4/2 AAOIFI SS 17.
282 Art. 4/4 AAOIFI SS 17.
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must hold some degree of ownership of a tangible property for the sukuk to 
be tradable in financial markets. Consequently, when the sukuk are traded in 
secondary markets, what is being traded is not (only) a debt claim but (also) 
(the ownership of) the underlying tangible property. The underlying property 
can, however, also be an intangible property. The sukuk holders will then have 
a proportionate share in an intangible property. As a result of the bay’ al-dayn, 
the sukuk can only be transferred at face value, which means that the trade of 
sukuk in secondary markets is obstructed in such case.
4.2 Sukuk: A Product of a Securitisation Process Called Tawreeq
The AAOIFI issued AAOIFI SS 17 that contains the Islamic finance rules for 
sukuk.283 The Shari’ah rules of AAOIFI SS 17 were not always respected in 
practice.284 As a reaction to the developments in the sukuk market, the AAOIFI 
issued a Resolution in February 2008 on sukuk referred to as the AAOIFI 
Resolution.285 The main target of the criticism of the AAOIFI Resolution was 
the equity-based sukuk.286 Additionally, disputable elements of other sukuk 
structures, such as the sukuk al-ijarah, were also addressed. When structur-
ing sukuk, the rules of AAOIFI SS 17 and of the AAOIFI Resolution should be 
taken into consideration.287
Article 2 AAOIFI SS 17 defines sukuk as
[…] certificates of equal value representing undivided shares in ownership of 
tangible assets, usufruct and services or (in the ownership of) the assets of 
particular projects or special investment activity […].
283 Art. 6 AAOIFI SS 17.
284 The Islamic finance practice has a hard time translating the general Shari’ah rules into specific legal 
requirements that must be respected under the laws of the jurisdiction that governs the transaction 
documents, see Ali & Salah (White Paper – Taking Stock and Moving Forward: The State of Islamic 
Finance and Prospects for the Future) 2010, pp. 12-13; IMF Policy Discussion Paper 2008, p. 10; IMF 
Working Paper 2007, p. 27. For more on the tension between an idealist Shari’ah approach and 
the practices of sukuk structures, in particular the sukuk al-mudarabah, the sukuk al-ijarah and the 
hybrid sukuk, see Saeed & Salah 2012.
285 Before the issuance of the AAOIFI Resolution, Usmani (a well-known Shari’ah scholar and chairman 
of the AAOIFI Shari’ah Board) criticised the developments in the sukuk market in a fatwa on the 
contemporary application of sukuk, see Usmani 2008. He stated that 85% of all sukuk outstanding 
at that time were not Shari’ah-compliant, see Arabian Business, Reuters, 22 November 2007; Abbas, 
Reuters, 7 June 2008; McSheehy, Bloomberg, 13 March 2008.
286 For a discussion of the equity-based sukuk structures, more in particular of the sukuk al-mudarabah 
structure before and after the issuance of the AAOIFI Resolution of 2008, see Salah 2010b.
287 From a structural perspective, the impact of the AAOIFI Resolution is that the criticised mecha-
nisms of sukuk structures from 2003 until 2008 will have limited, if any, precedential value going 
forward, see McMillen 2008, p. 745. For the different structures and mechanisms used in equity-
based sukuk structures in practice after the issuance of the AAOIFI Resolution, see Salah 2010b.
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The most significant element in this definition is the ownership of the sukuk 
holders in underlying assets. In the preceding section I discussed how the 
prohibition of riba results in the Shari’ah requirement that sukuk certificates 
should represent the proportionate ownership of sukuk holders in the underly-
ing property of the transaction. This raises the question how the ownership of 
an underlying property is transferred to the sukuk holders.
4.2.1 Transfer of the Right of Ownership of Tangible Property to Sukuk 
Holders
The issuance of sukuk is the result of a securitisation process called tawreeq: 
the ownership of a property is divided into units of equal value and securities 
(sukuk) are issued as per their value.288 From a Shari’ah perspective, the own-
ership of the sukuk holders is not realised through a transfer of proprietary 
rights under Islamic property law. The sukuk holders hold sukuk certificates 
that represent their ownership in the sense that the financial rights and obli-
gations represented by those sukuk relate to the returns and losses on the 
underlying property. Economically, the sukuk holders become the owners of 
the underlying property.
The view that no transfer of the right of ownership of the property to the sukuk 
holders is required under Islamic property law is supported when studying the 
legal concept of joint ownership of property (shirkat al-milk) under Islamic law, as 
discussed in chapter 3.289 Islamic law acknowledges the concept of joint owner-
ship of property, where two or more parties jointly have the right of ownership of 
property. If the right of ownership of the underlying property were to be trans-
ferred to all sukuk holders, a joint ownership between the sukuk holders would 
be created under Islamic law. Sukuk are, however, not an explication of the legal 
concept of shirkat  al-milk.290 No joint ownership of the underlying property is cre-
ated between the sukuk holders. The sukuk holders own the property through a 
partnership that exists between the sukuk holders, whereby they share the prof-
its and losses on the underlying property.291 The relationship among the sukuk 
holders resembles a contractual partnership (shirkat al-inan), where profits and 
losses are shared.292 From an Islamic property law perspective, the sukuk holders 
288 Art. 5/1/2 AAOIFI SS 17; App. D AAOIFI SS 17.
289 See Section 3.1.1 of Chapter 3.
290 No reference is made to the shirkat al-milk in AAOIFI SS 17. Usmani explicitly stated that sukuk are 
not an explication of the shirkat al-milk in his fatwa on the contemporary application of sukuk, which 
was a preamble to the AAOIFI Resolution, see Usmani 2008.
291 Cf. Art. 5/1/5/1 AAOIFI SS 17.
292 See Section 3.1.1 of Chapter 3.
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do not become the proprietary owners of the underlying property; they only own 
the property economically.
A comparison can be made with shares. According to Article 2/8 AAOIFI SS 
21, shares provide shareholders the ownership of the assets of a stock com-
pany. This is the economic reality because the financial benefits and losses 
that the stock company gains or suffers on the assets are for the shareholders. 
However, from a legal perspective shares provide shareholders only a bundle 
of rights: financial rights (e.g. rights to dividend) and controlling rights (e.g. 
voting rights). In Chapter 3, I discussed that Islamic finance law has accepted 
the concept of legal personality for stock companies.293 A shareholder is not 
the owner of the assets of a stock company because those assets are owned by 
the stock company itself. Nonetheless, shareholders are deemed the owners of 
the assets of a stock company under Islamic finance law. The Shari’ah scholars 
have adopted a substance-over-form approach in this regard: they have looked 
at the economic reality instead of the legal form of the relationship of the stock 
company with its shareholders.294
4.2.2 The Role of the SPV in the Securitisation Process Called Tawreeq
The party requiring funding does not have to transfer the right of ownership 
of the underlying property to sukuk holders. Within the securitisation process 
called tawreeq, sukuk can be issued representing the value of the underlying 
property to transfer the ownership of the property to the sukuk holders eco-
nomically. This may raise the incorrect impression that the party requiring 
funding can issue sukuk itself to the sukuk holders. In the process of tawreeq, 
however, the party requiring funding cannot remain the owner of the under-
lying property and issue sukuk representing the value of that property for two 
reasons. First, if it remains the owner of the property, it will have control over 
the property and the right to dispose of the property under Islamic property 
law. The party requiring funding may act in breach of the terms and condi-
tions of the issued sukuk and dispose of the property to other parties. Second, 
if the party requiring funding remains the owner of the property, the property 
will form part of its patrimony and its creditors will have recourse to the prop-
erty under Islamic property law. In the event of its bankruptcy, the property 
will form part of its bankruptcy estate.
293 See Section 3.1.3 of Chapter 3.
294 I do acknowledge that the claim that Shari’ah scholars have adopted a substance-over-form 
approach is controversial, especially due to the fact that Islamic finance has often been criticised for 
having a form-over-substance approach, see Lahlou & Tanega 2007, p. 359-372.
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For the reasons mentioned above, the underlying property is transferred 
by the party requiring funding to an SPV. SPVs fulfil a significant role in the 
process of tawreeq, especially in relation to the transfer of the ‘ownership’ of 
the underlying property to sukuk holders. The underlying property is trans-
ferred by the party requiring funding to an SPV, as a result of which the SPV 
becomes the owner of the property. The SPV issues sukuk certificates repre-
senting the value of the underlying property. Consequently, the ownership of 
the property rests with a separate legal entity that holds the property for the 
sukuk holders. The SPV does not have any other assets and is restricted in its 
activities. Therefore, Shari’ah scholars look through the SPV and regard the 
transaction as a direct transaction between the party requiring funding and 
the sukuk holders.295 There is also a separation of the property from the pat-
rimony of the party requiring funding. The creditors of the party requiring 
funding have no recourse to the property nor will it fall into its bankruptcy 
estate in case of bankruptcy.
Here another comparison can be made with shares. A joint stock company 
has legal personality and the company is the legal owner of all the assets in its 
own legal capacity. This results in a separation of funds: the assets of the joint 
stock company are separated from the patrimony of other parties because the 
joint stock company has legal personality. In the same way, in the process of 
tawreeq, the underlying property is separated from the patrimony of the party 
requiring funding by way of transfer to the SPV. Remarkably, a concept that 
was criticised from a Shari’ah perspective upholds the Shari’ah view in sukuk 
transactions: legal personality of a company (the SPV in this case).296
In practice, there had been several sukuk structures where the legal own-
ership of the underlying property was not transferred to the SPV.297 Some 
Shari’ah scholars and academics argued that the Shari’ah does not require 
registration of the transfer of ownership of immovable property in the pub-
lic registrars.298 As a result, only the beneficial ownership of the underlying 
property was transferred to the SPV according to the law of the jurisdiction 
that governed the sukuk transaction documents and the transfer of the right of 
ownership of the underlying property.299
295 The articles in AAOIFI SS 17 refer to sukuk transactions as direct transactions between the party 
requiring funding and the sukuk holders. This is, once again, the economic reality of the trans-
actions. SPVs are incorporated solely to legally facilitate the sukuk issuance.
296 For more on the debate on the concept of legal personality under the Shari’ah, see Section 3.1.3 of 
Chapter 3.
297 See Ali & Salah (White Paper – Taking Stock and Moving Forward: The State of Islamic Finance and 
Prospects for the Future) 2010, pp. 12.
298 Adam (Advances in Islamic Economics and Finance, Volume 1, Proceedings of the 6th International 
Conference on Islamic Economics and Finance) 2005, pp. 384-385; Hassan 2008, pp. 3-4.
299 As a result of such practice, an imbalance is created between the Shari’ah compliance of a sukuk 
transaction and the legal enforceability of the rights of the sukuk holders before the court of a 
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The transfer of the right of ownership of immovable property without registration 
of the transfer in the public registrars results in the transfer of its beneficial owner-
ship (as opposed to legal ownership) only in some jurisdictions. In the Netherlands, 
there is no split of the right of ownership in legal and beneficial ownership. 
Consequently, if the transfer of immovable property is not registered in the public 
registrars, there is no transfer of the right of ownership under Dutch law.300
The distinction between legal and beneficial ownership is, however, not 
known under Islamic property law.301 Consequently, transferring the benefi-
cial ownership of the underlying property to the SPV is not sufficient. This 
was also criticised by the AAOIFI in the AAOIFI Resolution.302 The AAOIFI 
Resolution states that the sukuk holders must own sukuk with all the rights 
and obligations of ownership in the underlying property.303 In order to realise 
this through the securitisation process called tawreeq, there should be a real 
transfer of the (legal) ownership of the underlying property from the party 
requiring funding to the SPV.304 In the same line of thought, it is also not pos-
sible for the party requiring funding to hold the ownership of the underlying 
property, issue sukuk and create only security rights over the property for the 
sukuk holders.
The transaction documents of sukuk transactions are often governed by 
English law in practice.305 The SPV creates an English law trust through a 
declaration of trust over the underlying property of the sukuk transaction.306 
The SPV (as the trustee) holds the property on trust for the benefit of the sukuk 
holders (as the beneficiaries). The ownership of the trust property is divided 
into legal ownership and beneficial ownership: the SPV is the legal owner and 
the sukuk holders are the beneficial owners. One of the legal consequences of 
the creation of a trust under English law is that in the case of bankruptcy of 
the trustee (SPV) the trust property does not fall into its bankruptcy estate.307 
jurisdiction, see Ali & Salah (White Paper – Taking Stock and Moving Forward: The State of Islamic 
Finance and Prospects for the Future) 2010, pp. 11-13.
300 See Art. 3:84 (1) in conjunction with 3:89 (1) DCC.
301 Usmani Interview 2010; Hassan 2008, p. 3-4. See also Section 2.3.1 of Chapter 2.
302 See AAOIFI Resolution 2008.
303 Rule 1 AAOIFI Resolution 2008. The wording of this rule might raise the impression that the right 
of ownership of the underlying property should be transferred from the SPV to the sukuk holders. 
However, Rule 1 AAOIFI Resolution specifically refers to Arts. 2 and 5/1/2 AAOIFI SS 17 on tawreeq.
304 McMillen 2008, pp. 741-743; Elgari 2008, pp. 4-6; Yean 2009, pp. 3-8.
305 Offering Circular TID Global Sukuk 2006, pp. 61-62; Offering Circular JAFZ Sukuk 2007, pp. 75-76; 
Offering Circular NICBM Sukuk 2006, pp. 16-17; Offering Circular URC Sukuk 2007, pp. 25-26; 
Offering Circular PETRONAS Global Sukuk 2009, pp. 93-94; Offering Circular Qatar Global Sukuk 
2003, pp.  14-15; Offering Circular DEWA Funding Sukuk 2008, p. 31; Offering Circular 1Malaysia 
Sukuk Global 2010, p. 41.
306 Ibid.
307 Hudson 2009a, p. 523; Gardner 2003, p. 248; Abdel-Khaleq & Richardson 2007, pp. 418-419.
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This makes English law trusts an attractive legal instrument for sukuk trans-
actions. Furthermore, it seems to further substantiate the requirement of the 
ownership of the sukuk holders: the sukuk holders acquire the beneficial own-
ership of the underlying property.
However, the use of English law trusts in sukuk transactions does not have 
a Shari’ah background. There is no Islamic finance rule according to which 
(English law) trusts should be used in sukuk transactions. Nor is there an 
Islamic finance rule according to which the sukuk holders should acquire the 
beneficial ownership of the underlying property. The distinction between 
legal and beneficial ownership as developed under Equity in English law is 
unknown under Islamic law.308 The use of English law trusts in sukuk trans-
actions is the result of market practice in financial markets.309 Consequently, 
the creation of an English law trust to transfer the beneficial ownership of 
the underlying property from the SPV to the sukuk holders is not necessarily 
required from a Shari’ah perspective. The creation of an English law trust 
is, nonetheless, an excellent way to secure the position of the sukuk holders 
against a possible bankruptcy of the SPV from a transactional perspective.
There are several studies with different views on the origins of the English law 
trust. Some studies have traced the roots of the English law trust to the Islamic legal 
concept of waqf.310 The waqf is a legal concept whereby the ownership of a property 
is held by a party, while its management or financial benefits are transferred to 
another party. According to the view taking in these studies, the origin of the trust 
goes back to the times of the Crusades. Before going off for war, Crusaders used to 
transfer their land ‘on trust’ to a friend. Upon return, they had no land, since the 
friend had become the legal owner of their land as a result of the transfer of the 
land under Common law. The Crusaders regarded this as unjust and petitioned to 
the Court of Chancery. Inspired by legal concepts through the contacts with the 
Middle Eastern and Islamic societies, the Crusaders transmitted the Islamic legal 
concept of waqf to England. Although the English law trust resembles and possibly 
originated from the Islamic law waqf, the use of English law trusts in sukuk trans-
actions has no Islamic law background. The Islamic waqf is used for religious and 
charitable purposes and has no connection with sukuk transactions.
308 Usmani Interview 2011; Hassan 2008, p. 3-4.
309 Rating agencies have expressed the need for trusts in sukuk transactions, see Moody’s Special 
Report 2006, p. 6-7. Trusts are also used in other financial transactions such as conventional secu-
ritisations, where an SPV creates a trust over its assets (debt receivables which it has purchased 
from an originator) for the benefit of bond holders.
310 See Hudson 2009a, pp. 42-43; Cattan (Law in the Middle East: Origin and Development of Islamic 
Law) 1955, pp. 214-222; Gaudiosi 1988, pp. 1244-1245; Thomas 1949, p. 166; Avini 1996, pp. 1159-
1162; Smith 1966, pp. 43-44. Cf. Worthington 2006, pp. 63-67; Parker & Mellows/Oakley 2008, 
pp. 2-3; Hayton & Marshall/Hayton 2001, pp. 9-13; Pettit 2006, pp. 12-15.
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Concluding, sukuk are Shari’ah-compliant securities. These securities should 
represent the ‘economic ownership’ of the sukuk holders in an identified prop-
erty. Pursuant to the terms and conditions of the sukuk, the sukuk holders 
should acquire financial rights that entitle them to profits realised with the 
underlying property. This does not mean that the right of ownership of the 
property should be proprietarily transferred to the sukuk holders. The sukuk 
holders only acquire the financial benefits and bear the financial losses of the 
property, as owners economically do. This is realised through a securitisation 
process called tawreeq, which under Islamic finance law requires:
1. the incorporation of an SPV;
2. the transfer of the right of ownership of the underlying property to the 
SPV; and
3. the issuance of sukuk certificates that economically represent the owner-
ship of the underlying property, that is, the financial rights and obligations 
represented by the sukuk should be based on the returns and losses on the 
underlying property.
4.3 Sukuk Structures
The AAOIFI acknowledges 14 sukuk structures.311 These structures differ sig-
nificantly and, therefore, they must be studied on a case-by-case basis.312 The 
underlying structure of each sukuk is determined by one of the Islamic finance 
contracts that were discussed in the previous chapter.313 The sukuk structures 
can be categorised into three basic types based on the Islamic finance con-
tract applied in the relevant sukuk transaction: equity-based, sale-based and 
lease-based.314 In this research the prototype of each sukuk structure will be 
discussed: the sukuk al-musharaka (equity-based), the sukuk al-murabaha 
(sale-based) and the sukuk al-ijarah (lease-based). In the following three sub-
sections, I will describe the legal structure of these three sukuk structures and 
the applicable Islamic finance rules.
There are in essence three parties in each structure. First, there is a party 
requiring funding.315 This party is looking for Shari’ah-compliant funding, 
311 The 14 sukuk structures are sukuk al-ijarah, sukuk ijarah-mowsufa-bithima, sukuk manfaa-ijarah, 
sukuk manfaa-ijarah-mowsufa-bithima, sukuk milkiyat-al-khadamt, sukuk al-salam, sukuk al-istisna’, 
sukuk al-murabaha, sukuk al-musharaka, sukuk al-mudarabah, sukuk al-wakalah, sukuk al-muzara’a, 
sukuk al-musaqa and sukuk al-mugharasa. For more on these structures, see Lahlou & Tanega 2007, 
pp. 367-368.
312 Islamic Finance in the UK: Regulation and Challenges 2007, p. 25.
313 Art. 4/3 AAOIFI SS 17.
314 Dusuki 2009, p. 9.
315 AAOIFI SS 17 refers to this party as the issuer. Strictly speaking, it is not the issuer in the transac-
tion. The sukuk certificates are issued by the SPV.
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either out of religious beliefs or to attract funding from Islamic investors. It 
is the party that ‘creates or initiates’ the transaction and will, therefore, be 
referred to as the originator.316 Second, there is an SPV. The SPV is a legal enti-
ty incorporated for the sole purpose of facilitating the sukuk transaction for 
the originator. The SPV holds the underlying property and issues the sukuk. 
Third, a group of investors will subscribe to the issued sukuk. They are the 
sukuk holders.
4.3.1 Equity-Based Sukuk: Sukuk al-Musharaka
The first sukuk were issued in the early 1980s and mainly structured through 
equity-based Islamic finance contracts such as the musharaka and the mudara-
bah.317 There are six types of equity-based sukuk. Article 3/6 AAOIFI SS 17 
defines equity-based sukuk as certificates issued with the aim of using the funds 
for establishing a new project, developing an existing project or financing a 
business activity on the basis of any of the partnership contracts. The partner-
ship contracts that can be used for equity-based sukuk are the musharaka, the 
mudarabah and the wakalah.318 In addition, there are three agricultural forms 
of equity-based sukuk: the sukuk al-muzara’a (sharecropping certificates),319 the 
sukuk al-musaqa (irrigation certificates)320 and the sukuk al-mugharasa (agri-
cultural certificates).321 The focus of this subsection is on the legal structure of 
the sukuk al-musharaka because the sukuk al-musharaka provides the basis for 
all six types of equity-based sukuk structures.
The sukuk al-musharaka is structured on the basis of the musharaka con-
tract.322 The structure commences with an originator looking for funding. The 
originator incorporates an SPV for the sole purpose of facilitating the sukuk 
transaction.323 The SPV has no other assets, nor will it engage in any other 
316 This is based on the meaning of the word ‘originator’ in Oxford Dictionaries Online. The term ‘origi-
nator’ is broadly used in the Islamic finance literature and practice and should not be confused with 
the term ‘originator’ as used in conventional securitisation transactions.
317 One of the very first definitions of sukuk given in February 1988 during the fourth session of the 
Council of the Islamic Fiqh Academy in Jeddah relates to the sukuk al-mudarabah. The Islamic Fiqh 
Academy defines sukuk as “[(…)] investment instruments which allocate the muqaradha capital (mud-
haraba) by floating certificates, as an evidence of capital ownership, on the basis of shares of equal value, 
registered in the name of their owners, as joint owners of shares in the venture capital or whatever shape 
it may take, in proportion to the each one’s share therein”. See OIC Islamic Fiqh Academy, Res. No. 30 
(5/4) 1988.
318 Strictly speaking, the wakalah is not a partnership contract. For more on these partnership con-
tracts, see Section 3.1 of Chapter 3.
319 Art. 3/7 AAOIFI SS 17.
320 Art. 3/8 AAOIFI SS 17.
321 Art. 3/9 AAOIFI SS 17.
322 Arts. 3/6/1 and 5/1/5 AAOIFI SS 17.
323 Jabeen & Javed 2007, p. 413.
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activities. The originator and the SPV enter into a musharaka contract.324 They 
both become partners to the musharaka. Both partners contribute capital to 
the musharaka. The management of the musharaka will be assigned to the 
originator as the manager of the musharaka.
The SPV issues sukuk in financial markets. The sukuk proceeds are used 
by the SPV as the capital contribution to the musharaka.325 The SPV holds the 
equity in the musharaka, so the sukuk certificates represent ‘economic owner-
ship’ of musharaka equity.326 Pursuant to the musharaka contract, profits and 
losses of the musharaka will be shared between the originator and the SPV. In 
most sukuk al-musharaka structures, a major part of the profit is distributed 
to the SPV (e.g. 90% to the SPV and 10% to the originator). The SPV pays the 
profits received through to the sukuk holders. The profits of the musharaka are 
the sole source of payment of the periodic distribution amounts to the sukuk 
holders. The returns on the sukuk are in a form that very much resembles 
dividends. This also means that no periodic distributions can take place if the 
musharaka is not profitable. Therefore, these sukuk are most suitable for inves-
tors who want to invest their money for an equity stake.327
The profit-and loss-sharing will continue until maturity. During this peri-
od, the sukuk certificates are tradable in secondary markets.328 The sukuk cer-
tificates represent the ‘economic ownership’ of the sukuk holders in the shares 
held by the SPV in the musharaka. The partners in a musharaka are regarded 
as the owners of all the assets of the musharaka. Therefore, the sukuk holders 
are deemed to be trading their shares in the assets of the musharaka when 
trading the sukuk in secondary markets. As a result, they are not (only) trading 
in debt claims and the prohibition of riba is respected.
At maturity, the originator purchases the shares in the musharaka from 
the SPV. The price paid for these shares to the SPV will be the source of repay-
ment of the principal amount of the sukuk holders.329 The SPV will pay the 
amount through to the sukuk holders after which the sukuk will be redeemed. 
The partnership also comes to an end since the originator will be the sole own-
er of the company. The originator as the owner of the company may dissolve 
the company or continue its business activities. Figure 1 provides an overview 
of the structure of the sukuk al-musharaka.
324 Dar Al Istithmar 2006, p. 23.
325 Art. 5/1/5/6 AAOIFI SS 17.
326 Rahman 2003, p. 7.
327 Jabeen & Javed 2007, p. 408.
328 Art. 5/2/16 AAOIFI SS 17.
329 Clifford Chance DIFC Sukuk Guidebook 2009, p. 22.
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Figure 1 Structure of sukuk al-musharaka
Two further practical aspects of the sukuk al-musharaka need to be addressed: 
(i) its profi t-and-loss-sharing characteristic; and (ii) its liability regime. First, 
the profi t-and-loss-sharing characteristic of the musharaka gives the sukuk al-
musharaka an equity feature. The investment in equity is generally regarded 
as riskier, when compared to investment in fi xed income securities, because 
of the lack of a fi xed stream of income. In practice, therefore, two mechanisms 
were invented to fi x the payments to the sukuk holders. In the event the profi ts 
realised by the musharaka were less than the envisaged periodic payments 
to the sukuk holders, the originator would provide interest-free loans to the 
SPV. The SPV used the amounts to pay the sukuk holders in order to fi x the 
periodic distributions to them. The SPV had to repay the loans, but only if 
it could be recovered by future profi ts realised by the musharaka. There was 
also a mechanism that fi xed the principal of the sukuk holders: the originator 
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provided the SPV a purchase undertaking, pursuant to which it was obliged 
to purchase the shares held by the SPV at the maturity date of the sukuk for 
a fixed agreed price equal to the principal amount of the sukuk holders. Such 
purchase undertaking is a binding promise called wa’d under Islamic law. 
Both mechanisms are declared impermissible by the AAOIFI Resolution.330 
The reason for the impermissibility is that fixing the payments to the sukuk 
holders (both the periodic distribution amounts and the principal) is contra-
dictory to the concept of profit-and-loss-sharing, which is at the heart of the 
contract of musharaka.331
Second, the structure of finance transactions is often determined by tax 
considerations and the liability of the investors. Tax law falls outside the scope 
of this study. As a starting point, the partners of a musharaka are person-
ally liable commensurate with the proportion of their investment for all the 
debts of the musharaka.332 This means that the originator and the SPV will 
be personally liable. In order to mitigate this risk, the parties can structure 
the musharaka through the incorporation of a stock company. The originator 
and the SPV become the shareholders of the stock company. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, the liability of the shareholders of a stock company is limited under 
Islamic law.333 Therefore, in this study I will treat the musharaka in the sukuk 
al-musharaka as a stock company.334
From an Islamic finance law perspective, the rules applicable to the con-
tract of musharaka should be respected when the sukuk al-musharaka is struc-
tured. I discussed these rules in Chapter 3.335 Based on the rules discussed in 
the previous chapter and the structure of the sukuk al-musharaka as discussed 
in this chapter, I can formulate three Islamic finance rules that should be 
respected in the sukuk al-musharaka:
1. the musharaka cannot issue preference shares;336
2. the articles of association of the musharaka should clearly define its 
objects;337 and
3. according to its objects, the main activities of the musharaka should per-
tain to halal tangible properties. This rule also leads to the requirement 
that the value of the tangible properties and the services of the musharaka 
330 Rules 3 and 4 AAOIFI Resolution 2008. For more on the use of such mechanisms before and after 
the issuance of the AAOIFI Resolution of 2008, see Salah 2010c.
331 Cf. Art. 3/1/5/7 AAOIFI SS 12 that states that the contract of musharaka cannot contain a clause that 
may result in a violation of the principle of profit-and-loss-sharing.
332 Usmani 2002, pp. 12-13; Thani, Abdullah & Hassan 2003, pp. 54-56; Visser 2009, pp. 55-57.
333 See Section 3.1.3 of Chapter 3.
334 See Section 5.1 of Chapter 5.
335 See Section 3.1 of Chapter 3.
336 Art. 4/1/2/14 AAOIFI SS 12, see also Art. 2/6 AAOIFI SS 21.
337 Art. 3/1/1/1 AAOIFI SS 12.
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may not be less than 30% of its total assets value in order for its shares to 
remain tradable.338
4.3.2 Sale-Based Sukuk: Sukuk al-Murabaha
The sale-based sukuk are issued on the basis of sale contracts such as murabaha, 
salam or istisna’. In this chapter the sukuk al-murabaha will be discussed. The 
sukuk al-murabaha is issued on the basis of the murabaha contract. Article 3/5 
AAOIFI SS 17 defines sukuk al-murabaha as certificates of equal value issued 
for the purpose of financing the purchase of a property.
The sukuk al-murabaha commences with an originator looking for funding 
for the purchase of an identified tangible property from a third-party seller.339 
The tangible property must be for halal purposes under Islamic law, that is, a 
tangible property that is not related to immoral industries (such as the arms, 
drugs, alcohol, gambling, prostitution and pornography industry).340 The orig-
inator incorporates an SPV that will issue sukuk to fund the purchase of the 
tangible property. The SPV uses the sukuk proceeds to pay the purchase price 
of the tangible property to the third-party seller.341 The third-party seller trans-
fers the right of ownership of the tangible property to the SPV.342 At this point, 
the underlying property in the sukuk transaction owned by the SPV is a tangi-
ble property and, consequently, the sukuk are tradable in secondary markets.343 
This is the only moment when the sukuk are tradable in secondary markets.
The SPV resells the tangible property to the originator. The originator pays 
an amount that includes the cost price plus a profit mark-up to the SPV.344 The 
right of ownership of the tangible property is transferred immediately to the 
originator, while the payment of the purchase price is deferred. The period for 
which the sukuk is outstanding will often be equal to the deferred payment 
period. The instalments will be paid through by the SPV to the sukuk holders. 
338 Art. 3/19 AAOIFI SS 21.
339 Cf. Art. 5/1/5/5 AAOIFI SS 17 that states that the originator is the seller of the tangible property 
and the sukuk holders are the buyers of the tangible property. The sukuk holders as investors in 
capital markets will, however, not be interested in the purchase of a tangible property. They will sell 
it onwards and are entitled to its sale price. The originator is often interested in the purchase of a 
tangible property and will be looking for funding. Therefore, contrary to what is mentioned in Art. 
5/1/5/5 AAOIFI SS 17, the originator will be the party to whom the tangible property is sold eventu-
ally. Another party will be the seller of the tangible property to the sukuk holders (through an SPV). 
This does not create any tension with Art. 5/1/5/5 AAOIFI SS 17 because the essence of that article 
is that the economic ownership of the tangible property is sold to the sukuk holders, making them 
temporarily the economic owners of the tangible property.
340 See Section 2.2 of Chapter 2.
341 Ramadili, Hassan & Adesina-Uthman 2010, p. 8.
342 Adam & Thomas 2004, pp. 131-133.
343 Art. 5/2/15 AAOIFI SS 17.
344 Dar Al Istithmar 2006, p. 20.
66
4  Sukuk
The SPV has a claim on the originator for the payment of the purchase price, 
which is the underlying property of the sukuk transaction at this point. After 
delivery of the tangible property to the originator, the sukuk al-murabaha are 
not tradable anymore.345 In practice, both sale contracts (between the third-
party seller and the SPV and between the SPV and the originator) are signed 
simultaneously. Consequently, the sukuk al-murabaha is not tradable.346 Since 
the SPV has only a contractual claim for the payment of the purchase price on 
the originator, it will require security for the payment of the purchase price. 
The originator will grant the SPV a security right over the tangible property to 
secure its payment obligations.
The SPV pays the instalments to the sukuk holders. This can be structured 
in different ways. The sukuk can be redeemable securities, which means that 
the deferred payments will be paid through to the sukuk holders redeeming 
the sukuk over time.347 With the payment of the last period, the sukuk are com-
pletely redeemed. It is, however, also possible to create a reserve account and 
pay the sukuk holders the profit mark-up over the underlying tangible prop-
erty periodically, while the cost price of the tangible property will be kept in 
the reserve account. At the maturity date of the sukuk, the funds held in the 
reserve account will be paid to the sukuk holders to redeem the sukuk. Another 
possibility is that the entire amount will be paid through to the sukuk holders 
at the maturity date of the sukuk. This turns the sukuk into a non-coupon secu-
rity comparable to a zero coupon bond.348 However, contrary to a zero coupon 
bond where a debt claim is sold at discount, in a sukuk transaction profit is 
made through trade in a tangible property.349 The originator can decide what 
kind of sukuk al-murabaha it would like to offer. Figure 2 gives an overview of 
this structure.
345 Art. 5/2/15 AAOIFI SS 17.
346 The AAOIFI Resolution reconfirmed that sukuk must not represent debts or receivables in order to 
be tradable, see Rule 2 AAOIFI Resolution 2008.
347 From a Shari’ah perspective, the redeemable feature of sukuk does not create any tension with 
Islamic law because the sukuk will be redeemed for their face value over time, which is permissible 
according to Art. 5/2/1 AAOIFI SS 17.
348 Al-Amine 2001, p. 3.
349 Zero coupon bonds are impermissible under Islamic finance law because the bonds are sold at 
discount. This results in a prohibition of riba because intangible properties are traded not for their 
face value, but with a decrease in value.
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Figure 2 Structure of sukuk al-murabaha
On the basis of the rules for the murabaha that were discussed in Chapter 3, I 
can formulate the Islamic fi nance law rules applicable to the sukuk al-murabaha:
1. the third-party seller should be the owner of the tangible property and pos-
sess it before the conclusion of the contract of sale with the SPV;
2. subsequently, the SPV should be the owner of the tangible property and 
possess it before the conclusion of the contract of sale with the originator;350
3. the SPV and the originator may not stipulate that the ownership of the 
tangible property is not transferred to the originator until full payment of 
the purchase price to the SPV;351
4. the originator may grant a security right only once the originator has in-
curred a debt for which the security will be granted;
5. the originator may grant a security right only over a tangible property it 
owns and possesses. If the security right is granted over the subject mat-
ter of the murabaha transaction, the originator and the SPV can agree on 
a ‘fi duciary pledge’, i.e. a security right that is granted to the SPV from the 
350 Art. 3/1/1 AAOIFI SS 8.
351 Art. 5/4 AAOIFI SS 8.
68
4  Sukuk
outset of the transfer on the tangible property that is the subject matter of 
the transfer;352
6. the SPV and the originator may not stipulate that a rebate will be given to 
the originator in the event of early payment of the purchase price by the 
originator to the SPV;353 and
7. the SPV and the originator may stipulate a penalty clause in the contract 
of sale between them, pursuant to which a penalty is charged in the event 
of default on an instalment, provided that the SPV pays that amount to a 
charity.354
4.3.3 Lease-Based Sukuk: Sukuk al-Ijarah
Lease-based sukuk are one of the most popular sukuk because they can offer 
fixed returns to sukuk holders (as the sukuk al-murabaha) and are tradable at 
the same time (as the sukuk al-musharaka), having the benefits of both the 
other two categories of sukuk. These two features also make lease-based sukuk 
a compatible alternative to conventional bonds.355 These sukuk are attractive 
for investors looking for Shari’ah-compliant fixed income securities.356 The 
contract of ijarah forms the basis of lease-based sukuk. Tangible property that 
is eligible for leasing such as land, building, aircraft, vehicles or equipment 
can be used as the underlying property of the sukuk transaction.357
There are five forms of lease-based sukuk. Article 3 AAOIFI SS 17 subcate-
gorises the five different forms of lease-based sukuk in two categories: (i) sukuk 
certificates representing ownership in a (leased) tangible property (sukuk al-
ijarah); and (ii) sukuk certificates representing the right of use of a tangible 
property (sukuk manfaa-ijarah). The sukuk manfaa-ijarah is, in turn, subdi-
vided into four different types, namely, sukuk representing: (a) the right of 
use of an existing tangible property; (b) the right of use of an identified future 
tangible property; (c) services of a specified party; and (d) identified future ser-
vices. The sukuk al-ijarah will be studied in this research. The sukuk al-ijarah 
is arguably the most flexible sukuk structure. It can be structured in several 
ways. The form of the sukuk al-ijarah depends on the nature of the leased 
property and the purpose of the sukuk issuance.358 The textbook example of 
352 Art. 5/2 AAOIFI SS 8.
353 Art. 5/9 AAOIFI SS 8.
354 Art. 5/6 AAOIFI SS 8.
355 Obaidullah 2005, p. 162.
356 Jabeen & Javed 2007, pp. 407-408.
357 Global Investment House Strategy Report 2008, p. 10; Kamali 2007, p. 14; Ayub 2007, pp. 400-401; 
Tariq & Dar 2007, p. 205; Ramadili, Hassan & Adesina-Uthman 2010, p. 8.
358 The sukuk al-ijarah can, for example, be acquired for asset finance purposes, to attract funding for 
working capital purposes or as a refinancing tool, see Al-Amine 2001, p. 5.
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the sukuk al-ijarah is a sukuk issuance over an underlying sale and leaseback 
transaction.359 This form of sukuk al-ijarah is also studied in this research.
The originator initiates the sukuk al-ijarah. The originator must have a tan-
gible property that will be the subject matter of the transaction. The use of the 
tangible property must be for halal purposes. This means that an armoury 
factory, for example, cannot be the subject matter of the sukuk transaction. 
The office building of a company, on the other hand, qualifies as a halal tan-
gible property. The originator incorporates an SPV. The originator sells and 
transfers the tangible property to the SPV, pursuant to a contract of sale.360 
The SPV becomes the owner of the tangible property.361 The SPV issues sukuk 
certificates and uses the sukuk proceeds to pay the purchase price of the tangi-
ble property to the originator.362
Next, the SPV (lessor) leases the tangible property back to the originator 
(lessee), pursuant to a separate ijarah contract.363 The originator acquires the 
right of use of the tangible property and pays rent to the SPV. The SPV pays 
the rent through to the sukuk holders as the periodic distribution amounts of 
the sukuk.364 The period of the ijarah contract will be equal to the period for 
which the sukuk are outstanding. During this period, the sukuk can be traded 
in secondary markets because the underlying property ‘owned’ by the sukuk 
holders is a (leased) tangible property.365
At the maturity date of the sukuk, the SPV sells the tangible property back 
to the originator.366 The right of ownership of the tangible property is trans-
ferred back to the originator and the originator pays a purchase price to the 
SPV. The SPV pays the purchase price through to the sukuk holders. The origi-
nator may provide a purchase undertaking to the SPV, pursuant to which the 
originator is obliged to offer to purchase the tangible property at the maturity 
date of the sukuk for a purchase price that is equal to the principal amount of 
the sukuk. Such purchase undertaking is the binding promise of wa’d under 
Islamic law. The AAOIFI Resolution confirmed that the use of such purchase 
undertakings is permissible in the sukuk al-ijarah structure.367 After paying 
back the sukuk holders their principal amount, the sukuk will be redeemed.368 
Figure 3 provides an overview of the sukuk al-ijarah structure.
359 Adam & Thomas 2004, p. 116.
360 Cf. Art. 5/1/5/1 AAOIFI SS 17.
361 Wilson 2006, p. 9.
362 Cf. Art. 5/1/5/1 AAOIFI SS 17.
363 Dar Al Istithmar 2006, p. 13.
364 Obaidullah 2005, pp. 162-164.
365 Art. 5/2/4 AAOIFI SS 17.
366 McMillen (Handbook of Islamic Banking) 2007, pp. 228-229.
367 Rule 5 AAOIFI 2008.
368 McMillen (Handbook of Islamic Banking) 2007, pp. 228-229.
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The reason for the diff erence in the approach of Shari’ah scholars to the use of the 
promise of wa’d in the sukuk al-musharaka and the use of the promise of wa’d in 
the sukuk al-ijarah is that the sukuk al-musharaka is an equity-based sukuk which is 
based on the concept of profi t-and-loss-sharing. A purchase undertaking that guar-
antees the principal of sukuk holders in the sukuk al-musharaka is contradictory to 
the essence of equity-based sukuk because it mitigates the (profi t- and) loss-sharing 
between the partners. However, the sukuk al-ijarah is based on a lease contract. 
Guaranteeing the principal of sukuk holders in the sukuk al-ijarah does not aff ect 
the essence of this structure because the concept of profi t-and-loss-sharing is not 
the cornerstone of this structure.
Figure 3 Structure of sukuk al-ijarah
From an Islamic fi nance law perspective, the following fi ve rules should be 
respected in the sukuk al-ijarah structure:
1. the originator should be the owner and the possessor of the tangible pro-
perty before the conclusion of the contract of sale with the SPV;
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2. the SPV should become the owner and the possessor of the tangible pro-
perty after the conclusion of the contract of sale with the originator;
3. the ijarah contract between the SPV and the originator should stipulate 
that the liabilities and the risks attached to the ownership of the tangible 
property are borne by the SPV;369
4. if a promise of wa’d is provided by the originator to offer to purchase the 
tangible property at the maturity date of the sukuk, it may not be a bilateral 
promise.370 It should be binding only on the originator; and
5. at the maturity date of the sukuk, a new offer and acceptance are required to 
conclude a new contract of sale between the originator and the SPV.371 The 
binding promise may not be an offer.
4.4 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter I discussed the concept of sukuk as Islamic securities. Based on 
the principles of riba and gharar, these securities should represent the ‘owner-
ship’ of the sukuk holders in an underlying property. Islamic property law does 
not require the sukuk holders to become the owners of the underlying prop-
erty. The sukuk certificates should provide the sukuk holders financial rights, 
according to which they are entitled to the financial benefits realised with the 
underlying property. Economically, the sukuk holders become the owners of 
the property. Depending on whether the underlying property is tangible or 
intangible, the sukuk certificates can be traded in secondary markets.
The three basic sukuk structures were analysed in this chapter: the sukuk 
al-musharaka, the sukuk al-murabaha and the sukuk al-ijarah. In the sukuk al-
musharaka the originator and the SPV incorporate a musharaka partnership, 
whereby the SPV issues sukuk to attract funding for the partnership. In the 
sukuk al-murabaha the originator funds the purchase of a tangible property 
through an SPV that issues sukuk to attract funding for the originator. In the 
sukuk al-ijarah the originator enters into a sale and leaseback transaction with 
the SPV to acquire funding, whereby the SPV issues sukuk to raise money for 
such funding. On the basis of the Islamic finance rules for each underlying 
Islamic finance contract and for sukuk, I created a framework for the three 
sukuk structures. This framework should be taken into consideration when 
structuring sukuk under Dutch law, as discussed in the subsequent chapters.
369 Arts. 5/1/5, 5/1/7 and 5/1/8 AAOIFI SS 9.
370 Art. 8/2 AAOIFI SS 9.
371 Arts. 8/1 and 8/3 AAOIFI SS 9.
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5 Structuring Underlying Islamic Finance 
Contracts in Sukuk Transactions under 
Dutch Law
In this chapter I assess the underlying Islamic finance contracts (the mush-
araka, the murabaha and the ijarah) of the sukuk al-musharaka, the sukuk 
al-murabaha and the sukuk al-ijarah under Dutch law in order to answer 
the question whether these transactions can be structured in a Dutch legal 
environment. In the previous chapter I formulated specific rules for each 
sukuk structure that should be respected in order to acquire the approval of 
a Shari’ah supervisory board so that the securities qualify as sukuk and can 
be offered as Shari’ah-compliant instruments in financial markets. In this 
chapter I will assess those specific rules for each sukuk structure under Dutch 
law. The Islamic finance rules for the sukuk al-musharaka are assessed under 
Dutch corporate law (Section 5.1). The Islamic finance rules for the sukuk al-
murabaha (Section 5.2) and the sukuk al-ijarah (Section 5.3) are assessed under 
Dutch property law and Dutch contract law.
5.1 The Musharaka in the Sukuk al-Musharaka under Dutch Corporate Law
5.1.1 Islamic Finance Rules for a Musharaka Stock Company in Sukuk 
al- Musharaka
In the sukuk al-musharaka structure the originator incorporates a musharaka. 
In Chapter 4 I discussed that the musharaka in the sukuk al-musharaka should 
be incorporated as a stock company (kapitaalvennootschap) instead of a part-
nership contract in order to limit the liability of the partners of the musharaka. 
The originator and the SPV subscribe to the shares of the musharaka and 
become shareholders of the musharaka. The SPV issues sukuk certificates and 
uses the sukuk proceeds to pay for the shares of the musharaka. During the 
term of the sukuk, the musharaka pays dividends to the originator and the SPV 
as its shareholders. The SPV pays the dividends through to the sukuk holders. 
At maturity of the sukuk, the originator purchases the shares of the SPV in the 
musharaka at market value. The SPV pays the purchase price of the shares to 
the sukuk holders. The sukuk will be redeemed. In this chapter I discuss only 
the legal form of the musharaka under Dutch law, as marked in Figure 1. I do 
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not discuss the legal form of the SPV and its legal relationship with the sukuk 
holders; these aspects will be discussed in Chapter 6.
Figure 1 Underlying Islamic fi nance contract in sukuk al-musharaka under 
Dutch law
In the previous chapter I formulated three Islamic fi nance law rules for the 
sukuk al-musharaka:
1. the musharaka cannot issue preference shares;
2. the articles of association of the musharaka should clearly defi ne its ob-
jects; and
3. according to its objects, the main activities of the musharaka should per-
tain to halal tangible properties. This rule also leads to the requirement 
that the value of the tangible properties and the services of the musharaka 
may not be less than 30% of its total assets value in order for its shares to 
remain tradable.
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According to Islamic law, these rules must be met in order to qualify the secu-
rities as Shari’ah-compliant. Otherwise, a Shari’ah supervisory board will 
not approve the structure. These three rules should, therefore, be met under 
Dutch law when the sukuk al-musharaka is structured in a Dutch legal envi-
ronment. In the next subsection I assess the three Islamic finance rules for 
the sukuk al-musharaka under Dutch corporate law. The first two rules raise no 
issues under Dutch corporate law. The third rule that requires that the main 
activities of the musharaka should pertain to halal tangible assets can also be 
met easily. The further requirement that the value of the tangible properties 
and the services of the musharaka may not be less than 30% of its total assets 
value in order for its shares to remain tradable deserves closer consideration.
Strictly speaking, the term ‘tradable’ does not refer to the transfer of the shares. 
This means that the shares can be transferred if the shares are transferred for the 
same price for which they were purchased initially by the SPV (even when the 
value of the tangible properties and the services of the musharaka is less than 30% 
of its total assets value). In such case, the shares are not traded, but they are only 
transferred from an Islamic finance law perspective. However, if the SPV sells and 
transfers the shares for a lower or higher price than its initial purchase price, the 
shares are traded. As discussed in chapter 4, the originator and the SPV cannot fix 
the purchase price of the shares in a musharaka in the sukuk al-musharaka struc-
ture.372 According to the AAOIFI Resolution of February 2008, it is impermissible 
to fix the purchase price of the shares because it affects the profit- and loss-sharing 
characteristic of the musharaka. Therefore, the shares should always be sold and 
transferred at their market value or at a price to be agreed upon at the moment 
of the sale of the shares, which means that in practice the transfer of the shares 
will almost always qualify as the trade of the shares from an Islamic finance law 
perspective.
The tradability of the shares in the musharaka is not necessarily required for 
the structure: the originator and the SPV hold the shares until maturity of the 
sukuk. However, the SPV will sell and transfer its shares at market value at 
least at maturity of the sukuk or earlier in case of an event of default (to use the 
proceeds to redeem the sukuk). Therefore, Shari’ah scholars will not approve 
the sukuk al-musharaka structure if the requirement that the value of the tan-
gible properties and the services of the musharaka may not be less than 30% 
of its total assets value in order for its shares to remain tradable is not met. 
Shari’ah scholars have formulated this rule as an additional check to ensure 
that the requirement that the main activities of the musharaka should pertain 
372 See Section 4.3.1 of Chapter 4.
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to tangible properties is not circumvented. Their reasoning is that if the value 
of the tangible properties and the services of the musharaka is not at least 30% 
of its total assets value, its main activities do not relate to tangible properties 
even if this is stipulated in its objects.373 In order to ensure that the prohibition 
of riba, the prohibition of the bay al-dayn in particular (which bans the trade 
in claims), is not violated the shares cannot be traded in such event. Hence, as 
a starting point, the shares in the musharaka are tradable if its main activities 
pertain to tangible properties. Only at times when the value of the tangible 
properties and the services of the musharaka is less than 30% of its total assets 
value, its shares may not be traded from an Islamic finance law perspective. I 
will assess whether this Islamic finance rule can be met through the stipula-
tion of transfer restrictions (blokkeringsregeling) in the articles of association of 
the musharaka under Dutch corporate law.
5.1.2 Musharaka under Dutch Corporate Law: Incorporation of a Musharaka 
BV
Dutch corporate law distinguishes between two forms of stock companies: a 
private limited liability company (BV) and a public limited liability company 
(NV). The musharaka in a sukuk al-musharaka structure has a closed circle of 
shareholders: the originator and the SPV. Therefore, I will review the possibili-
ties to structure a musharaka through the incorporation of a Dutch BV. I will 
use the term ‘musharaka BV’ when addressing a musharaka incorporated as a 
Dutch BV. Next, I assess whether a BV can be incorporated in such way that it 
meets the above-formulated Islamic finance rules.
In this research I study the possibilities to structure a musharaka only as a BV 
under Dutch law.374 This, however, does not mean that the musharaka cannot 
be structured in other legal forms under Dutch law. It might also be possible to 
structure the musharaka as an NV, as a limited partnership (commanditaire ven-
nootschap), as a general partnership (vennootschap onder firma) or as a cooperative 
(coöperatie) under Dutch corporate law.375
First, the issuance of preference shares is not permitted under Islamic finance 
law. Preference shares provide shareholders special financial rights as stipu-
lated in the articles of association of a company, for example, priority with 
regard to payment of dividends. This disrupts the appropriation of profits and 
373 See App. B AAOIFI SS 21. See also Section 3.1.3 of Chapter 3.
374 See Section 4.3.1 of Chapter 4 and Section 5.1.1 of this chapter.
375 For more on some of these possibilities, see Van Rossum 2009, pp. 360-366.
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is not in line with the Islamic concept of profit-and-loss-sharing.376 Under 
Dutch corporate law, Article 2:201 (1) DCC attaches equal rights and obliga-
tions to all shares of a BV to the proportion of the amount they represent, so 
long the articles of association do not provide otherwise.377 So long the articles 
of association of a musharaka BV do not stipulate that it can issue preference 
shares, such shares will be non-existent.
The second Islamic finance rule for a musharaka in a sukuk al-musharaka 
has a counterpart under Dutch corporate law: a notarial deed of incorporation 
is required for the incorporation of a BV, which, according to Article 2:177 (1) 
DCC, should contain the articles of association that include the name, the 
registered office and the objects of the BV.378 In the musharaka BV, its objects 
should stipulate that the musharaka BV is a Shari’ah-compliant BV with a 
short description of the three addressed Islamic finance rules.
The third Islamic finance rule has no counterpart under Dutch corporate 
law. It can, however, be met easily. The objects of the musharaka BV in its arti-
cles of association should explicitly limit the activities of the musharaka BV to 
halal activities, with a list of prohibited immoral industries which are haram 
and in which it cannot engage. Its objects should, furthermore, stipulate to 
what tangible properties its main activities pertain. The musharaka BV can, 
for example, be a car manufacturer. It can, however, not be a factoring com-
pany or a weapons manufacturer.
Furthermore, the value of the tangible properties and the services of the 
musharaka BV may not be less than 30% of its total assets value.379 Otherwise, 
the shares of the musharaka BV cannot be tradable from an Islamic law per-
spective. It is possible to structure this Islamic finance requirement through 
the stipulation of transfer restrictions in the articles of association of a mush-
araka BV under Dutch law. The originator as its founder should stipulate in the 
articles of association of the musharaka BV that the shares of the musharaka 
376 See Section 3.1.3 of Chapter 3.
377 As the words of Art. 2:201 (1) DCC indicate, the article is a directory provision (regelend recht), so it 
is possible to deviate from it in the articles of association of a BV. The Dutch Supreme Court con-
firmed this for Art. 2:92 (1) DCC, see Dutch Supreme Court 14 December 2007, NJ 2008, 105. Art. 
2:92 (1) DCC is the counterpart provision for the NV of Art. 2:201 (1) DCC, which is applicable on the 
BV. As a result, it is possible to issue preference shares under Dutch corporate law, see also Huizink 
2009, pp. 93-94. Pursuant to Art. 2:201 (3) DCC, it is also possible to issue priority shares under 
Dutch corporate law. The issuance of priority shares is not conflicting with the Shari’ah because 
priority shares do not disrupt the appropriation of profits, see Section 3.1.3 of Chapter 3.
378 Art. 2:175 (2) in conjunction with 2:177 (1) DCC. Dutch law requires that, in addition to the objects of 
the BV, its name and its registered office should be stipulated in its articles of association, due to the 
significance of the addressed information for third parties, see Pitlo & Raaijmakers 2006, pp. 199-
200. Arts. 2:178 and 2:244 (4) DCC contain provisions on other information that must be included 
in the articles of association of a BV.
379 See the third Islamic finance rule for the sukuk al-musharaka, as mentioned in Section 5.1.1 of this 
chapter.
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BV are freely transferable as a starting point. It should, furthermore, stipulate 
that the transfer of the shares is excluded only at times when the value of the 
tangible properties and the services of the musharaka BV is less than 30% 
of its total assets value based on its annual accounts of that year. In order to 
operationalise the Islamic finance requirement in practice, the check of the 
financial ratio may be based on the annual accounts of the musharaka BV. As a 
result, there will be a continuing check of the required financial ratio with the 
publication of the annual accounts every year. In addition, an accountant can 
determine the percentage of the tangible properties, but also of the services of 
the musharaka BV by calculating the revenues from the rendering of services.
The articles of association should stipulate that if the financial ratio is not 
met, the managing board should send a notice to the shareholders that the 
transfer of the shares is excluded temporarily. The managing board should 
also register such notice with the shareholders register of the musharaka BV 
and publish it on the website of the musharaka BV pursuant to its the articles 
of association. Once the value of the tangible properties and the services of the 
musharaka BV is over 30% of its total assets value based on its annual accounts 
of the subsequent year (or possibly earlier based on an interim report of an 
accountant), the managing board should send another notice to the sharehold-
ers stating that the shares can be traded freely again, together with the regis-
tration of such notice with the shareholders register and its publication on the 
website of the musharaka BV. According to Article 2:195 (3) DCC, the transfer 
of the shares of a BV can be excluded temporarily. A transfer of the shares 
disregarding such exclusion in the articles of association of the musharaka BV 
is invalid under Dutch law.
A temporary exclusion is not bound by a maximum period. The nature of the busi-
ness of a BV determines what period is justified. According to the parliamentary 
history, a temporary exclusion by a period of five years will be in line with the 
principle of reasonableness and fairness (redelijkheid en billijkheid) of article 2:8 
DCC, but a longer period, e.g. 20 years, can also be justified.380 The transfer of the 
shares of a musharaka BV in a sukuk al-musharaka may not be excluded perma-
nently. The managing board of the musharaka BV should ensure that the value of 
the tangible properties and the services of the musharaka BV is at least 30% of its 
total assets value at the maturity date of the sukuk, if not earlier, so that the shares 
can be transferred by the SPV to the originator at the maturity date. The sukuk 
al-musharaka will be issued for a defined period, which in practice is often five 
380 Parliamentary History, Flex BV Law 2012, p. 180.
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years.381 The SPV should be able to transfer its shares in the musharaka BV at the 
maturity date of the sukuk so that it has proceeds which it can use to redeem the 
sukuk (i.e. the purchase price paid by the originator to the SPV for the purchase 
of the shares will be paid through by the SPV to the sukuk holders to redeem the 
sukuk). If the value of the tangible properties and the services of the musharaka BV 
is not at least 30% of its total assets value at the maturity date of the sukuk, the SPV 
cannot transfer the shares and the sukuk cannot be redeemed yet. In practice, it is 
unlikely that such event will occur because the musharaka BV will be a company 
whose main activities pertain to tangible properties and which, in addition, will 
take account of the required financial ratio for Shari’ah compliance purposes. The 
articles of association could, however, stipulate that if such unlikely event occurs, 
the managing board has the obligation to act to the best of its ability to increase 
the percentage of tangible properties in the musharaka BV according to a period 
defined in its transfer restrictions, e.g. six months. The maturity date of the sukuk 
will be extended for that period, e.g. six months.
Finally, in order to ensure the Shari’ah compliance of the musharaka BV not 
only upon its incorporation but also thereafter, an amendment of the objects 
and of the transfer restrictions of the musharaka BV must be excluded in its 
articles of association. According to Article 2:231 (1) DCC, these articles can, 
nevertheless, be amended if all shareholders accept such amendment in a 
general meeting of shareholders where all subscribed capital is represented. 
Furthermore, based on Article 2:231 (3) DCC it is also possible to amend the 
stipulation in the articles of association that excludes the amendment of the 
objects and of the transfer restrictions of the BV if all shareholders accept 
such amendment in a general meeting of shareholders where all subscribed 
capital is represented. As a starting point, the shareholders must refrain 
from amending the objects and the transfer restrictions of the musharaka BV, 
assuming that they will act in accordance with the articles of association of 
the musharaka BV. If the shareholders, nevertheless, would like to amend the 
objects or the transfer restrictions of the musharaka BV (or the stipulation in 
its articles of association that excludes their amendment), acceptance of the 
amendment is required by all shareholders of the musharaka BV, including 
the SPV. The SPV, in turn, must act in the interest of the sukuk holders based 
on its own articles of association. It will, therefore, not accept an amendment 
of the objects or of the transfer restrictions of the musharaka BV that results in 
a violation of the Islamic finance rules for the musharaka BV.
381 See Offering Circular TID Global Sukuk 2006, p. 4; Offering Circular JAFZ Sukuk 2007, p. 16; Offering 
Circular NICBM Sukuk 2006, p. 5; Offering Circular URC Sukuk 2007, p. 8.
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5.1.3 Legal Effects and Practical Considerations of Transfer Restrictions in 
the Articles of Association of the Musharaka BV with respect to the 
Transfer of its Shares and the Sukuk
The stipulation of transfer restrictions in the articles of association of the 
musharaka BV is peculiar. In practice, the shares in the musharaka BV will 
not be traded by the originator and the SPV. They will hold the shares dur-
ing the period when the sukuk is outstanding. During this period, the sukuk 
certificates will be traded in secondary markets by the sukuk holders. At the 
maturity of the sukuk, the SPV will transfer its shares in the musharaka BV to 
the originator so that it has proceeds which it can use to redeem the sukuk. The 
stipulation of transfer restrictions in the articles of association of the mushara-
ka BV is, nonetheless, required to meet the Islamic finance requirement that 
the value of the tangible properties and the services of the musharaka BV may 
not be less than 30% of its total assets value in order for its shares to remain 
tradable. This requirement has to be met in order to acquire the approval of 
a Shari’ah supervisory board for the transaction. Article 2:195 (3) DCC makes 
the implementation of this Islamic finance rule possible under Dutch law.
On 1 October 2012, the Bill on simpler and more flexible BV law, also referred to as 
the Flex BV law, entered into force. With the entry into force of the Flex BV law, the 
statutory provisions relating to transfer restrictions were amended. Under former 
BV law, there was no possibility for a (temporary) exclusion of the transfer of the 
shares of a BV.382 This amendment has been useful in enhancing the Shari’ah 
compliance of a BV.
A transfer of the shares disregarding a temporary exclusion in the articles of 
association of the musharaka BV is invalid according to Article 2:195 (3) DCC. 
The transfer restrictions have proprietary effects under Dutch law.383 In case of 
a right of pledge on the shares of a musharaka BV, the pledgee is also bound by 
the transfer restrictions.384 So is a bankruptcy trustee in case of bankruptcy of 
one of the shareholders of the musharaka BV. It should, however, be noted that 
under specific circumstances, for example, in case of bankruptcy, the transfer 
restrictions in the articles of association of the musharaka BV can be set aside 
382 See former Art. 2:195 (8) DCC.
383 Art. 2:195 (3) DCC. The former Art. 2:195 DCC did not explicitly mention that a transfer of shares dis-
regarding the transfer restrictions in the articles of association of a BV was invalid. However, in the 
literature it was generally accepted that a transfer of shares disregarding transfer restrictions was 
invalid based on the former Art. 2:195 (4) and (5) DCC. See Asser/Maeijer, Van Solinge & Nieuwe 
Weme 2010 (2-II*), no. 300; Huizink 2009, pp. 109-112; Van Schilfgaarde/Winter 2009, pp. 130-131; 
Slagter 2005, pp. 225-226; Kortmann 1991, pp. 282-283; Dortmund 1989, p. 29; Schwarz 1986, p. 23.
384 See Art. 2:198 (6) DCC.
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by a court.385 The court will grant such request only if the interests of the peti-
tioner require this and the interests of other parties are not disproportionally 
prejudiced.386 If a bankruptcy trustee files such request, the court will consid-
er the interests of the creditors in the bankruptcy and not the interests of the 
bankruptcy trustee himself.387 Besides the interest of the petitioner, the court 
will also consider whether the interests of other parties are not disproportion-
ally prejudiced. According to the parliamentary history, such interests of other 
parties can be the interests of the shareholders in case of applicability of the 
transfer restrictions.388 In the case of the sukuk al-musharaka, non-applicability 
of the transfer restrictions may raise questions on the Shari’ah compliance 
of the (sukuk al-) musharaka. As a result, unrest may be caused among the 
sukuk holders as investors, which could even result in declaring the sukuk 
due and payable, which affects the SPV as the shareholder of the musharaka 
BV.389 Although this is a highly casuistic question, there may be good argu-
ments why non-applicability of the transfer restrictions of the musharaka BV 
prejudices the interests of others disproportionally. However, there remains 
a risk that a court will declare the transfer restrictions non-applicable. The 
risk addressed is a litigation risk and does not affect the Shari’ah compliance 
of the proposed structure for the musharaka upfront, but it only affects its 
Shari’ah compliance once the court has declared the transfer restrictions non-
applicable. It illustrates that in case of litigation, the Shari’ah compliance of 
the sukuk transaction can be affected. A comparable risk is present with regard 
to inquiry proceedings (enquêteprocedure) at the Enterprise Chamber of the 
Amsterdam Court of Appeal (Ondernemingskamer). The court can declare the 
transfer restrictions non-applicable by way of immediate injunctions (onmid-
delijke voorzieningen) if the court reaches the conclusion that there has been 
failure of policy (wanbeleid) within the musharaka BV.
The SPV as shareholder in the musharaka BV issues sukuk to fund its pay-
ment for the shares. As addressed, the trade in financial instruments occurs 
at the level of the sukuk and not at the level of the shares in the musharaka 
BV. Consequently, the transfer restrictions in the articles of association of the 
385 In the event of bankruptcy, debt managing of natural persons (schuldsaneringsregeling natuurlijke 
personen), right of pledge, attachment in execution (executoriaal beslag), issue of bequest (afgifte 
van legaat) or transfer from a community (toedeling uit een gemeenschap), the court can declare the 
transfer restrictions partially or completely non-applicable, see Art. 2:195 (7) DCC.
386 The bankruptcy trustee, administrator, pledgee, execution creditor, interested party by an issue of 
bequest or interested party by a transfer from a community can file such request with the court 
according to Art. 2:195 (7) DCC.
387 Parliamentary History, Flex BV Law 2012, p. 191.
388 Ibid.
389 Whether the sukuk holders can declare the sukuk due and payable on the basis of non-Shari’ah com-
pliance of the sukuk mainly depends on the terms and conditions, in particular the events of default 
and the remedies, of the sukuk as stipulated in its offering circular.
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musharaka BV do not affect the tradability of the sukuk issued by the SPV. The 
sukuk holders have a legal relationship only with the SPV. The sukuk holders 
can freely transfer their sukuk under Dutch law, provided that the terms and 
conditions of the sukuk do not contain transfer restrictions for the transfer 
of the sukuk.390 This is comparable to the issuance of depositary receipts for 
shares (certificering van aandelen), where transfer restrictions in the articles 
of association of the BV do not affect the tradability of the depositary receipts 
issued by the administration office (stichting administratiekantoor).391 As a mat-
ter of fact, one of the motives to issue such depositary receipts was formerly to 
enhance tradability of the shares of a BV because mandatory transfer restric-
tions used to apply to the transfer of shares of a BV before the entry into force 
of the Flex BV law. Similar reasoning exists under Islamic law: in the case of 
sukuk al-musharaka, the shares of the musharaka cannot be traded when the 
value of its tangible properties and its services is less than 30% of its total 
assets value, but the sukuk remain tradable in order to create liquidity in sec-
ondary markets. This raises no issues under Islamic law. Therefore, the issu-
ance of sukuk creates maximum flexibility.
Concluding, the musharaka in the sukuk al-musharaka can be incorporated 
as a Dutch BV under Dutch corporate law. In order to ensure that it meets the 
Islamic finance rules for the musharaka in a sukuk al-musharaka, its objects 
should stipulate that the musharaka BV is a Shari’ah-compliant BV, which 
means that: (i) it cannot issue preference shares; (ii) its activities are limited 
to halal activites, with a list of prohibited immoral industries which are haram 
and in which it cannot engage; and (iii) its main activities must relate to tan-
gible properties and it will have transfer restrictions. The transfer restrictions 
should exclude the transfer of the shares when the value of the tangible prop-
erties and the services of the musharaka BV is less than 30% of its total assets 
value based on its annual accounts of that year. The possibility to amend the 
objects clause and the clauses with the transfer restrictions of the musharaka 
BV should be excluded in the articles of association of the musharaka BV.
390 The legal relationship between the SPV and the sukuk holders and the nature of the sukuk are 
assessed under Dutch law in Chapter 6.
391 Asser/Maeijer, Van Solinge & Nieuwe Weme 2010 (2-II*), nos. 660-661.
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5.2 The Murabaha in the Sukuk al-Murabaha under Dutch Property and 
Contract Law
5.2.1 Islamic Finance Rules for Murabaha Transaction in Sukuk al-Murabaha
The sukuk al-murabaha is used for asset finance purposes: a party requiring 
funding for the purchase of a tangible property can use the sukuk al-mura-
baha. This originator incorporates an SPV. The SPV will purchase a halal 
tangible property from a third-party seller. The SPV issues sukuk in capital 
markets. The sukuk proceeds are used by the SPV to pay the purchase price of 
the tangible property to the third-party seller. Next, the SPV sells the tangible 
property to the originator. The originator pays the initial purchase price plus a 
profit mark-up to the SPV. This amount is paid in instalments. The SPV pays 
the amount through to the sukuk holders as the periodic distributions and 
the principal of the sukuk certificates.392 At the maturity date of the sukuk, the 
sukuk will be redeemed. In this section, I assess the sale from the third-party 
seller to the SPV, and the resale from the SPV to the originator under Dutch 
law, as marked in Figure 2. The legal form of the SPV and its legal relationship 
with the sukuk holders are assessed under Dutch law in Chapter 6.
In Chapters 2 and 3 I discussed the Islamic finance rules for the murabaha. 
On the basis of those rules, I created an Islamic finance framework for the 
sukuk al-murabaha in Chapter 4:
1. the third-party seller should be the owner of the tangible property and pos-
sess it before the conclusion of the contract of sale with the SPV;
2. subsequently, the SPV should be the owner of the tangible property and 
possess it before the conclusion of the contract of sale with the originator;
3. the SPV and the originator may not stipulate that the ownership of the 
tangible property is not transferred to the originator until full payment of 
the purchase price to the SPV;
4. the originator may grant a security right only once the originator has in-
curred a debt for which the security will be granted;
5. the originator may grant a security right only over a tangible property it 
owns and possesses. If the security right is granted over the subject mat-
ter of the murabaha transaction, the originator and the SPV can agree on 
a ‘fiduciary pledge’, i.e. a security right that is granted to the SPV from the 
392 The payment of the periodic distributions and the principal to the sukuk holders can be structured 
in different ways, see Section 4.3.2 of Chapter 4.
84
5  Structuring Underlying Islamic Finance Contracts in Sukuk Transactions under Dutch Law
outset of the transfer on the tangible property that is the subject matter of 
the transfer;393
6. the SPV and the originator may not stipulate that a rebate will be given to 
the originator in the event of early payment of the purchase price by the 
originator to the SPV; and
7. the SPV and the originator may stipulate a penalty clause in the contract 
of sale between them, pursuant to which a penalty is charged in the event 
of default on an instalment, provided that the SPV pays that amount to a 
charity.
Figure 2 Underlying Islamic fi nance contract in sukuk al-murabaha under Dutch 
law
These Islamic fi nance rules should be met in order to structure the sukuk 
al-murabaha in a Shari’ah-compliant manner under Dutch law. Otherwise, a 
Shari’ah supervisory board will refrain from approving the structure and the 
393 The term ‘fi duciary pledge’ is mentioned in Art. 5/2 AAOIFI SS 8, see Section 3.2.1 of Chapter 3.
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securities cannot be offered as sukuk in financial markets. As a starting point, 
I will take the first rule as a given: the following sections are based on the 
assumption that the third-party seller is the owner and the possessor of the 
tangible property. The second, third, fourth, and fifth rules will be assessed 
under Dutch property law (Section 5.2.2). The second and third rules relate 
to the transfer of the tangible property from the third-party seller to the SPV 
and its transfer from the SPV to the originator. I will assess how the owner-
ship of the tangible property is transferred and delivered in the murabaha 
transaction under Dutch property law (Section 5.2.2.1). The third, fourth, and 
fifth Islamic finance rules relate to the creation of security rights to secure the 
instalments from the originator to the SPV. I will assess the possibilities to 
secure the instalments from the originator to the SPV in the murabaha trans-
action under Dutch property law (Section 5.2.2.2). The final two rules (sixth 
and seventh) relate to the treatment of early and late payment of instalments 
and are assessed under Dutch contract law (Section 5.2.3). The originator and 
the SPV should ensure that they stipulate these rules as part of the terms and 
conditions of the contract of sale between them when structuring the sukuk 
al-murabaha. I will assess whether these rules are not conflicting with the 
provisions of book 7A DCC.
5.2.2 Sukuk al-Murabaha under Dutch Property Law
According to the second Islamic finance rule, the SPV should become the 
owner and the possessor of the tangible property. The conclusion of the con-
tract of sale has the legal effect of an immediate transfer of the ownership 
of the tangible property under Islamic property law. This leads to the third 
Islamic finance requirement that the SPV and the originator cannot stipulate 
that the ownership of the tangible property will be transferred to the origina-
tor at a later date (after full payment of the purchase price by the originator 
to the SPV). The transfer of the ownership of the tangible property from the 
third-party seller to the SPV does not require the delivery of the tangible prop-
erty to the SPV under Islamic property law; the conclusion of the contract 
of sale is sufficient. However, the SPV cannot transfer the ownership of the 
tangible property to the originator so long the tangible property has not been 
delivered to it under Islamic property law. This requires the SPV to become 
the possessor of the tangible property as well. Under Dutch law the transfer of 
the right of ownership of a tangible property requires its delivery. Therefore, 
the third-party seller should transfer the right of ownership of the tangible 
property to the SPV and the SPV should transfer it to the originator under 
Duch law to meet the second and third Islamic finance rules for the sukuk al-
murabaha (Section 5.2.2.1).
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The third, fourth and fifth Islamic finance rules for the sukuk al-murabaha 
relate to the security right of the SPV for the payment of the purchase price by 
the originator. As a result of the third Islamic finance rule, the reservation of 
ownership (eigendomsvoorbehoud) is not possible in this structure, although it 
would be possible in a conventional transaction under Dutch law. The creation 
of a security right on the tangible property is possible in the sukuk al-muraba-
ha structure. The fourth and fifth Islamic finance rules ensure that a security 
right is created to secure a claim and that the owner of a tangible property cre-
ates a security right on it. I will assess how the security right of the SPV can 
be created under Dutch property law (Section 5.2.2.2).
5.2.2.1 Transfers of Tangible Property under Dutch Property Law
The right of ownership of the tangible property should be transferred by the 
third-party seller to the SPV, followed by its transfer from the SPV to the origi-
nator under Dutch property law. A valid transfer of property must meet the 
three cumulative requirements of Article 3:84 (1) DCC: (i) delivery (levering); 
(ii) pursuant to a valid title (geldige titel); (iii) by the party who has the right to 
dispose of the property (beschikkingsbevoegdheid).
First, the transfer of the property occurs by the party that has the right to dispose 
of the property. This Dutch law requirement resembles the Islamic finance rule 
that (the third-party seller or the SPV as) the transferor should be the owner of 
the tangible property in order to be able to transfer it to the transferee.394 Second, 
there should be a valid title for each transfer.395 The title for a transfer is the legal 
basis for the transfer of the property. The title should describe the property in a 
sufficiently precise manner.396 In the murabaha transaction, the title is the obliga-
tion of the third-party seller to transfer the tangible property to the SPV in the first 
contract of sale and the obligation of the SPV to transfer the tangible property to 
394 The Islamic finance rule originates from the principle of gharar: one cannot transfer property one 
does not own yet due to the presence of uncertainty. Dutch property law seems to be in line with 
the principle of gharar at this point. The legal effect of Art. 3:84 (1) DCC and its comparison with 
Islamic law become even clearer in the case of transfer of non-existing or not-yet-owned property. 
Art. 3:97 (1) DCC allows the delivery in advance of future property, i.e. property that does not exist 
yet or that the transferor does not own yet. The right of ownership of future property is, however, 
not transferred to the transferee due to Art. 3:84 (1) DCC until the transferor has acquired its right 
of ownership. For more on gharar, its impact on Islamic property law and a comparison with Dutch 
property law, see Sections 2.2.2, 2.3.1, 2.3.2 and 2.3.3 of Chapter 2.
395 Dutch law has a causal legal system, which means that an invalid title of delivery results in an invalid 
transfer, see Dutch Supreme Court 5 May 1950, NJ 1951, 1, with case note by Veegens.
396 See Art. 3:84 (2) DCC. The determinability of the property in Art. 3:84 (2) DCC seems to follow from 
the determinability stated in Art. 6:227 DCC, pursuant to which the contractual obligations of par-
ties should be determinable, see Snijders & Rank-Berenschot 2012, pp. 266-267. This requirement 
under Dutch law resembles the principle of gharar under Islamic law, which also requires parties to 
determine the property being transferred, see Sections 2.2.2 and 2.3.2 of Chapter 2.
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the originator in the second contract of sale. Third, there should be a valid delivery 
of the tangible property in both transfers. If the underlying property in the sukuk 
transaction is an immovable property, its delivery requires: (i) a notarial deed for 
the purpose of transfer of the immovable property; (ii) followed by its entry in 
the public registers.397 If the underlying property is a movable property, its deliv-
ery occurs by provision of possession of the movable property to the transferee.398 
A transferor provides possession of the movable property by enabling the trans-
feree to exercise such control over the movable property as the transferor was able 
to exercise over it.399 This means that the transferor can physically deliver the mov-
able property to the transferee. A bilateral declaration without physical delivery is, 
however, also sufficient to transfer possession.400
In a conventional A–B–C transaction under Dutch law, whereby party A sells 
a tangible property to party B and party B sells it to party C (as is the case in 
a murabaha transaction), party A can deliver the tangible property to party C 
directly. This is, however, not possible in the sukuk al-murabaha transaction. 
According to the Islamic finance rules for the sukuk al-murabaha, the SPV 
should become the owner of the tangible property.401 The right of ownership 
of the tangible property should be transferred to the SPV first, after which the 
SPV can transfer its right of ownership to the originator.
A sukuk al-murabaha transaction is a finance transaction. The SPV is incor-
porated only to facilitate the transaction. If the subject matter of the transaction 
is a movable property, the third-party seller and the SPV will prefer transfer of 
possession of the movable property to the SPV through a bilateral declaration 
without physical delivery. The third-party seller can transfer the possession 
of the movable property to the SPV according to Article 3:115 (a) DCC. This is 
referred to as a traditio constituto possessorio delivery (CP-delivery). Traditio con-
stituto possessorio literally means ‘transfer with ownership statement,’ refer-
ring to the statement of the transferor to hold the movable property for the 
transferee and not for himself anymore. 402 The third-party seller stipulates 
that it holds the movable property for the SPV henceforth. Consequently, the 
movable property is delivered to the SPV and the SPV becomes its owner.
Next, the ownership of the movable property is delivered by the SPV to 
the originator. The SPV can deliver the movable property by provision of its 
397 Art. 3:89 (1) DCC.
398 Art. 3:90 (1) DCC.
399 Art. 3:114 DCC.
400 Art. 3:115 DCC.
401 See the second Islamic finance rule for the sukuk al-murabaha, as mentioned in Section 5.2.1 of this 
chapter.
402 Pitlo/Reehuis & Heisterkamp 2012, pp. 184-187.
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possession (bezitsverschaffing) to the originator.403 This can be realised in one 
of the following three forms:
1. by way of physical delivery of the movable property to the originator;
2. with a bilateral declaration without physical delivery due to Article 3:115 (a) 
DCC; or
3. with a bilateral declaration without physical delivery due to Article 3:115 (c) 
DCC.
In the sukuk al-murabaha transaction the originator physically acquires the 
movable property from the third-party seller. The third-party seller performs 
the physical delivery in the name of the SPV based on its legal relationship 
with the SPV.404 Thus, the SPV is regarded to transfer possession (bezitsover-
dracht) of the movable property to the originator.405 It should, however, be 
noted that in a finance transaction such as the sukuk al-murabaha the SPV 
and the originator would like to have certainty with regard to their legal posi-
tions at the moment of the execution of the finance documents and not after 
physical delivery of the movable property. In addition, a physical delivery of 
the movable property adds an, although minimal, insolvency risk into the 
transaction: if the SPV goes bankrupt after payment of the purchase price by 
the originator to the SPV and before physical delivery of the movable property 
to the originator, the movable property will fall into the bankruptcy estate of 
the SPV.406 The SPV and the originator may, therefore, prefer transfer of pos-
session of the movable property with a bilateral declaration without physical 
delivery.
The murabaha transaction is accepted from an Islamic law perspective with the 
argument that the financier (SPV) owns the property for a moment with the asso-
ciated risks thereof.407 Remarkably, the insolvency risk of the SPV mentioned above 
is such risk that could justify this transaction from an Islamic law perspective 
because of its profit-and-loss sharing characteristic. Nonetheless, as mentioned 
in chapter 3, such risks are often mitigated because both transfers (between the 
third-party seller and the SPV and between the SPV and the originator) occur 
simultaneously in practice and Shari’ah scholars have accepted such practice as 
Shari’ah-compliant.408 Consequently, when the sukuk al-murabaha is structured 
403 Art. 3:90 (1) DCC.
404 Cf. Art. 3:110 DCC. See also Asser/Bartels & Van Mierlo 2013 (3-IV), no. 165; Pitlo/Reehuis & 
Heisterkamp 2012, pp. 181-182 & 242-243; Snijders & Rank-Berenschot 2012, pp. 370-371.
405 See Art. 3:114 DCC.
406 See Arts. 23 and 35 DBA.
407 See Section 3.2.1 of Chapter 3.
408 Ibid.
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under Dutch law the originator and the SPV will also look for ways to mitigate 
such risks.
In case of transfer of possession with a bilateral declaration without physical 
delivery, the SPV can deliver the movable property to the originator through a 
CP-delivery. The SPV stipulates that it will hold the movable property for the 
originator henceforth. The originator then becomes the owner of the movable 
property. The movable property will be physically relocated to the originator 
at a later date.
Alternatively, in case of transfer of possession with a bilateral declaration 
without physical delivery, the SPV can also deliver the movable property to 
the originator pursuant to Article 3:115 (c) DCC. A delivery pursuant to Article 
3:115 (c) DCC is called traditio longa manu, meaning ‘transfer with the long 
hand’.409 After the CP-delivery from the third-party seller to the SPV, the SPV 
becomes the owner of the movable property. The movable property remains 
physically with the third-party seller, who holds it for the SPV. The SPV then 
delivers the movable property to the originator through a traditio longa manu. 
The third-party seller holds the movable property for the originator hence-
forth. The third-party seller should be notified of the transfer of the movable 
property from the SPV to the originator so that the requirement of Article 3:115 
(c) DCC is met and the ownership of the movable property is transferred to the 
originator, followed by its physical relocation to the originator at a later date.
A delivery traditio longa manu is preferred to a CP-delivery for the transfer 
from the SPV to the originator. In this research I have assumed that the third-
party seller is the owner of the movable property. In practice it is, however, 
possible that a creditor of the third-party seller has a non-possessory right of 
pledge (bezitloos pandrecht) on the movable property. If the originator does not 
know nor should have known about such non-possessory right of pledge at 
the moment of the transfer, such right of pledge of the creditor of the third-
party seller is extinguished on the basis of Article 3:86 (2) DCC. According to 
Article 3:90 (2) DCC, a CP-delivery has no effect towards a third party with 
a prior right on the movable property until the moment when the movable 
property has come into the hands of the transferee, unless the third party 
has consented to the transfer. However, Article 3:90 (2) DCC does not apply 
to a delivery traditio longa manu, which means that the originator is protected 
against third parties with prior rights on the movable property on the basis 
409 Pitlo/Reehuis & Heisterkamp 2012, pp. 191-193.
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of Article 3:86 (2) DCC, provided that the originator did not know nor should 
have known about such rights.410
The Dutch Supreme Court acknowledged that the delivery traditio longa manu is 
legally equal to a physical delivery of a property.411 Therefore, the risks associated 
with the CP-delivery are not present in case of a delivery traditio longa manu. The 
reason for the different treatment of the CP-delivery and the delivery traditio longa 
manu is that according to the Dutch Supreme Court a delivery traditio longa manu 
results in a material delivery after the transferor or transferee gives notice to the 
third-party holder, while a CP-delivery does not result in a material delivery. The 
Dutch Supreme Court, furthermore, referred to the principle of publicity: while in 
the case of a transfer through a CP-delivery the transfer occurs exclusively between 
the parties involved without any outward expressions, a transfer through a delivery 
traditio longa manu is not unknowable and not uncontrollable for another party 
because a third-party holder is involved who will onwards hold the property for 
the transferee instead of the transferor and who can inform another party in this 
regard whenever asked.412
5.2.2.2 Security Rights to Secure Instalments under Dutch Property Law
The originator pays the purchase price in instalments to the SPV. The SPV 
will, therefore, require security to secure the instalments. Under Dutch law 
the first form of security that comes to mind is the reservation of ownership 
according to Article 3:92 (1) DCC.413 If the tangible property is transferred 
with the reservation of ownership, the SPV remains the owner of the tangible 
property until the originator has paid the full purchase price.414 The reserva-
tion of ownership is, however, in conflict with Islamic law for two reasons.415 
First, the right of ownership of a tangible property transfers immediately to 
the transferee (originator), with the conclusion of the contract of sale under 
Islamic property law. Second, it is not possible to make the transfer of owner-
ship conditional, for example, upon payment of the full purchase price by the 
originator, under Islamic property law.
410 See Dutch Supreme Court 1 May 1987, NJ 1988, 852, with case note by Kleijn; Dutch Supreme Court 
18 September 1987, NJ 1988, 983, with case note by Kleijn.
411 Dutch Supreme Court 1 May 1987, NJ 1988, 852, with case note by Kleijn; Dutch Supreme Court 18 
September 1987, NJ 1988, 983, with case note by Kleijn.
412 See Dutch Supreme Court 18 September 1987, NJ 1988, 983, with case note by Kleijn.
413 For more on the Dutch reservation of ownership, see Vriesendorp 1985a.
414 This is the presumption by law, see Art. 3:92 (1) DCC.
415 See the third Islamic finance rule for the sukuk al-murabaha, as mentioned in Section 5.2.1 of this 
chapter. For more on the reasons for the impermissibility of the reservation of ownership under 
Islamic law, see Section 2.3 of Chapter 2.
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The originator can, nonetheless, create a security right to secure the out-
standing instalments in favour of the SPV. According to Islamic finance law, 
the originator should have incurred a debt for which the security is granted 
and it should own and possess the tangible property over which it creates a 
security right.416 These requirements return under Dutch property law: a secu-
rity right should secure a debt417 and a security right can only be granted by 
the party who has the right to dispose of the property.418 Under Islamic finance 
law, the security right can be a ‘fiduciary pledge’.419 Such ‘fiduciary pledge’ 
under Islamic finance law resembles what is known under Dutch property law 
as a transfer subject to the reservation of a security right (overdracht onder voor-
behoud van een zekerheidsrecht). According to Article 3:81 (1) DCC, a party enti-
tled to an independent (zelfstandig) and transferable (overdraagbaar) right can 
transfer its right subject to the reservation of a limited right (beperkte recht), 
provided that such party respects the requirements for both (i) the transfer of 
the property and (ii) the creation of the limited right.
In the previous subsection, I already discussed the rules for a valid transfer.420 The 
creation of a security right also requires: (i) establishment (vestiging); (ii) pur suant 
to a valid title; (iii) by the party who has the right to dispose of the property.421 
The valid title for the creation of the security right can be stipulated in the con-
tract of sale between the SPV and the originator, which should address that the 
tangible property is transferred subject to the reservation of a security right. The 
contract of sale should clearly stipulate the intention of the originator and the SPV 
to transfer the tangible property and also to create a security right over the tangible 
 property.422 The party who has the right to dispose of the tangible property is the 
SPV.423 The asset is transferred by the SPV to the originator simultaneously with 
the creation of a security right that remains with the SPV. The originator acquires 
the right of ownership of the tangible property encumbered with a security right 
from the outset. If the property is an immovable property, a right of mortgage can 
be created through a notarial deed and its registration in the public registers.424 
For both the transfer of the immovable property from the SPV to the originator 
416 See the fourth and fifth Islamic finance rules for the sukuk al-murabaha, as mentioned in Section 
5.2.1 of this chapter.
417 Art. 3:227 DCC.
418 Art. 3:98 in conjunction with 3:84 (1) DCC.
419 See the fifth Islamic finance rule for the sukuk al-murabaha, as mentioned in Section 5.2.1 of this 
chapter.
420 See Section 5.2.2.1 of this chapter.
421 Art. 3:98 in connection with Art. 3:84 (1) DCC.
422 Dutch Supreme Court 4 December 1998, NJ 1999, 549, with case note by Kleijn/AA 1999, 288, with 
case note by Van Mierlo, case note Van Mierlo, under 4; Vriesendorp 1985b, p. 534.
423 Parliamentary History, Book 3 DCC 1981, p. 407.
424 Art. 3:260 (1) DCC.
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and the creation of the right of mortgage for the SPV, parties can suffice with a 
single notarial deed and its registration in the public registers, provided that the 
notarial deed separately and clearly stipulates that it is intended for both the trans-
fer of the property and the creation of a right of mortgage.425 If the property in the 
sukuk transaction is a movable property which is transferred through a delivery 
traditio longa manu, a right of pledge can be created without bringing the mov-
able property physically under the control of the pledgee, i.e. the SPV, through an 
authentic deed (authentieke akte) or a registered private instrument (geregistreerde 
onderhandse akte).426
The most significant advantage of a transfer of a tangible property subject to 
the reservation of a security right relates to the ranking of the security right 
of the SPV in relation to other security rights. In Potharst/Serrée, the Dutch 
Supreme Court confirmed that upon the transfer of the right of ownership 
subject to the reservation of a right of pledge the transferee acquires a right 
of ownership that is encumbered with a right of pledge from the outset.427 
The right of pledge remains with the transferor, so the transferee is not able 
to establish a right of pledge that can be regarded as a previously created right 
of pledge.428 The Dutch Supreme Court ruled that rights of pledges granted 
by the transferee to other parties are not effective against a transferor/pledgee 
who has transferred the movable property subject to a reservation of a right 
of pledge, not even when the transferee has granted the right of pledge to 
other parties in advance, that is, before the transfer subject to the reserva-
tion of the right of pledge occurred.429 In the sukuk al-murabaha transaction 
it is, for example, conceivable that the originator has provided other parties 
security rights on all its properties and all its future properties (i.e. properties 
it is anticipating to acquire in the future). As a result of Potharst/Serrée, the 
425 See Art. 24 (4) Land Registry Act (Kadasterwet). If the notarial deed does not separately and clearly 
stipulate that it is intended for both the transfer of the immovable property and the creation of a 
right of mortgage, the right of mortgage is not created. For the considerations of the Dutch legisla-
ture with regard to the acceptance of a single notarial deed for both the transfer of the immovable 
property and the creation of a right of mortgage, see Parliamentary History, Act Implementing 
Books 3, 5 and 6 DCC 1990, pp. 1195-1196.
426 Art. 3:237 (1) DCC.
427 Dutch Supreme Court 4 December 1998, NJ 1999, 549, with case note by Kleijn/AA 1999, 288, with 
case note by Van Mierlo, para. 3.6.4.
428 Under Dutch property law, it is possible to create a right of pledge in advance, according to Art. 3:98 
in conjunction with 3:97 (1) DCC. The right of pledge is not created yet. The formalities required 
for its registration are only fulfilled in advance based on Art. 3:98 in conjunction with 3:97 (1) DCC. 
Once the pledgor becomes the owner of the movable property, the right of pledge is created accord-
ing to Art. 3:84 (1) DCC. It is not possible to create a right of mortgage in advance, see Art. 3:97 (1) 
DCC.
429 Dutch Supreme Court 4 December 1998, NJ 1999, 549, with case note by Kleijn/AA 1999, 288, with 
case note by Van Mierlo, para. 3.6.4.
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security right of the SPV has a higher priority in ranking than those security 
rights.
The counterparties of the originator to whom the originator might have granted 
rights of pledges do no rank higher in priority with an appeal on third-party pro-
tection according to article 3:238 (2) DCC either.430 Such protection is only given to 
those who have the movable property under their control (macht) due to their right 
of pledge and who have acted in good faith (te goeder trouw) at the moment when 
the movable property was brought under their control.431 In the sukuk al-murabaha 
transaction, however, the originator often needs the movable property for its busi-
ness which means that the movable property will remain under its control.
5.2.3 Sukuk al-Murabaha under Dutch Contract Law: Murabaha as 
Instalment Sale within the Meaning of Book 7A DCC
The contract of sale between the SPV and the originator qualifies as a pur-
chase and sale of property on instalments (koop en verkoop op afbetaling), in 
short an instalment sale, according to Article 7A:1576 (1) DCC. That article 
defines an instalment sale as a purchase and sale where parties agree that 
the purchase price is paid in at least two instalments that commence after 
the property is physically delivered to the purchaser. The instalment sale is a 
genus consisting of two species:432 (i) instalment sale with an unconditional 
transfer of the right of ownership; and (ii) instalment sale with the transfer 
of the right of ownership under the suspensive condition of payment of the 
purchase price, also referred to as hire purchase (huurkoop).433 In the sukuk al-
murabaha, the transfer of the tangible property from the SPV to the originator 
occurs unconditionally. The transfer is subject to the reservation of a security 
right, but this does not alter the fact that the transfer of the right of ownership 
is unconditional and that the originator becomes the owner of the tangible 
property. It only results in the tangible property being encumbered with a 
security right from the outset.
Book 7A DCC provides mandatory rules (dwingend recht) for instalment 
sales.434 The mandatory provisions of book 7A DCC do not apply to the pur-
chase of immovable property.435 The provisions discussed below are only 
430 See Dutch Supreme Court 4 December 1998, NJ 1999, 549, with case note by Kleijn/AA 1999, 288, 
with case note by Van Mierlo, case note Van Mierlo, under 7. Cf. Dutch Supreme Court 4 December 
1998, NJ 1999, 549, with case note by Kleijn/AA 1999, 288, with case note by Van Mierlo, para. 3.6.4.
431 See Art. 3:238 (1) and (2) DCC.
432 Explanation Draft Meijers 1972, p. 863.
433 See Art. 7A:1576h ff. DCC.
434 Art. 7A:1576a DCC.
435 Art. 7A:1576 (4) (a) DCC.
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relevant if the underlying property in the sukuk al-murabaha is a movable 
property.
The IHPIPA which provides mandatory rules for hire purchase of immovable 
property does not apply to the murabaha in the sukuk al-murabaha either. Article 1 
(1) IHPIPA defines a hire purchase agreement as an instalment sale where parties 
agree that the ownership of the sold tangible property is not transferred by sole 
physical delivery, but only upon fulfilment of the suspensive condition of payment 
in full of whatever is due by the buyer under the sale contract.436 A hire purchase 
agreement is, thus, an instalment sale with the reservation of ownership. There is 
no reservation of ownership in the murabaha in the sukuk al-murabaha. The right 
of ownership of the tangible property is transferred unconditionally. According to 
article 1 (2) IHPIPA all agreements with the same essence as hire purchase, either 
made in the form of a rental agreement or in any other form or name, are consid-
ered a hire purchase agreement.437 The murabaha does not qualify as an agreement 
with the same essence of hire purchase either because an essential element of the 
statutory definition of hire purchase is lacking in the murabaha, i.e. the reservation 
of ownership.438 The transfer of the movable property subject to the reservation of 
a security right in the murabaha transaction does not alter this fact because a secu-
rity right does not provide the security right holder (SPV) the right of ownership 
of the movable property in case of default on an instalment payment by its debtor 
(originator) under Dutch law.439
Book 7A DCC used to provide mandatory rules for early payments. From an 
Islamic finance law perspective, the SPV and the originator cannot stipulate 
that a rebate will be given to the originator in case of early payment of the 
purchase price.440 If the SPV wishes to provide a rebate out of leniency alone, 
it is permitted to do so.441 However, the SPV should not have the obligation to 
provide a rebate to the originator. The former Article 7A:1576e DCC imposed 
a mandatory annual discount in case of early payment of the entire amount 
due: the purchaser was entitled to an annual discount of 5% on each instal-
ment paid early.442 Such discount on early paid instalments could have been 
436 Cf. Art. 7A:1576h (1) DCC.
437 Cf. Art. 7A:1576h (2) DCC.
438 For more on the essential elements of the statutory definition of hire purchase in relation to agree-
ments with the same essence as hire purchase, see Section 5.3.3.2 of this chapter.
439 Art. 3:235 DCC.
440 See the sixth Islamic finance rule for the sukuk al-murabaha, as mentioned in Section 5.2.1 of this 
chapter.
441 Art. 5/9 AAOIFI SS 8.
442 See former Art. 7A:1576e (2) DCC. The purchaser had the right to pay one or more following instal-
ments early under former Art. 7A:1576e (1) DCC. It was possible to deviate from these mandatory 
rules only if it was favourable to the purchaser, see former Art. 7A:1576e (3) DCC.
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conflicting with Islamic law.443 On 25 May 2011, Article 7A:1576e DCC was, 
however, abolished with the trading into force of an Amendment Act of Book 
7 DCC, ff. amending, among other acts, book 7 and 7A DCC as a result of 
the implementation of the Consumer Credit Directive (Directive 2008/48/
EC).444 With the implementation of the Consumer Credit Directive, Title 2a 
on Consument Credit Agreements (Consumentenkredietovereenkomsten) was 
introduced in book 7 DCC, which contains a specific provision on early repay-
ment of consumer credit in Article 7:68 DCC.445 The addressed provision does 
not affect sukuk transactions.
The Dutch legislature is also working on a legislative proposal for the 
further implementation of the Consumer Credit Directive through the imple-
mentation of a new Title 7.2b and 7.2c on Consumer Credit Agreements 
(Consumentenkredietovereenkomsten), Purchase Credit (Goederenkrediet) and Loans 
(Geldlening) in book 7 DCC.446 Articles III and V of the Draft Legislative Proposal 
on Consumer Credit Agreements, Purchase Credit and Loans propose to abolish 
the mandatory provisions in book 7A for instalment sale and hire purchase and to 
repeal the IHPIPA.
Article 7A:1576b DCC contains mandatory rules for penalty clauses. Under 
Islamic finance law, the SPV and the originator can stipulate a penalty clause 
in the murabaha contract, provided that the SPV pays that amount to a chari-
ty.447 Article 7A:1576b DCC does not prevent the originator and the SPV from 
contractually agreeing that if a penalty is charged, the amount incurred by 
the originator towards the SPV should be paid to a charity. Article 7A:1576b (1) 
DCC requires that penalty clauses, i.e. stipulations that oblige the transferee 
to pay an amount of money in case of default, are in writing.448 The originator 
and the SPV should, furthermore, be aware that according to Article 7A:1576b 
(2) DCC, a court can reduce or abolish the penalty if the court rules that the 
penalty is excessive. Article 7A:1576d DCC states that the penalty can only be 
incurred if the originator remains in default after the SPV has sent notice of 
default (ingebrekestelling). Consequently, the mandatory rules of book 7A DCC 
do not raise any tension with Islamic finance law.
443 In addition, it might also lead to practical concerns in finance transactions, see Van Rossum 2009, 
pp. 362-363.
444 See Art. I (C) Amendment Act of Book 7 DCC, ff. regarding implementation of Directive 2008/48/EC.
445 For more on Title 2a on Consument Credit Agreements in book 7 DCC, see Biemans 2013.
446 Draft Legislative Proposal on Consumer Credit Agreements, Purchase Credit and Loans.
447 See the seventh Islamic finance rule for the sukuk al-murabaha, as mentioned in Section 5.2.1 of this 
chapter.
448 This is in line with the principle of gharar and the basic principle of Islamic contract law that parties 
are encouraged to write down their obligations, see Sections 2.2.2 and 2.3.2 of Chapter 2.
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Under Dutch law the authority of a court to reduce or abolish the penalty in case 
it is excessive is meant to avoid burdening the financial needy excessively. This 
resembles the rationale for the restrictions on penalty clauses under Islamic law. 
As a starting point, stipulating a penalty clause in the murabaha is forbidden 
under Islamic law. According to Islamic scholars, the payment of a penalty in case 
of default on an instalment resembles interest and is prohibited as a result of the 
ban on riba. Furthermore, a penalty burdens the financial needy excessively and is, 
therefore, not allowed under Islamic law. However, penalty clauses were permitted 
by way of exception in murabaha transactions under Islamic finance law in order 
to give the originator an incentive to pay on time, provided that the amount is paid 
to a charity.
Concluding, the murabaha in the sukuk al-murabaha can be structured under 
Dutch law. The third-party seller transfers the halal tangible property to the 
SPV, followed by its transfer by the SPV to the originator subject to the res-
ervation of a security right. If the underlying property is a movable property, 
the third-party seller delivers it through a CP-delivery to the SPV and the SPV 
delivers it through a delivery traditio longa manu to the originator. The mov-
able property is physically relocated by the third-party seller to the originator 
at a later date. The contract of sale between the SPV and the originator quali-
fies as an instalment sale. The Islamic finance rules for the murabaha are not 
in conflict with the mandatory rules in book 7A DCC.
5.3 The Ijarah in the Sukuk al-Ijarah under Dutch Property and Contract 
Law
5.3.1 Islamic Finance Rules for Sale and Leaseback in Sukuk al-Ijarah
The sukuk al-ijarah structure is based on a sale and leaseback between an 
originator and an SPV. The originator incorporates the SPV. The originator 
sells and transfers a halal tangible property to the SPV. The SPV issues sukuk 
in financial markets to fund the purchase of the tangible property. The SPV 
uses the sukuk proceeds, received from the sukuk holders, to pay the purchase 
price of the tangible property to the originator. The SPV becomes the owner of 
the tangible property and leases it back to the originator. The originator makes 
lease payments to the SPV for the use of the tangible property. The SPV, in 
turn, pays the lease payments through to the sukuk holders as periodic distri-
butions over the sukuk. This continues until the maturity date of the sukuk. At 
the maturity date of the sukuk, the SPV sells and transfers the halal tangible 
property back to the originator. The SPV pays the purchase price, which it 
receives from the originator, through to the sukuk holders. The sukuk will be 
redeemed. The focus of this section is on the sale and leaseback, as marked in 
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Figure 3. I will assess the sale and leaseback in the sukuk al-ijarah under Dutch 
property and contract law. The legal form of the SPV and the legal relationship 
between the SPV and the sukuk holders are discussed in the next chapter.
Figure 3 Underlying Islamic fi nance contract in sukuk al-ijarah under Dutch law
In Chapter 4 I formulated fi ve Islamic fi nance rules for the sukuk al-ijarah. 
In this chapter I take these fi ve rules as my theoretical framework and assess 
them under Dutch law:
1. the originator should be the owner and the possessor of the tangible pro-
perty before the conclusion of the contract of sale with the SPV;
2. the SPV should become the owner and the possessor of the tangible pro-
perty after the conclusion of the contract of sale with the originator;
3. the ijarah contract between the SPV and the originator should stipulate 
that the liabilities and the risks attached to the ownership of the tangible 
property are borne by the SPV;
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4. if a promise of wa’d is provided by the originator to offer to purchase the 
tangible property at the maturity date of the sukuk, it may not be a bilateral 
promise. It should be binding only on the originator; and
5. at the maturity date of the sukuk, a new offer and acceptance are required 
to conclude a new contract of sale between the originator and the SPV. The 
binding promise may not be an offer.
The five Islamic finance rules for the sukuk al-ijarah have to be met in order to 
acquire the approval of a Shari’ah supervisory board. As a result, the securities 
can be offered as sukuk in financial markets. As a starting point, I will take the 
first rule as a given: I assume that the originator is the owner and the posses-
sor of the halal tangible property. The second Islamic finance rule relates to 
the transfer of the right of ownership of the tangible property to the SPV and 
is assessed under Dutch property law (Section 5.3.2). The originator should 
transfer the ownership of the tangible property to the SPV and it should also 
deliver it to the SPV so that the SPV becomes the owner and the possessor of 
the tangible property. The SPV becomes the owner of the tangible property 
with the conclusion of the contract under Islamic property law. It should also 
become the possessor of the tangible property in order to be able to transfer it 
to the originator at the maturity of the sukuk, which means that the tangible 
property should also be delivered to it. Dutch law requires the delivery of a tan-
gible property for a valid transfer of its rights of ownership. Thus, the second 
Islamic finance rule requires a valid transfer of the right of ownership of the 
tangible property from the originator to the SPV under Dutch law.
The third, fourth and fifth Islamic finance rules are assessed under Dutch 
contract law (Section 5.3.3). The fourth and fifth rules determine the legal 
form of the promise of wa’d (Section 5.3.3.1). The conclusion of a contract of 
sale has the immediate effect of the transfer of the right of ownership of a 
tangible property under Islamic property law and, therefore, it is not possible 
to conclude a contract of sale pursuant to which the ownership of a tangi-
ble property is transferred at a future date. The promise of wa’d provided by 
the originator to the SPV pursuant to which the originator promises to offer 
to purchase the tangible property at the maturity of the sukuk should only 
be binding on the originator. Otherwise, a contract of sale is effectively con-
cluded. For the same reason, a new offer and acceptance are required at the 
maturity of the sukuk to conclude a new contract of sale between the originator 
and the SPV. The promise of wa’d cannot be an offer because otherwise its sole 
acceptance will lead to the conclusion of a contract of sale. Finally, the third 
Islamic finance rule for the sukuk al-ijarah determines the contents of the ija-
rah contract (Section 5.3.3.2). The SPV as the owner of the tangible property 
should bear the liabilities and the risks attached to its ownership.
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5.3.2 Sale and Leaseback in Sukuk al-Ijarah and the Fiducia Prohibition under 
Dutch Property Law
A valid transfer of the halal tangible property from the originator to the SPV 
in the sukuk al-ijarah should meet the requirements of Article 3:84 (1) DCC: 
(i) delivery; (ii) pursuant to a valid title; (iii) by the party that has the right to 
dispose of the property. The originator as the owner of the tangible property 
has the right to dispose of the tangible property. If the property in a sukuk 
al-ijarah is an immovable property, its delivery requires a notarial deed and 
its registration in the public registers.449 If the property is a movable prop-
erty, the most convenient way to deliver it is through a CP-delivery.450 In the 
case of sale and leaseback transactions, movable properties are often delivered 
through CP-deliveries so that the property can remain with the transferor/
lessee (originator).
The title for the transfer of the halal tangible property from the originator 
to the SPV deserves closer consideration under Dutch property law. The legal 
validity of financial transactions are often questioned in light of Article 3:84 
(3) DCC.451 In the Netherlands there has been much discord concerning the 
legal validity of the title for (conventional) sale and leaseback transactions in 
light of the fiducia prohibition of Article 3:84 (3) DCC.452 I next assess whether 
the sale and leaseback in the sukuk al-ijarah is a transfer for security purposes 
(fiducia cum creditore), which is invalidated by Article 3:84 (3) DCC.453
Article 3:84 (3) DCC states that a legal act (i) that is ‘intended to transfer property 
for purposes of security’ or (ii) which ‘does not have the purpose of bringing the 
property into the patrimony of the transferee’ does not constitute a valid title for 
the transfer of that property. The first type of legal act that does not constitute a 
valid title due to the fiducia prohibition is referred to as the fiducia cum creditore. 
449 Art. 3:89 (1) DCC.
450 Art. 3:90 in conjunction with 3:115 (a) DCC.
451 The legal validity of the following financial transactions are questioned in light of Art. 3:84 (3) DCC: 
leveraged leasing, repurchase agreements (repo’s), sale and leaseback transactions, securitisa-
tions, covered bond programs and sukuk transactions. See Rank 1998; Wibier 2008, pp. 146-152; 
Salomons & Van ‘t Westeinde 2008a, pp. 453-460; Wibier (reactie) 2008, pp. 715-717; Salomons & 
van ‘t Westeinde (naschrift) 2008, pp. 717-718; Rongen 2012, pp. 795-978; Salah 2010d, pp. 271-272.
452 Salomons 1994, pp. 1261-1266; Heyman 1994, pp. 1-14; Kleijn 1994, pp. 15-17; Kortmann 1994, 
pp. 18-23; Kortmann & Van Hees 1995, pp. 991-996; Vegter 1995a, pp. 534-536; Vegter 1995b, 
pp.  555-557; Salomons 1995, pp. 820-822; Lokin (Fiduciaire verhoudingen: Libellus Amicorum Prof. 
Mr. S.C.J.J. Kortmann) 2007, pp. 137-155; Salah 2013a, pp. 138-146.
453 Art. 3:84 (3) DCC is also relevant with regard to the legal relationship of the SPV and the sukuk hold-
ers. One may argue that the legal relationship between the SPV and the sukuk holders is in conflict 
with the fiducia prohibition, more in particular with the fiducia cum amico. I will discuss the legal 
validity of the relationship between the SPV and the sukuk holders in light of Art. 3:84 (3) DCC in 
Chapter 6.
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It refers to a fiduciary security transfer. The second type of legal act is referred to 
as the fiducia cum amico. That is a transfer of property for purposes of administra-
tion that lacks the intention of bringing the property into the patrimony of the 
transferee. In general, (conventional) sale and leaseback transactions have a secu-
rity feature. The transferor/lessee acquires ‘funding’ in the form of the purchase 
price paid for the property sold. The periodic lease payments paid by the trans-
feror/lessee to the transferee/lessor resemble ‘interest’ paid for the ‘funding’.454 
The transferee/lessor holds the right of ownership of the property as ‘collateral’, 
while the transferor/lessee has the right to use the property. Conventional leasing 
companies, for example, often use sale and leaseback transactions to acquire some 
form of security for the payment of the lease price.455
In the landmark case Keereweer q.q./Sogelease, also known as Sogelease, the 
Dutch Supreme Court ruled that the sale and leaseback addressed did not 
intend to transfer property for purposes of security within the meaning of 
Article 3:84 (3) DCC.456 According to the Dutch Supreme Court, the criteri-
on for the application of Article 3:84 (3) DCC in relation to fiduciary security 
transfers is whether the legal act has the purpose of providing the transferee/
lessor a security right on the property in such manner that it protects his inter-
ests as creditor in relation to other creditors of the transferor/lessee.457 The 
essence of such protection as creditor is by nature the right to have recourse 
to the transferred property with priority over other creditors of the transferor/
lessee, e.g. the contract restricts the right of the transferee/lessor in such man-
ner that in case of default of the transferor/lessee, the transferee/lessor will 
have only the restricted right to sell the property, have recourse to the pro-
ceeds and pay any excess back to the transferor/lessee.458 If the legal act, on 
the other hand, intends an ‘actual transfer’, i.e. a transfer of property to the 
transferee/lessor without any proprietary limitation, Article 3:84 (3) DCC does 
not preclude it.459 Thus, Article 3:84 (3) DCC only invalidates the transfer of 
property, which in essence gives the transferee only a security right. In B.T.L. 
454 The comparison of the sale and leaseback with an interest-based loan might raise the question 
whether the sale and leaseback in the sukuk al-ijarah is not in conflict with Islamic finance law. For 
the Shari’ah compliance of the sale and leaseback in the sukuk al-ijarah, see Chapter 4.
455 Pitlo/Reehuis & Heisterkamp 2012, pp. 88-90.
456 Dutch Supreme Court 19 May 1995, NJ 1996, 119, with case note by Kleijn/AA 1995, 11, with case 
note by Vriesendorp. If the transfer had been a fiduciary security transfer within the meaning of 
Art. 3:84 (3) DCC, the fiduciary ownership of the fiduciary owner had to be converted into a right of 
pledge, see Art. 86 (1) Transitional Act of the new Dutch Civil Code (Overgangswet nieuw Burgerlijk 
Wetboek).
457 Dutch Supreme Court 19 May 1995, NJ 1996, 119, with case note by Kleijn/AA 1995, 11, with case 
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Lease/Erven Van Summeren, also known as B.T.L. Lease, the Dutch Supreme 
Court ruled that the Haviltex criterion460 should be used to explain the title 
for the transfer of property when assessing whether there has been an ‘actual 
transfer’ of property.461
In its ruling in Sogelease, the Dutch Supreme Court stressed the background of the 
fiduciary security transfer as developed in case law before the introduction of the 
current Dutch Civil Code: the fiduciary security transfer provided an alternative 
for the possessory right of pledge in the form of a non-possessory security. Before 
the introduction of the current Dutch Civil Code in 1992, a non-possessory right 
of pledge (bezitloos pandrecht) on movable property did not exist.462 If a financier 
required security in the form of a right of pledge on movable property, the bor-
rower had to bring the movable property under the possession of the financier. 
Obviously, this was inconvenient if the borrower needed the movable property to 
conduct its business. It was, however, possible to transfer the ownership of prop-
erty through a CP-delivery. When security over movable property was required, 
while the borrower required the property for its business, the property was trans-
ferred for security purposes. This practice was accepted by the Dutch Supreme 
Court in two cases in 1929.463 In the subsequent decades, the statutory provisions 
for rights of pledges and rights of mortgages were applied by analogy to fiduci-
ary security transfers.464 According to the Dutch Supreme Court in Sogelease, it is 
this form of fiduciary security transfer that is prohibited by article 3:84 (3) DCC 
460 In Ermes et al./Haviltex the Dutch Supreme Court provided the criterion for the explanation of agree-
ments, the so-called Haviltex criterion: ‘in essence it comes down to the meaning that parties can 
reasonably attach to each other’s statements and behaviour, in the circumstances concerned, and 
to what they, in that respect, could reasonably expect from each other’. See Dutch Supreme Court 
13 March 1981, NJ 1981, 635, with case note by Brunner.
461 Dutch Supreme Court 18 November 2005, NJ 2006, 151. This was in line with earlier case law of the 
Dutch Supreme Court. In ING/Muller the Dutch Supreme Court ruled that the Haviltex criterion 
should be used to explain the title (i.e. the legal basis that obliged to create the right of pledge) that 
underlies the deed of creation of a right of pledge, see Dutch Supreme Court 20 September 2002, NJ 
2002, 610, with case note by Du Perron.
462 Salah 2013a, pp. 138-139.
463 See Dutch Supreme Court 25 January 1929, NJ 1929, 616, with case note by Scholten; Dutch Supreme 
Court 21 June 1929, NJ 1929, 1096.
464 See Dutch Supreme Court 13 January 1938, NJ 1938, 566, with case note by Scholten; Dutch 
Supreme Court 3 January 1941, NJ 1941, 470, with case note by Scholten; Dutch Supreme Court 30 
January 1953, NJ 1953, 578, with case note by Houwing; Dutch Supreme Court 6 March 1970, NJ 
1970, 433, with case note by Houwing; Dutch Supreme Court 7 March 1975, NJ 1976, 91, with case 
note by Kleijn; Dutch Supreme Court 18 September 1987, NJ 1988, 983, with case note by Kleijn; 
Dutch Supreme Court 18 December 1987, NJ 1988, 340, with case note by Van der Grinten; Dutch 
Supreme Court 18 September 1992, NJ 1993, 455, with case note by Snijders; Dutch Supreme Court 
5 November 1993, NJ 1994, 258, with case note by Kleijn.
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because an alternative was introduced with the non-possessory right of pledge of 
article 3:237 DCC in the current Dutch Civil Code.465
Article 3:84 (3) DCC does not invalidate the title for the transfer of the tangible 
property from the originator to the SPV in the sale and leaseback in the sukuk 
al-ijarah. The originator and the SPV intend an ‘actual transfer’ of the tangible 
property from the originator to the SPV. The purpose of the sukuk al-ijarah 
transaction is to attract Shari’ah-compliant funding and, therefore, the origi-
nator and the SPV wish to meet the Islamic finance rules for such transaction. 
According to the Islamic finance rules for a sukuk al-ijarah, there must be a 
transfer of the right of ownership of the tangible property from the originator 
to the SPV. From an Islamic property law perspective, the SPV should have 
the complete and free right of disposal of the tangible property.466 It is, thus, 
not possible to proprietarily limit the right of ownership of the SPV to a right 
of recourse to the tangible property. Under Islamic property law, it is not even 
possible to contractually condition a right of ownership on a future event, such 
as an event of default with regard to the lease payments.467 The originator 
and the SPV ‘reasonably expect from each other’468 that the sukuk transac-
tion is a Shari’ah-compliant transaction where the Islamic finance rules are 
respected. They will, thus, intend an ‘actual transfer’ of the tangible property 
under Dutch law.
Economically, the originator acquires funding and it gives the SPV ‘col-
lateral’ through the transfer of the right of ownership of the tangible property. 
Legally, the right of ownership of the SPV is not limited to a security right 
under Dutch law.469 The legal form of the transaction is such that an ‘actual 
transfer’ occurs and that parties agree to ‘stronger collateral’ through the use 
of the right of ownership, instead of a security right. The legal form of the ‘col-
lateral’ in the sukuk al-ijarah (the right of ownership) leads to a practical con-
sideration in these transactions. The originator in the sukuk al-ijarah should 
ensure that it does not sell the tangible property below its value. According to 
465 See Dutch Supreme Court 19 May 1995, NJ 1996, 119, with case note by Kleijn/AA 1995, 11, with case 
note by Vriesendorp, paras. 3.4.2-3.4.3.
466 See Section 2.3.1 of Chapter 2.
467 See Rule VII of Islamic contract law in Section 2.3.2 of Chapter 2.
468 Dutch Supreme Court 13 March 1981, NJ 1981, 635, with case note by Brunner.
469 The distinction between security in the sale and leaseback and a security right (such as a right of 
pledge respectively right of mortgage) is also addressed in the case notes of Sogelease by Kleijn 
and by Vriesendorp. Kleijn discusses the relation between the different forms of security under 
Dutch law, see Dutch Supreme Court 19 May 1995, NJ 1996, 119, with case note by Kleijn/AA 1995, 
11, with case note by Vriesendorp, case note Kleijn, under 3. Vriesendorp addresses the difference 
between security through an ‘actual transfer’ and security through a right of pledge, see Dutch 
Supreme Court 19 May 1995, NJ 1996, 119, with case note by Kleijn/AA 1995, 11, with case note by 
Vriesendorp, case note Vriesendorp, pp. 878-879.
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the legal analysis above, the SPV will be the owner of the tangible property 
under Dutch law. If the tangible property is sold below its value, the originator 
will be at loss in case of default. As the owner of the underlying halal tangible 
property, the SPV is free to dispose of the tangible property to another party 
from a property law perspective. If the SPV sells and transfers the tangible 
property to another party, it is entitled to the entire sale proceeds. Such pro-
ceeds may include any excess over the periodic lease payments and the princi-
pal. The proceeds may be paid through to the sukuk holders if this is stipulated 
in the terms and conditions of the sukuk. The originator will lose property the 
value of which is higher than the funding it acquired. In order to avoid this 
scenario, the originator should valuate the tangible property and sell it for the 
valued price.
If the recourse of the sukuk holders is limited to the underlying halal tangible 
property only, this may also have a downside for them: if the proceeds realised 
with the sale of the tangible property are less than the principal amount of the 
sukuk, the sukuk holders have to bear the losses of such sale. The originator will 
often ensure that the value of the underlying halal tangible property is not of less 
value than the funding it acquires through the sukuk proceeds to keep the sukuk 
attractive for investors so that they are willing to subscribe to the sukuk. The origi-
nator also provides the SPV a promise of wa’d.470 Nonetheless, the downside of the 
transaction for the sukuk holders stresses the importance of a correct valuation of 
the tangible property.
5.3.3 Sukuk al-Ijarah under Dutch Contract Law
5.3.3.1 The Promise of Wa’d under Dutch Contract Law
In the sukuk al-ijarah structure the originator provides the SPV a binding 
promise called wa’d, pursuant to which it will offer to purchase the tangi-
ble property at the maturity date of the sukuk from the SPV for a price equal 
to the price that the SPV paid for its purchase at the commencement of the 
structure. The originator provides certainty with regard to the repayment of 
the principal amount of the sukuk so that the sukuk are attractive for potential 
investors in financial markets. The originator ensures that the SPV is paid 
back the amount it used to purchase the underlying halal tangible property 
from the originator so that the SPV can use that amount to pay back the prin-
cipal amount of the subscribers to the sukuk. As a result, the principal amount 
of the sukuk holders is fixed: the SPV and, consequently, the sukuk holders do 
not take the risk of depreciation of the tangible property.
470 See Section 5.3.3.1 of this chapter.
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In Chapter 2 I discussed the rationale for the use of promises of wa’d under 
Islamic contract law.471 Under Islamic contract law it is not possible to enter 
into future sale contracts, i.e. contracts pursuant to which a tangible property 
will be transferred to the transferee at a future date. The legal effect of a valid 
contract of sale is the immediate transfer of the right of ownership of a tangi-
ble property under Islamic private law.472 Therefore, in the sukuk al-ijarah the 
originator and the SPV may not enter into a future sale contract either.473 The 
originator provides a promise of wa’d, often structured through a purchase 
undertaking, pursuant to which the originator is obliged to offer to purchase 
the tangible property at the maturity date of the sukuk.474 The binding prom-
ise should be binding only on one party: if both the originator and the SPV 
provide a binding promise pursuant to which they are obliged to sell and pur-
chase the tangible property at a future date respectively, they effectively enter 
into a future sale contract.475 Furthermore, the binding promise of wa’d should 
not constitute an offer. Otherwise, its sole acceptance is sufficient to conclude 
a contract of sale at the maturity date of the sukuk.476
Under Dutch law, the promise of wa’d in the sukuk al-ijarah should be 
structured as a unilateral obligation to offer to purchase the tangible prop-
erty (aanbiedingsplicht).477 The originator will have the unilateral obligation 
to offer to purchase the tangible property at a predetermined price (equal to 
the principal amount of the sukuk holders) at the maturity date of the sukuk. 
In essence, this is a binding unilateral obligation of the originator to make an 
offer to the SPV. At the maturity date of the sukuk, the SPV should wait until 
the originator makes the offer. Once the originator makes the offer, the SPV 
is free to accept or reject it. The binding unilateral obligation of the origina-
tor to offer to purchase the tangible property from the SPV will be a contract 
between the originator and the SPV under Dutch law. Entering into such con-
tract will, however, not be in conflict with Islamic law. The contract is not a 
sale contract, but only a contract in which the wa’d is documented in the form 
of a unilateral obligation to offer to purchase the tangible property.
The promise of wa’d should be drafted carefully under Dutch law. It is a uni-
lateral contract (eenzijdige overeenkomst) with the obligation of the originator 
471 See Section 2.3.2 of Chapter 2.
472 App. B AAOIFI SS 9.
473 Art. 8/7 AAOIFI SS 9.
474 The use of purchase undertakings has an English law background. Promises of wa’d are often struc-
tured as undertakings under English law, due to the requirement of consideration for contracts 
under English law. The use of purchase undertakings is permissible in the sukuk al-ijarah. This was 
confirmed by the AAOIFI in the AAOIFI Resolution of 2008, see Section 4.3.3 of Chapter 4.
475 Cf. Art. 8/2 AAOIFI SS 9.
476 Cf. Art. 8/3 AAOIFI SS 9.
477 Asser/Hijma 2013 (7-I*), no. 184.
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to offer to purchase the tangible property. First, the promise of wa’d should 
not be a unilateral legal act (eenzijdige rechtshandeling) of the originator under 
Dutch law. The promise of wa’d is binding on the originator from an Islamic 
law perspective and, therefore, it should be documented as a contract under 
Dutch law so that the SPV can legally enforce it (in rechte afdwingen). Second, it 
cannot be a unilateral contract that gives the SPV a right to sell, also known as 
a sale option. A right to sell is a contractually provided entitlement (wilsrecht) 
that provides the entitled party (SPV) the right to sell the property at a certain 
date for a specified price.478 According to Article 6:219 (3) DCC, a stipulation 
where one party binds itself to enter into a contract with another party at the 
latter’s option is deemed to be an irrevocable offer (onherroepelijk aanbod). If 
the sale option were an irrevocable offer of the originator, sole acceptance by 
the SPV results in a contract of sale under Dutch law. This leads to a violation 
of Islamic law. Third, it is also not possible to document the promise of wa’d 
as a reciprocal contract (wederkerige overeenkomst) with the condition that the 
tangible property is sold and transferred to the originator at the occurrence of 
the maturity date of the sukuk. The conditional transfer of the right of owner-
ship is in conflict with Islamic law.
5.3.3.2 Ijarah Contract under Dutch Contract Law
In the sukuk al-ijarah, the SPV (lessor) leases the underlying halal tangible 
property to the originator (lessee) pursuant to an ijarah contract: the lessor 
provides the lessee the right of use of a tangible property for a specified period 
against payment of an agreed lease price.479 Article 7:201 DCC defines a rental 
agreement as an ‘agreement where one party, the lessor, undertakes to provide 
another party, the lessee, the use of a tangible property or part of it and the 
lessee undertakes for a consideration’. The ijarah qualifies as a rental agree-
ment within the meaning of Article 7:201 DCC.480 According to the Islamic 
finance rules for the ijarah contract, the lessor as the owner of the tangible 
property should bear all the liabilities and risks attached to the ownership of 
the tangible property. This requirement does not raise any issues under Dutch 
law. The rules of book 7 DCC are directory rules (regelend recht), which means 
that parties can contractually agree on the distribution of liabilities and risks 
as they wish. In addition, there are (semi-) mandatory rules for rental agree-
ments in book 7 DCC, but these rules do not prevent the originator and the 
SPV to contractually agree that the lessor as the owner of the tangible property 
478 Cf. Ibid.
479 Cf. App. C AAOIFI SS 9.
480 Van Rossum 2009, p. 364. Cf. Art. 1 AAOIFI SS 9, which refers to the ijarah as an operational lease. 
An operational lease is often qualified as a rental agreement under Dutch law, see Van Hees 1997, 
pp. 24-28.
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should bear all the liabilities and risks attached to the ownership of that tan-
gible property.
Book 7 DCC provides semi-mandatory rules in relation to the obligations 
of the SPV as lessor in case of defects in the leased property.481 Article 7:206 
(1) DCC obliges the SPV to repair any defects at the request of the origina-
tor, unless it is impossible or it requires costs that in the circumstances con-
cerned cannot reasonably be demanded from the SPV.482 The originator is 
entitled to claim a proportionate reduction of lease payments, if a defect leads 
to impairment of enjoyment.483 The SPV is, on the other hand, not responsible 
for minor repairs and not obliged to repair defects for occurrence of which the 
originator is liable towards the SPV, nor can the originator demand reduction 
of lease payments.484 Furthermore, the SPV is obliged to pay damages if: (i) a 
defect occurs after the conclusion of the ijarah contract which is attributable to 
the SPV; (ii) a defect existed during the conclusion of the ijarah contract and 
the SPV knew or should have known about it; or (iii) in relation to which the 
SPV informed the originator that such defect did not exist.485
From an Islamic finance law perspective, these semi-mandatory rules of 
book 7 DCC do not raise any issues. Under Islamic finance law, the leased 
property remains the responsibility of the SPV as its owner/lessor, which 
means that the SPV is also responsible for major maintenance of the leased 
property and any defects that impair its enjoyment.486 The SPV cannot exclude 
its liability towards the originator as lessee for any impairment of enjoyment 
as a result of defects, unless the defects can be attributed to the originator 
from an Islamic finance law perspective.487
The practical meaning of the semi-mandatory rules of book 7 DCC for the 
ijarah contract are not significant. The originator has been the owner of the 
tangible property before the sale and leaseback in the sukuk al-ijarah is con-
cluded and it is aware of the state and the quality of the tangible property, even 
better than the SPV is. Furthermore, the originator will not request the SPV 
to repair any defects based on the semi-mandatory rules of book 7 DCC. The 
sukuk al-ijarah is a finance transaction and the SPV is solely incorporated by 
481 The originator and the SPV cannot deviate from the rules of Arts. 7:206 (1) and (2), 7:207 and 7:208 
DCC to the detriment of the originator, to the extent that the SPV knew or should have known about 
the defects at the moment of the conclusion of the ijarah contract. See Art. 7:209 DCC.
482 A defect is a state, quality or other circumstance that cannot be attributed to the originator, as a 
result of which the leased property cannot provide the originator the enjoyment of the property 
which the originator could expect from a well-maintained property of that kind, see Art. 7:204 (2) 
DCC.
483 Art. 7:207 (1) DCC.
484 Arts. 7:206 (2) and 7:207 (2) DCC.
485 Art. 7:208 DCC.
486 Arts. 5/1/5, 5/1/7 and 5/1/8 AAOIFI SS 9.
487 Arts. 5/1/5 and 5/1/6 AAOIFI SS 9.
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the originator to facilitate this sukuk transaction. The originator will not claim 
a proportionate reduction of lease payments on the basis of the semi-mandato-
ry rules of book 7 DCC either because a reduction of the lease payments may 
result in a reduction of the periodic payments to sukuk holders. This, in turn, 
could lead to the sukuk becoming due and payable under the terms and condi-
tions of the sukuk.
Article 7:230a DCC provides semi-mandatory eviction protection rules which 
parties cannot deviate from to the detriment of the lessee, in the case of lease of 
immovable property, not being residential premises within the meaning of arti-
cle 7:233 DCC and not being commercial premises within the meaning of article 
7:290 (2) DCC. There are also (semi-) mandatory rules for the lease of residential 
and commercial premises.488 The rules addressed are not in conflict with Islamic 
finance law.
Besides the ijarah contract between the originator and the SPV, the originator 
and the SPV agree on the above discussed promise of wa’d which is a con-
tract with the unilateral obligation of the originator to offer the purchase of 
the tangible property at the maturity date of the sukuk under Dutch law. The 
combination of both contracts raises the question whether the legal relation-
ship between the SPV (as lessor) and the originator (as lessee) qualifies as 
hire purchase. Book 7A DCC contains mandatory rules for hire purchase 
agreements of movable property.489 The IHPIPA provides mandatory rules for 
hire purchase of immovable property.490 Articles 7A:1576h (1) DCC and 1 (1) 
IHPIPA define a hire purchase agreement as an instalment sale where par-
ties agree that the ownership of the sold tangible property is not transferred 
by sole physical delivery, but only upon fulfilment of the suspensive condition 
of payment in full of whatever is due by the buyer under the sale contract.491 
A hire purchase agreement is, thus, an instalment sale with the reservation 
488 See Arts. 7:232 ff. respectively 7:291 ff. DCC. In practice, the leased property in a sale and leaseback 
in a sukuk al-ijarah will often not be residential or commercial premises. The originator will, for 
example, sell and leaseback its office buildings in the sukuk transaction. Such immovable proper-
ties do not qualify as residential premises. The definition of ‘commercial premises’ in Art. 7:290 (2) 
DCC is used in a narrow sense and its scope is restricted to premises for operating retail business, 
restaurant business, handicraft business, etc., see Asser/Abas 2011 (5-IIA), nos. 247-251. For exam-
ple, according to case law, office buildings of a bank do not qualify as commercial premises within 
the meaning of Art. 1624 former DCC (the predecessor of Art. 7:290 DCC), see Sub District Court of 
Heerlen 15 April 1981, NJ 1981, 438.
489 Art. 7A:1576a DCC. The mandatory rules of book 7A DCC are not applicable to immovable property, 
see Art. 7A:1576 (4) (a) DCC.
490 Art. 15 IHPIPA.
491 According to Art. 7A:1576 (1) DCC, an instalment sale is a purchase where the parties agree to pay-
ment of the purchase price in instalments, two or more of which will be due after physical delivery 
of the tangible property to the buyer. See Section 5.2.3 of this chapter.
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of ownership. The ijarah contract is a rental agreement and not an instalment 
sale. It does not meet the description of Articles 7A:1576h (1) DCC and 1 (1) 
IHPIPA. The SPV provides the originator only the right of use of the tangible 
property. The right of ownership of the tangible property is not transferred 
with the ijarah contract or with the contract with the unilateral obligation to 
offer.
According to Articles 7A:1576h (2) DCC and 1 (2) IHPIPA, all agreements 
with the same essence as hire purchase, either made in the form of a rent-
al agreement or in any other form or name, are considered a hire purchase 
agreement. Such agreement should have the essential elements of a hire pur-
chase based on its statutory definition: (i) the sale price of the property is paid 
in two or more instalments; (ii) the property is delivered to the hire purchaser; 
and (iii) its right of ownership is transferred to the hire purchaser under the 
suspensive condition of payment in full of whatever is due.
In Dexia/Tuijl, also known as Dexia, the Court of Appeal assessed whether con-
tracts for securities leasing (effectenlease) could be qualified as agreements with the 
same essence as hire purchase according to article 7A:1576h (2) DCC.492 The Court 
of Appeal assessed whether the sale price was paid in two or more instalments, 
whether the shares were delivered, and whether their ownership was transferred 
to the lessee under the suspensive condition of full payment of whatever was 
due.493 The Dutch Supreme Court was required to rule, inter alia, on the question 
whether the shares were delivered to the lessee, where parties argued in Supreme 
Court appeal that the delivery of the shares was an essential element of the statu-
tory definition of hire purchase and since the obligation to deliver the shares was 
missing in the contracts for securities leasing, these contracts could not be quali-
fied as hire purchase.494 The Dutch Supreme Court ruled that the shares were 
delivered and their ownership was transferred under a suspensive condition of full 
payment of whatever was due, upholding the view of the Court of Appeal.495 The 
legal framework for the assessment of whether a contract has the same essence as 
hire purchase was whether such contract contained the essential elements of the 
statutory definition of hire purchase.
In addition to the elements in the statutory definition of hire purchase, the 
relation between (the sum of) the lease payments and the purchase price that 
has to be paid at the end of the lease period is a relevant element in assessing 
492 Dutch Supreme Court 28 March 2008, NJ 2009, 578, with case note by Hijma, see paras. 2.6 and 2.11 
ruling Court of Appeal.
493 Ibid., see paras. 2.9-2.11 ruling Court of Appeal.
494 Ibid., see para. 4.3.
495 Ibid., see para. 4.4.
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whether an agreement has the same essence as hire purchase.496 If the lease 
payments for the lease of a property include not only a fee for the use of the 
property, but also parts of its purchase price, leaving only a symbolic part of 
the purchase price that has to be paid for the purchase of the property at the 
end of the lease period (possibly by exercising a purchase option), an indica-
tion is given for the qualification of a contract as hire purchase.
The ijarah contract between the originator and the SPV and its combina-
tion with a contract with the unilateral obligation of the originator to offer 
the purchase of the tangible property at the maturity date of the sukuk in the 
sukuk al-ijarah do not fall within scope of Articles 7A:1576h (2) DCC and 1 
(2) IHPIPA. In both contracts, there is no obligation to transfer the right of 
ownership of the leased tangible property to the originator under the suspen-
sive condition of payment in full of whatever is due. Pursuant to the ijarah 
contract, the SPV is obliged to provide the originator the right of use of the 
tangible property and the originator is obliged to pay rent. Pursuant to the 
contract with the unilateral obligation to offer, the originator is only obliged 
to offer to purchase the tangible property. The SPV is, however, not obliged to 
accept such offer. Although in practice the SPV might accept the offer of the 
originator (since it ensures that the initial sale price of the tangible property 
paid by the SPV to the originator is repaid to the SPV and, hence, the sukuk 
holders are ensured that the principal of the sukuk will be repaid), there is no 
legal obligation for the SPV to accept such offer and – what is in particular 
relevant with regard to hire purchase – there is no legal obligation to transfer 
the right of ownership of the tangible property from the SPV to the originator.
What is more, the lease payments in the sukuk al-ijarah do not contain 
parts of the purchase price of the tangible property. This factor, furthermore, 
substantiates that the ijarah contract and the contract to offer to purchase the 
tangible property in the sukuk al-ijarah do not qualify as hire purchase on the 
basis of Articles 7A:1576h (2) DCC and 1 (2) IHPIPA.497 The lease payments 
consist of fees for the use of the tangible property, which will be paid through 
to sukuk holders as periodic returns on their investment. The lease payments 
do not contain parts of the purchase price. Pursuant to the promise of wa’d, 
the purchase price of the tangible property at the end of the lease period 
496 Court of Appeal of Amsterdam 28 May 1975, NJ 1977, 460; District Court of ’s-Hertogenbosch 
13 June 1997, NJ 1998, 432; Court of Appeal of ’s-Hertogenbosch 30 September 2008, RI 2008, 90. 
See also Van Hees 1997, pp. 29-39, with further references to case law and the literature.
497 Van Rossum 2009, p. 364. Van Rossum discusses Art. 7A:1576h (2) DCC in relation to the ijarah 
wa-iqtina. Strictly speaking, the ijarah in the sukuk al-ijarah does not qualify as an ijarah wa-iqtina 
because the ijarah in the sukuk al-ijarah is combined with a promise to purchase by the lessee (pro-
viding the lessor a ‘sale option’), while the ijarah wa-iqtina is an ijarah combined with a promise to 
sell by the lessor (providing the lessee a ‘purchase option’). For the discussion of the ijarah contract 
in light of Art. 7:1576h (2) DCC and Art. 1 (2) IHPIPA the difference addressed is, however, irrelevant.
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(being the maturity date of the sukuk) is a substantial amount: it is equal to 
the purchase price of the tangible property paid by the SPV to the originator at 
the commencement of the sukuk transaction.498 As addressed in the previous 
subsection, the purchase price of the tangible property paid by the SPV to the 
originator should be based on correct valuations.499
The result of the legal analysis above is that the sukuk holders are ensured 
that the principal of the sukuk will be repaid to them. The originator is obliged 
to offer to purchase the tangible property for its initial sale price (i.e. the price 
for which the tangible property was sold by the originator to the SPV). In the 
event of depreciation of the underlying tangible property during the period 
for which the sukuk were issued, the SPV will accept the offer of the originator 
and sell the tangible property (since it will receive a higher price than the mar-
ket value of the tangible property at that moment). In the event of appreciation 
of the underlying tangible property, however, the SPV is free to sell the tangi-
ble property to another party. In such case it is conceivable that the originator 
purchases the tangible property for its market value (the offer of the originator 
to purchase the tangible property for its market value will not be based on the 
discussed promise of wa’d). Hence, the originator bears the downside of the 
fluctuation of the value of the underlying tangible property, while the SPV 
(and, eventually, the sukuk holders) enjoy only its upside. From a Shari’ah per-
spective, this is accepted by the Shari’ah scholars with the argument that the 
concept of profit-and-loss-sharing is not an essential element of the ijarah, but 
it is an essential element of partnership contracts such as the musharaka.500 
From a practical perspective, the originator should anticipate this risk. The 
originator could use tangible properties the value of which is less vulnerable 
to fluctuations in the sukuk al-ijarah.501
Concluding, the sale and leaseback in the sukuk al-ijarah can be structured 
under Dutch law. The title for the transfer of the tangible property in the sale 
and leaseback is not invalidated by the fiducia prohibition. The promise of wa’d 
provided by the originator to the SPV can be structured through a unilateral 
obligation to offer to purchase the tangible property. The ijarah contract quali-
fies as a rental agreement and the Islamic finance rules for the ijarah are not 
in conflict with the (semi-) mandatory rules for rental agreements in book 7 
DCC. The mandatory rules for hire purchase are not applicable to the sukuk 
498 Offering Circular PETRONAS Global Sukuk 2009, pp. 118-120; Offering Circular Qatar Global Sukuk 
2003, pp. 3 & 18; Offering Circular DEWA Funding Sukuk 2008, pp. 16 & 78-79; Offering Circular 1 
Malaysia Sukuk Global 2010, pp. 64-65.
499 See Section 5.3.2 of this chapter.
500 See Rule 5 AAOIFI Resolution of 2008; see also Section 4.3.3 of Chapter 4 and Section 5.3.3.1 of this 
chapter.
501 In Chapter 4 I discussed the type of assets that are often used in the sukuk al-ijarah, see Section 4.3.3 
of Chapter 4.
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al-ijarah because the ijarah and its combination with the unilateral obligation 
to offer do not qualify as hire purchase.
5.4 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter I assessed how the underlying Islamic finance contracts in 
the sukuk al-musharaka, the sukuk al-murabaha and the sukuk al-ijarah can 
be structured under Dutch law. In this final subsection I will reflect on my 
findings with some concluding remarks. These concluding remarks are two-
fold: (i) I will summarise my findings; and (ii) I will arrive at a synthesis of 
some legal concepts that were discussed in this chapter under Islamic law and 
under Dutch law.
Summarising, all three types of sukuk transactions can be structured 
under Dutch law. The musharaka in the sukuk al-musharaka can be incorpo-
rated as a BV under Dutch corporate law. The objects of the musharaka BV 
should stipulate that it is a Shari’ah-compliant BV and the transfer of its shares 
should be excluded in its articles of association when the value of its tangible 
properties and services is less than 30% of its total assets value based on its 
annual accounts of that year. The murabaha in the sukuk al-murabaha occurs 
through a sale and transfer of the tangible property from the third-party seller 
to the SPV, followed by an instalment sale and transfer of it from the SPV to 
the originator with the reservation of a security right for the SPV under Dutch 
law. The sale and leaseback in the sukuk al-ijarah can be structured through 
an ‘actual transfer’ of the tangible property by the originator to the SPV, fol-
lowed by a leaseback from the SPV to the originator pursuant to an ijarah that 
qualifies as a rental agreement under Dutch law. The originator and the SPV 
also conclude a promise of wa’d that qualifies as a contract with a unilateral 
obligation of the originator to offer to repurchase the tangible property at the 
end of the lease under Dutch law.
I arrive at a synthesis of some Islamic and Dutch legal concepts discussed 
in this chapter. The transactions discussed in this chapter relate to the posi-
tion of the right of ownership under Islamic and Dutch property law. Within 
Islamic property law, the right of ownership (milk) is the complete and exclu-
sive right of an owner (malik) to dispose of tangible property with the exclu-
sion of other parties. It is not possible to condition the exclusive right of an 
owner under Islamic law: it is not possible to transfer the right of ownership of 
a tangible property under the suspensive condition of payment of an amount, 
as discussed in relation to the sukuk al-murabaha in Subsection 5.2. In the 
same line of thought, a fiduciary security transfer where the right of owner-
ship of an owner is restricted to a right of recourse which can be enforced 
upon the condition that the transferor defaults on a payment is not possible, 
as discussed in relation to the sukuk al-ijarah in Subsection 5.3. However, it 
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is possible to create a security right on a tangible property. It is also possible 
to transfer a right of ownership with the reservation of a security right under 
Islamic law (a ‘fiduciary pledge’ under Islamic law). If parties to a transaction 
wish to provide ‘collateral’ in the form of a right of ownership, they should be 
aware that they unconditionally transfer the right of ownership of the tangible 
property, which means that they provide the transferee more than a security 
right.
Dutch law shows a similarity with Islamic law. Based on the fiducia prohi-
bition of Article 3:84 (3) DCC and on the landmark case Sogelease, Dutch law 
does not accept fiduciary security ownership (fiduciaire zekerheidseigendom). 
The parties to a transaction should either transfer the complete right of own-
ership of a property or create a security right to secure a claim under Dutch 
law. If they, nonetheless, use the right of ownership to secure a claim, they 
transfer the complete right of ownership and give the transferee more than a 
security right. At the same time, Dutch law shows a difference with Islamic 
law: Dutch law has accepted conditional ownership (voorwaardelijke eigendom). 
An example of conditional ownership is the reservation of ownership (eigen-
domsvoorbehoud). In essence, the reservation of ownership is also a form of 
security ownership (zekerheidseigendom). The approach of the Dutch legisla-
ture towards the reservation of ownership has been pragmatic in order to meet 
the needs of commercial and financial transactions in practice.
Another observation with regard to the right of ownership relates to the 
limitation of its scope to tangible property (ayn) under Islamic law. The trade 
in intangible properties, i.e. claims, (bay’ al-dayn) is prohibited if the claims 
are traded for another price than their face value. In commercial transactions, 
claims are rarely traded at face value, so the principle of bay’ al-dayn practically 
results in the prohibition of the trade in claims. The trade in the shares of a 
stock company are, nonetheless, accepted under Islamic finance law with the 
reasoning that the shareholders of a stock company are deemed its owners. 
When they sell their shares, they sell their ownership in the assets of the stock 
company. This also explains the restriction of the main activities of a mush-
araka stock company to tangible properties, as was discussed in relation to the 
incorporation of a musharaka BV in Subsection 5.1. The approach of Islamic 
scholars is, however, inconsistent with the acceptance of the concept of legal 
personality for a musharaka stock company under Islamic law. A musharaka 
stock company acts in its own legal capacity and is the owner of the tangible 
properties it holds under Islamic finance law. Its shareholders have only finan-
cial rights and controlling rights.
The approach of Islamic scholars towards conventional shares shows a 
form of modern day ijtihad (as discussed in Chapter 2) within Islamic finance 
law: independent reasoning by Islamic scholars through which modern day 
concepts have been given place within Islamic law by way of an exception 
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to the classical doctrine of Islamic (property) law. Consequently, the Islamic 
rules are adapted to modern day concepts. In addition, the approach of Islamic 
scholars also corresponds to the economic reality in society. The concept of 
legal personality for a company is a legal fiction. The reality is that sharehold-
ers enjoy the profits and bear the losses realised by a company and economi-
cally act as the owners of its assets.
The addressed inconsistency in the Islamic legal system is taken a step fur-
ther with the tradability of the sukuk al-musharaka: securities (sukuk) issued 
over securities (shares in a musharaka BV). The inconsistency is stressed 
where the shares of the musharaka cannot be traded when the value of its tan-
gible properties and services is less than 30% of its total assets value, while the 
sukuk remain tradable in such event. Strictly speaking, one might argue that 
acceptance of the tradability of the sukuk al-musharaka results in a violation 
of the ban on riba, more specifically the ban on the bay’ al-dayn. The sukuk 
al-musharaka is, nonetheless, one of the 14 sukuk structures accepted by the 
AAOIFI. Two points deserve consideration in this regard. First, the acceptance 
of the tradability of the sukuk al-musharaka shows the significance of another 
explication of the prohibition of riba: the emphasis on the concept of profit-
and-loss-sharing. The significance of the profit- and loss-sharing nature of the 
sukuk al-musharaka also returns in the ban on preference shares, as discussed 
in Subsection 5.1. Hence, the prohibition of riba mainly stands on two pillars: 
(i) the emphasis on the concept of profit-and-loss-sharing; and (ii) the prohibi-
tion on the trade in claims (bay’ al-dayn). Second, the tradability of securities 
issued over securities raises the question whether sukuk issued over underly-
ing sukuk are tradable. So far, this has not been accepted by the AAOIFI.
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6 The Rights of Sukuk Holders in Sukuk 
Transactions under Dutch Law
In this chapter I assess the rights of the sukuk holders under Dutch law. The 
sukuk holders subscribe to sukuk issued by an SPV. The SPV, in turn, concludes 
an Islamic finance contract with the party requiring funding, the originator. 
The SPV connects the sukuk holders as financiers to the transactions of the 
Islamic finance contracts. This occurs through a securitisation process called 
tawreeq. In the previous chapter I assessed the underlying Islamic finance 
contracts of the sukuk al-musharaka, the sukuk al-murabaha and the sukuk al-
ijarah under Dutch law. The focus of this chapter is on the legal position of the 
sukuk holders in these sukuk structures. I will first discuss the Islamic finance 
rules for tawreeq that should be respected in all three sukuk structures in order 
to acquire the approval of a Shari’ah supervisory board (Section 6.1). Next, 
those Islamic finance rules are assessed under Dutch corporate, property and 
bankruptcy law (Section 6.2). This enables me to answer the question whether 
sukuk can be structured under Dutch law.
6.1 Islamic Finance Rules for the Securitisation Process Called Tawreeq
The originator incorporates an SPV as part of the securitisation process called 
tawreeq. The SPV acquires the underlying property of the sukuk transaction 
and becomes its owner. The SPV issues sukuk. From an Islamic finance law 
perspective, the sukuk should give the sukuk holders the ‘ownership’ of the 
underlying property of the sukuk transaction. The right of ownership of the 
underlying property does not have to be proprietarily transferred to the sukuk 
holders. Islamic finance law requires that the sukuk entitle the sukuk holders 
to financial rights, which are based on the returns on the underlying property. 
The terms and conditions of the sukuk stipulate the conditions of the sukuk 
issuance and the rights of the sukuk holders.502 Pursuant to the terms and 
conditions of the sukuk, the sukuk holders should have claims on the SPV for 
502 Offering Circular TID Global Sukuk 2006, pp. 57-72; Offering Circular JAFZ Sukuk 2007, pp. 73-89; 
Offering Circular NICBM Sukuk 2006, pp. 13-26; Offering Circular URC Sukuk 2007, pp. 22-39; 
Offering Circular PETRONAS Global Sukuk 2009, pp. 86-107; Offering Circular Qatar Global Sukuk 
2003, pp. 10-23; Offering Circular DEWA Funding Sukuk 2008, pp. 27-40; Offering Circular 1 Malaysia 
Sukuk Global 2010, pp. 27-53.
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payment of amounts equal to revenues generated with the underlying prop-
erty. Economically, the sukuk holders become the owners of the property.
In the sukuk al-musharaka the underlying properties are shares in a Dutch BV.503 In 
the sukuk al-murabaha the underlying property is a claim on the originator for the 
payment of the purchase price of the tangible property that is sold by the SPV to 
the originator.504 In the sukuk al-ijarah the underlying property is a tangible prop-
erty that is the subject-matter of the sale and leaseback transaction between the 
originator (transferor/lessee) and the SPV (transferee/lessor).505 The SPV provides 
the sukuk holders the economic ownership of the underlying property through 
tawreeq. The sukuk holders hold sukuk certificates that represent their ownership in 
the sense that the financial rights and obligations represented by those sukuk are 
the returns and losses on the underlying property. The sukuk holders as economic 
owners of the underlying properties can trade their sukuk certificates if the under-
lying properties are (deemed) tangible properties. Therefore, sukuk al-musharaka 
and sukuk al-ijarah are tradable in secondary markets.506 Sukuk al-murabaha are, 
on the other hand, not tradable.507 In this chapter I do not assess the tradability of 
sukuk certificates from one investor to another under Dutch law.
In this chapter I assess the process of tawreeq under Dutch corporate, property 
and bankruptcy law. In Chapter 4 I formulated three Islamic finance rules 
for tawreeq, which should be taken into consideration when structuring sukuk 
under Dutch law:
1. the incorporation of an SPV;
2. the transfer of the right of ownership of the underlying property to the 
SPV; and
3. the issuance of sukuk certificates that economically represent the owner-
ship of the underlying property, that is, the financial rights and obligations 
represented by the sukuk should be based on the returns and losses on the 
underlying property.
These rules are my theoretical framework for an assessment under Dutch law. 
The Islamic finance rules should be met in order to acquire the approval of 
a Shari’ah supervisory board for the qualification of the securities as sukuk. 
503 See Section 5.1 of Chapter 5.
504 See Section 5.2 of Chapter 5.
505 See Section 5.3 of Chapter 5.
506 Strictly speaking, the underlying properties in the sukuk al-musharaka are not tangible properties. 
The underlying properties that the SPV holds are shares in a musharaka BV. Nonetheless, Islamic 
scholars have accepted the tradability of sukuk al-musharaka. See Sections 5.1 and 5.4 of Chapter 5.
507 The sukuk al-murabaha are often offered to a closed circle of investors through private placements 
because these sukuk are not tradable. See Section 1.4 of Chapter 1.
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Otherwise, a Shari’ah supervisory board may not approve the sukuk structure 
which means that the securities are not Shari’ah-compliant and cannot be 
offered as sukuk in financial markets.
6.2 The Securitisation Process Called Tawreeq and the Rights of the Sukuk 
Holders under Dutch Law
In this section the three Islamic finance rules for tawreeq are assessed under 
Dutch law. The first two Islamic finance rules ensure that there is a separation 
of the underlying property from the patrimony of the originator. According to 
the first Islamic finance rule, an SPV should be incorporated. The SPV is a sep-
arate legal entity with its own patrimony. There are no Shari’ah requirements 
for the legal form of the SPV. The SPV has the sole purpose of facilitating the 
sukuk transaction. In most – if not all – sukuk structures, a new SPV is incor-
porated for each new sukuk structure.508 In this section I assess the legal form 
of the SPV under Dutch corporate law (Section 6.2.1).
In the literature, it has been suggested that the use of a single SPV for more sukuk 
issuances is preferable, in order to reduce transaction costs.509 Nonetheless, the 
incorporation of a new SPV for each sukuk issuance serves valid purposes. First, 
it ensures that there is a separation of funds, which is in particular relevant in the 
case of bankruptcy of the SPV. Such purpose is especially evident in jurisdictions 
such as the Netherlands where a debtor cannot divide his patrimony into separate 
(trust) funds and, consequently, cannot (i) separate property from its private bank-
ruptcy estate or (ii) keep a part of its patrimony separate for a specific group of its 
creditors.510 Separating the underlying property of the sukuk transaction from the 
bankruptcy estate of the SPV may, on the other hand, be less problematic in juris-
dictions where it is possible to create a trust over the underlying property, since 
a trust property does not fall into the bankruptcy estate of the trustee. Second, if 
a single SPV is used for each sukuk issuance, it is more evident that that SPV is 
managing the property of that specific sukuk transaction for the sukuk holders of 
the sukuk transaction concerned. As a result, the properties of several sukuk hold-
ers are not commingled and possible discussions between different pools of sukuk 
holders about the question which underlying property is managed by the SPV for 
which pool of sukuk holders are avoided.
508 Offering Circular TID Global Sukuk 2006, p. 17; Offering Circular JAFZ Sukuk 2007, p. 34; Offering 
Circular NICBM Sukuk 2006, pp. 30-31; Offering Circular URC Sukuk 2007, p. 40; Offering Circular 
PETRONAS Global Sukuk 2009, p. 82; Offering Circular Qatar Global Sukuk 2003, pp. 27-28; Offering 
Circular DEWA Funding Sukuk 2008, pp. 44-45; Offering Circular 1 Malaysia Sukuk Global 2010, 
pp. 59-60.
509 See McMillen 2008, p. 735.
510 Art. 3:276 DCC.
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According to the second Islamic finance rule, the originator should transfer 
the right of ownership of the underlying property to the SPV. The second 
Islamic finance rule for tawreeq was discussed for each sukuk structure in the 
previous chapter.
The third Islamic finance rule relates to the transfer of the economic own-
ership of the underlying property of the sukuk transaction by the SPV to the 
sukuk holders. The SPV issues sukuk certificates. Pursuant to the terms and 
conditions of the sukuk, the financial rights and obligations represented by the 
sukuk should be based on the returns and losses on the underlying property. In 
this section I will also assess how the ‘ownership’ of the underlying property 
is transferred by the SPV to the sukuk holders under Dutch law (Section 6.2.2).
The first two Islamic finance rules for tawreeq ensure that there is a sep-
aration of the underlying property from the patrimony of the originator. A 
bankruptcy is the litmus test for the question whether property has been sepa-
rated from the patrimony of the originator. Therefore, the bankruptcy of the 
originator is analysed in Section 6.2.3. There are no Shari’ah requirements 
that need to be taken into consideration in this regard. The bankruptcy of the 
originator will be analysed under Dutch law.
6.2.1 The Legal Form of the SPV under Dutch Corporate Law
The SPV is incorporated to facilitate the sukuk transaction and there are no 
Shari’ah requirements for its legal form. In practice, an orphan structure can 
be used: the SPV is incorporated as a limited liability company and its shares 
are held by another party.511 An orphan structure can also be used under 
Dutch corporate law. The SPV can be incorporated as a Dutch BV that issues 
the sukuk. The shares of the Dutch BV can be held by a Dutch foundation 
(stichting). The objects clause of the foundation will limit its objects to the sole 
purpose of holding the shares of the BV.
It is also possible to incorporate the SPV itself as a foundation.512 In 2004, 
the German state Saxony-Anhalt issued the first European sukuk. The SPV 
was incorporated as a Dutch foundation.513 It has been mentioned that the use 
of a foundation as an SPV is in line with Dutch market practice in structured 
asset finance transactions.514 In the literature, the use of a foundation as an 
511 Offering Circular TID Global Sukuk 2006, p. 17; Offering Circular JAFZ Sukuk 2007, p. 34; Offering 
Circular NICBM Sukuk 2006, pp. 30-31; Offering Circular URC Sukuk 2007, p. 40; Offering Circular 
DEWA Funding Sukuk 2008, pp. 44-45.
512 Salah 2010a, pp. 46-48.
513 Offering Circular Saxony-Anhalt Sukuk 2004, p. 26.
514 Muller & Hooft 2008.
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SPV is preferred over the use of a BV for the following two reasons.515 First, a 
foundation is a legal entity that has no members.516 Unlike a BV, there can be 
no tension between the interests of the legal entity itself and the interests of its 
shareholders because a foundation has no shareholders as such.517 It has only 
a managing board. Second, a foundation aims to realise objects as defined in 
its articles of association with capital provided for that purpose.518 As appears 
from its statutory definition, the foundation is meant to be incorporated with 
a focus on a specific purpose such as the custody of assets.519
According to article 2:285 (3) DCC the objects of a foundation cannot stipulate that 
payments are made to its founders or to those who are part of its corporate bodies. 
The objects of a foundation can also not stipulate that payments are made to oth-
ers, unless such payments have an idealistic or societal purpose.520 The rationale 
behind this provision is to make a distinction between a foundation and a corpo-
ration.521 The foundation is not a form of enterprise. Unlike a BV, a foundation, 
for example, cannot have the object of making profit distributions to investors in 
its capital.522 This, however, does not mean that a foundation cannot serve com-
mercial purposes.523 A foundation may, for example, be used for the custody and 
management of assets, even in commercial transactions such as the issuance of 
depositary receipts for shares (certificering van aandelen)524 or conventional secu-
ritisations.525 The payments to sukuk holders in sukuk transactions are pursuant to 
an agreement, i.e. the terms and conditions of the sukuk. The payments to sukuk 
holders do not occur pursuant to the objects of the foundation as stipulated in its 
articles of association. In the literature, it is broadly accepted that payments pur-
suant to an agreement for valuable consideration (overeenkomst onder bezwarende 
515 Ibid. The use of a foundation as an SPV, instead of a BV, is also preferred in conventional securitisa-
tions, see Van Houte 2001, pp. 76-81. Often, tax advantages of a foundation compared to a BV are 
addressed. Tax law falls outside the scope of this research and will not be discussed. For more on 
the tax law aspects of the use of foundations as SPVs, see Muller & Hooft 2008; Wessels, Schwarz 
& Van de Streek 2002, p. 210; Van Houte (Financiering, belegging en verzekering: Convergentie van 
financiële markten) 2006, p. 289; Van Houte 2009a, pp. 303-314; Van Houte 2009b, pp. 87-98.
516 Art. 2:285 (1) DCC.
517 Van Houte (Financiering, belegging en verzekering: Convergentie van financiële markten) 2006, p. 289.
518 Art. 2:285 (1) DCC.
519 Van Houte 2001, pp. 76-81.
520 Art. 2:285 (3) DCC.
521 Asser/Van der Grinten & Maeijer 1997 (2-II), no. 471.
522 Pitlo/Raaijmakers 2006, p. 665.
523 Aertsen 2004, p. 116; Dijk & Van der Ploeg 2007, pp. 20-21.
524 For more on issuing depositary receipts for shares, see Section 6.2.2.3 of this chapter.
525 See Van Houte 2001, pp. 76-81. For more on conventional securitisations, see Schwarcz, Markell & 
Broome 2004; Schwarcz 2007; Schwarcz 2008; Schwarcz 2009, pp. 211-268; Wood 2008, Chapters 
28 & 29. For more on conventional securitisations and Dutch law, see Rongen 2012; Vriesendorp & 
Wibier 2009, pp. 2-8; Wibier 2009a, pp. 1198-1207; Wibier 2011a. For a comparison of conventional 
securitisations with Islamic securitisations, see Wibier & Salah 2010, pp. 1738-1746; Wibier & Salah 
(Islamic Finance and the Influence of Religion on the Law) 2011.
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titel) do not fall within the scope of the prohibited payments of article 2:285 (3) 
DCC.526 Furthermore, in sukuk transactions, the payments to sukuk holders are 
not in conflict with the rationale of article 2:285 (3) DCC. The foundation is not 
making profit as a corporation, which it pays (as a form of dividends) to the sukuk 
holders. The foundation does not make profit itself; it only pays through to the 
sukuk holders amounts it receives from the musharaka BV and the originator.
The activities of the SPV should be restricted, regardless of whether the SPV 
is incorporated as a BV or as a foundation. The objects of the SPV as stipulated 
in its articles of association should stipulate that the SPV has the sole purpose 
of facilitating the sukuk transaction so that the SPV cannot undertake other 
activities than those necessarily required to facilitate the sukuk transaction. 
As a result, the risk of bankruptcy of the SPV is mitigated, making the SPV a 
bankruptcy-remote vehicle.527
In addition to a restricted description of its objects, other measures can be taken to 
make the SPV a bankruptcy-remote vehicle, such as measures to mitigate the risk 
of filing for a bankruptcy proceeding by the SPV itself or by its creditors, meas-
ures to mitigate external influence on the SPV (through unwanted control over its 
shares or through bankruptcy of other parties triggering the bankruptcy of the 
SPV) or measures to safeguard its patrimony.528
A transgression of the objects (doeloverschrijding) of the SPV results in an ultra 
vires act. According to Article 2:7 DCC, a legal act of a legal entity is voidable 
(i) if the legal act leads to a transgression of the objects of the legal entity 
and (ii) if the counterparty knew this or could have known this without own 
research. The voidability of an ultra vires claim has external force. This means 
that it affects the power of representation of the managing board of the SPV. 
According to Article 2:7 DCC, only the SPV can invoke the ultra vires claim. 
If the managing board of the SPV refuses to invoke such claim, its managing 
board can be replaced by a new managing board.529
526 Asser/Van der Grinten & Maeijer 1997 (2-II), no. 472; Overes (GS Rechtspersonen, Art. 2:285 DCC) 
2012, no. 7; Dijk & Van der Ploeg 2007, pp. 20-21; Pitlo/Raaijmakers 2006, p. 665.
527 The bankruptcy-remoteness of the SPV is one of its most significant features, see DeLorenzo & 
McMillen (Islamic Finance: The Regulatory Challenge) 2007, pp. 177-178; McMillen 2006, pp. 164-166; 
McMilen 2007, pp. 453-455; IMF Policy Discussion Paper 2008, p. 14; IMF Working Paper 2007, p. 
28; Adam (Advances in Islamic Economics and Finance, Volume 1, Proceedings of the 6th International 
Conference on Islamic Economics and Finance) 2005, pp. 383-385; Abdel-Khaleq & Richardson 2007, 
pp. 418-419.
528 For a discussion of such measures for SPVs in conventional securitisations under Dutch law, see 
Rongen 2012, pp. 151-184.
529 If the SPV is a BV, its shareholder (i.e. the foundation holding its shares for the purpose of facili-
tating the sukuk transaction) can replace the managing board. See Art. 2:244 DCC. If the SPV is a 
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For the question whether a legal act leads to transgression of the objects of the 
SPV, its objects as defined in its articles of association is not decisive.530 All circum-
stances should be taken into consideration.531 The knowledge of the transgression 
of the objects is required at the moment of performance of the legal act.532 The sole 
publication of the articles of association of the foundation is not sufficient to prove 
the required knowledge of the counterparty.533 According to case law of the Dutch 
Supreme Court, however, the articles of association do have a key role in relation 
to the required knowledge of transgression of the objects: the counterparty of the 
foundation bears the risk of unfamiliarity with the objects of the SPV as stipulated 
in its articles of association. If the counterparty of the SPV, after consulting the 
articles of association of the SPV, should have known that a legal act results in a 
transgression of its objects, the counterparty cannot rely on his unfamiliarity with 
the objects of the SPV.534
Finally, Dutch corporate law provides specific rules for a foundation that make 
the incorporation of an SPV as a foundation attractive. According to Article 
2:291 (2) DCC, the managing board of a foundation only has the power to enter 
into certain specified acts when such power is granted to it by the articles of 
association of the foundation.535 The articles of association of the foundation 
can restrict the power of representation of its managing board with regard to 
the acts mentioned in Article 2:291 (2) DCC.536 If the managing board disre-
gards the articles of association and, nonetheless, performs such legal acts, 
those legal acts will be void.537 It is possible to restrict with external effect incur-
ring of debts and liabilities that are not part of the sukuk transaction, granting 
security for debts not related to the sukuk transaction and transfer or encum-
brance of immovable property outside the scope of the sukuk transaction. The 
latter is relevant with regard to the sukuk al-murabaha and the sukuk al-ijarah 
foundation, the sukuk holders as interested parties within the meaning of Art. 2:298 (1) DCC can 
request the court to dismiss the managing board of the foundation and appoint a new managing 
board.
530 Dutch Supreme Court 16 October 1992, NJ 1993, 98, with case note by Maeijer, para. 3.2.
531 See Dutch Supreme Court 7 February 1992, NJ 1992, 438, with case note by Maeijer, para. 3.3; Dutch 
Supreme Court 16 October 1992, NJ 1993, 98, with case note by Maeijer, para. 3.2; Dutch Supreme 
Court 20 September 1996, NJ 1997, 149, para. 3.4.
532 See  Huizink (GS Rechtspersonen, Art. 2:7 DCC) 2005, no. 4.
533 See Asser/Van der Grinten & Maeijer 1997 (2-II), no. 75; Huizink (GS Rechtspersonen, Art. 2:7 DCC) 
2005, no. 8.
534 Dutch Supreme Court 15 June 1973, NJ 1973, 469, with case note by Wachter.
535 The power of representation of the managing board of a foundation is unrestricted and unlimited, 
unless the law provides otherwise, see Art. 2:292 (3) DCC. Dutch corporate law has statutory restric-
tions which are specifically applicable to foundations. See Asser/Van der Grinten & Maeijer 1997 
(2-II), nos. 484-485; cf. Asser/Van der Grinten & Maeijer 1997 (2-II), no. 319.
536 Parliamentary History, Act Implementing Book 2 DCC 1977, pp. 1206-1208.
537 Asser/Van der Grinten & Maeijer 1997 (2-11), no. 320. The foundation has the power to invoke the 
restriction of its power of representation, see Art. 2:292 (3) DCC.
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where the underlying property can be immovable property. Article 2:291 (2) 
DCC, thus, further promotes the bankruptcy-remoteness of the SPV.
6.2.2 The Ownership of Sukuk Holders in Underlying Properties of Sukuk 
Transactions under Dutch Law
The SPV issues sukuk. The sukuk should give the sukuk holders the ‘economic 
ownership’ of the underlying property of the sukuk transaction. Pursuant to 
the terms and conditions of the sukuk, the sukuk holders should have finan-
cial rights that entitle them to profits generated with the underlying property. 
However, the right of ownership of the underlying property does not have to 
be proprietarily transferred to the sukuk holders. In practice, the SPV often 
creates an English law trust over the underlying property of a sukuk transac-
tion (the trust property).538 As a result, the SPV is the legal owner of the trust 
property and the sukuk holders are the beneficial owners of the trust property. 
The creation of an English law trust is not required under Islamic finance law, 
but its use is attractive in sukuk transactions because the trust property does 
not fall into the bankruptcy estate of the SPV in case of its bankruptcy.539
It is not possible to create a trust under Dutch law.540 There are three 
impediments for the creation of a trust. First, Article 3:84 (3) DCC declares the 
title for the transfer of a property invalid if it is intended for security purposes 
(fiducia cum creditore) or if it does not have the purpose of bringing the prop-
erty into the patrimony of the transferee (fiducia cum amico). The creation of a 
trust is a form of the prohibited fiducia cum amico because the trust property 
does not form part of the bankruptcy estate of the trustee.541 Second, according 
to the paritas creditorum in Article 3:277 (1) DCC, creditors have an equal right 
amongst themselves to be paid from the net proceeds of the properties of their 
538 Offering Circular TID Global Sukuk 2006, pp. 61-62; Offering Circular JAFZ Sukuk 2007, pp. 75-76; 
Offering Circular NICBM Sukuk 2006, pp. 16-17; Offering Circular URC Sukuk 2007, pp. 25-26; 
Offering Circular PETRONAS Global Sukuk 2009, pp. 93-94; Offering Circular Qatar Global Sukuk 
2003, pp. 14-15; Offering Circular DEWA Funding Sukuk 2008, p. 31; Offering Circular 1 Malaysia 
Sukuk Global 2010, p. 41.
539 See Section 4.2.2 of Chapter 4.
540 Aertsen 2004, pp. 1-5; Wibier 2011b, pp. 37-38. Although The Hague Convention on the Law 
Applicable to Trusts and on Their Recognition (Hague Trust Convention) requires the Netherlands 
to recognise foreign law trusts that have been validly created under such foreign law, it does not 
introduce the trust into domestic Dutch law.
541 According to the Dutch Supreme Court, a transaction where one party has the complete right of 
ownership of a property, while another party only has contractual rights on the property is not 
in conflict with the closed legal system of Dutch property law, see Dutch Supreme Court 19 May 
1995, NJ 1996, 119, with case note by Kleijn/AA 1995, 11, with case note by Vriesendorp, para. 3.6. 
In the case of a trust, however, the beneficiaries seem to have an interest in the trust property that 
cannot be qualified as contractual rights only under Dutch law, see Hoppenreijs & Vriesendorp 
(Verkenningen op de grens van burgerlijk recht en belastingrecht: Opstellen over (fiscaal) ondernemings-
recht, erfrecht en insolventierecht) 2000, pp. 57-58. 
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debtor, after payment of the costs of execution, in proportion to their claims, 
except for the causes of preference recognised by law. The creation of a trust 
provides a cause of preference not recognised by law because the beneficial 
ownership of sukuk holders is not affected by the bankruptcy of the trustee 
as the legal owner of the trust property. Third, Article 3:276 DCC states that 
unless otherwise provided by law or contract, a creditor can take recourse for 
his claim against all the properties of his debtor. The Dutch Supreme Court 
ruled that it is only possible to make an exception to Article 3:276 DCC if this 
is provided by the law.542 The creation of a trust violates this rule because the 
creditors of a trustee cannot take recourse for their claims against the trust 
property in the event of bankruptcy of the trustee.543
The Netherlands is party to The Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts 
and on Their Recognition (Hague Trust Convention). As a party to the Hague Trust 
Convention, the Netherlands could be obliged to recognise certain aspects of a trust 
created under English law in sukuk transactions (although this is arguable in this 
study based on article 13 of the Hague Trust Convention that mentions that no state 
shall be bound to recognise a trust the significant elements of which are more 
closely connected with a state that does not have a trust because this study is based 
on the assumption that a Dutch legal entity initiates a sukuk transaction through 
the use of an underlying property located in the Netherlands, where Dutch law 
governs all transaction documents). However, as mentioned in chapter 1, private 
international law falls outside the scope of this research.544 Therefore, the Hague 
Trust Convention is not discussed in this book.
In civil law jurisdictions such as the Netherlands where the trust is unknown, 
the question arises in what way the ‘economic ownership’ of the sukuk hold-
ers can be realised and protected against a possible bankruptcy of the SPV.545 
In the following subsections I discuss the ‘economic ownership’ of the sukuk 
holders under Dutch law (Section 6.2.2.1). I then assess the creation of secu-
rity rights to secure their position in the event of bankruptcy of the SPV under 
Dutch law. I assess the possibility to provide the sukuk holders security rights 
through a collective security arrangement (collectieve zekerheidsarrangement) 
(Section 6.2.2.2) and through the statutory joint right of pledge of Article 
542 Dutch Supreme Court 13 June 2003, NJ 2004, 196, with case note by Kleijn, para. 3.3.4.
543 Another view on Art. 3:276 DCC is that it is in fact a form of a statutory trust under Dutch law, see 
Vriesendorp (Trust en onderneming) 2003, pp. 151-161.
544 See Section 1.3 of Chapter 1.
545 The French legislature, for example, was contemplating the introduction of the fiducie (the French 
equivalent of an English law trust) to facilitate sukuk transactions. For more on the French fiducie, 
see Report of Brunel No. 1901, Assemblée Nationale, 2009; Report of Marini No. 442, Sénat, 2009; 
cf. Kopalit 2009, pp. 701-706.
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3:259 DCC in the case of issuance of depositary receipts for shares (certifi caten 
van aandelen) (Section 6.2.2.3). Finally, with regard to the sukuk al-musharaka, 
I will also assess the possibility to provide the sukuk holders the economic 
ownership of the shares in the musharaka BV through the issuance of non-
voting shares (stemrechtloze aandelen) (Section 6.2.2.4). Hence, the focus of 
the following subsections is on the legal relationship between the SPV and the 
sukuk holders as indicated in Figures 1, 2 and 3 (except for Subsection 6.2.2.4 
where the musharaka BV will issue non-voting shares to the sukuk holders 
directly and no SPV is incorporated).
Figure 1 Rights of sukuk holders in sukuk al-musharaka under Dutch law
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Figure 2 Rights of sukuk holders in sukuk al-murabaha under Dutch law
Figure 3 Rights of sukuk holders in sukuk al-ijarah under Dutch law
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6.2.2.1 The Economic Ownership of Sukuk Holders under Dutch Property Law
The terms and conditions of the sukuk form the agreement between the SPV 
as the issuer of the sukuk and the sukuk holders as the subscribers to the sukuk 
under Dutch law.546 The terms and conditions of the sukuk should stipulate 
that the sukuk holders are the economic owners of the underlying property 
of the sukuk transaction, that is, that the sukuk holders have provided capital 
so that the SPV can acquire the property and that the sukuk holders are enti-
tled to the financial benefits realised with that property. The sukuk holders 
have financial rights towards the SPV, i.e. contractual claims for payment of 
amounts pursuant to the terms and conditions of the sukuk. The legal rela-
tionship between the SPV and the sukuk holders is contractual under Dutch 
law. As a result, the SPV remains the owner of the underlying property in 
the sukuk transaction and the sukuk holders acquire its economic ownership 
(economische eigendom) under Dutch law.
Under Dutch law the term ‘economic ownership’ refers to a bundle of con-
tractual rights and obligations in relation to a property.547 The legal owner 
of a property transfers the benefits and expenditures of that property to the 
economic owner, pursuant to an agreement between both parties.548 The 
term ‘economic ownership’ does not have a statutory basis under Dutch law. 
According to the Dutch Supreme Court, economic ownership is not ownership 
as known under Dutch property law.549 It is a summary description without an 
independent meaning of the legal relationship between the parties that have 
established the economic ownership.550 Dutch legal practice felt the need to 
deem economic ownership as a sort of unity.551
In the course of the preparations of book 5 of the Dutch Civil Code, the ques-
tion was raised whether the distinction between legal ownership and economic 
546 In the Dutch literature there has been discussion on the question whether the acceptance of the 
terms and conditions of conventional bonds results in the conclusion of one agreement between the 
issuer and the bond holders or in several agreements between the issuer and each bond holder. For 
an overview of these discussions, see Prinsen 2004, pp. 13-24. Furthermore, in the Dutch literature 
there has been discussion on whether the terms and conditions of securities qualify as general con-
ditions within the meaning of Art. 6:231 (a) DCC. For an overview of these discussions, see Uniken 
Venema & Eisma 1990, p. 81; Asser/Maeijer, Van Solinge & Nieuwe Weme 2010 (2-II*), no. 661; 
Prinsen 2004, pp. 24-25; Van der Velden 2008, pp. 269-275. Both discussions are not relevant for the 
focus of this subsection: the economic ownership of sukuk holders under Dutch property law.
547 Dutch Supreme Court 5 March 2004, NJ 2004, 316, with case note by Stein, para. 3.3.1. Cf. Dutch 
Supreme Court 3 November 2006, NJ 2007, 155, with case note by Van Schilfgaarde, para. 3.4.
548 Parliamentary History, Book 5 DCC 1981, p. 17. Cf. Dutch Supreme Court 23 September 2002, NJ 
2003, 400, with case note by Kleijn, para. 3.5.2.
549 Dutch Supreme Court 5 March 2004, NJ 2004, 316, with case note by Stein, para. 3.3.1.
550 Dutch Supreme Court 3 November 2006, NJ 2007, 155, with case note by Van Schilfgaarde, para. 3.5.
551 See Asser/Mijnssen, De Haan & Van Dam 2006 (3-I), no. 483.
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ownership should be codified in law.552 The Dutch legislature did not codify eco-
nomic ownership because there was no need to provide statutory rules for the 
legal position of an economic owner; his legal position could be determined by the 
rules of the contract pursuant to which his economic ownership was created.553 In 
addition, the Dutch legislature mentioned that economic ownership should not be 
codified because it relates to fiduciary ownership and the English law trust, which 
are prohibited by article 3:84 (3) DCC.554
In the parliamentary history of article 3:84 (3) DCC some examples are given of 
transactions that are not invalidated by article 3:84 (3) DCC, such as: (i) the trans-
fer of a property to a foundation or a BV with restricted objects that then becomes 
the owner of the property and that has a contractual relationship with other parties 
in relation to that property; or (ii) the issuance of depositary receipts for shares or 
immovable property possibly secured with security rights.555 The proposed struc-
ture for sukuk transactions in this book is completely in line with such examples: 
the ownership of the property is separated from the patrimony of the originator 
and is transferred to the SPV (i.e. a BV or a foundation with restricted objects) 
that, in turn, holds the property for the sukuk holders according to the contractual 
arrangements between them.
The economic ownership of the sukuk holders has no effect towards third par-
ties such as the creditors of the SPV. In a sukuk transaction the SPV has the 
right of ownership of the underlying property of the sukuk transaction and the 
sukuk holders have only contractual rights. Consequently, the creditors of the 
SPV can have recourse against the underlying property of a sukuk transaction 
because the property remains part of the patrimony of the SPV. In Amsem/
Van Tuijn & Leutscher, the Dutch Supreme Court ruled that the transfer of 
economic ownership does not change the legal ownership positions of the 
parties.556 The property remains available for attachment (beslag) by creditors 
of the legal owner.557
Furthermore, in the event of bankruptcy of the SPV, the property falls into 
its bankruptcy estate. In Van den Bos q.q./Mulders & Welleman, also known as 
Nebula, the Dutch Supreme Court had to deal with the question whether the 
economic owner of an immovable property could rent the immovable property 
552 Parliamentary History, Book 5 DCC 1981, pp. 17-18.
553 Ibid., p. 17.
554 Ibid., p. 18.
555 Parliamentary History, Act Implementing Books 3, 5 and 6 DCC 1990, pp. 1201-1202.
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after the bankruptcy of its legal owner to a third party with effect towards the 
bankruptcy estate.558 The Dutch Supreme Court ruled that the bankruptcy of a 
party does not affect its agreements with other parties, but this does not mean 
that those other parties can exercise the rights under such agreements as if 
there were no bankruptcy, even if no active performance from the bankruptcy 
trustee is required and he only has to tolerate something.559 As a result of the 
bankruptcy of the legal owner of the property, its economic owner can no 
longer enforce his right of use of the property against the bankruptcy trustee 
and, consequently, the economic owner cannot provide third parties, by con-
cluding a rental agreement with them, a right of tenancy of the property that 
can be enforced towards the bankruptcy trustee of the legal owner either.560 
In a sukuk transaction, the bankruptcy trustee of the SPV in the case of its 
bankruptcy may default under the agreement with the sukuk holders. In such 
event, the sukuk holders have a contractual claim for damages as a result of 
breach of contract. Such contractual claims are ordinary, unsecured claims on 
the bankruptcy estate of the SPV.561
6.2.2.2 Security Rights for Sukuk Holders through Collective Security 
Arrangement under Dutch Property Law
Notwithstanding that the SPV is incorporated as a bankruptcy-remote vehicle, 
the sukuk holders may require security rights in order to secure their position 
in relation to other creditors of the SPV or in its bankruptcy under Dutch 
law. What is rather peculiar about the security rights of the sukuk holders is 
that the security rights are for a changing group of creditors: in the sukuk al-
musharaka and the sukuk al-ijarah the sukuk holders can sell and transfer their 
sukuk in capital markets and (new) sukuk holders can enter and exit the pool of 
creditors. Such security arrangement is also referred to as a collective security 
arrangement.562 In this subsection I assess the possibilities for a collective 
security arrangement for sukuk holders under Dutch law.
A collective security arrangement ensures that the security rights of the 
sukuk holders are administrated effectively and that possible enforcement is 
realised efficiently.563 In collective security arrangements one party (the secu-
rity agent) will acquire, administrate and, if need be, enforce the security 
558 Dutch Supreme Court 3 November 2006, NJ 2007, 155, with case note by Van Schilfgaarde, para. 3.4. 
For more on the Nebula case, see Wibier 2008b, pp. 445-452.
559 According to the Dutch Supreme Court, the equality of creditors (paritas creditorum) as codified in 
Arts. 26 and 108 ff. DBA is otherwise violated, see Dutch Supreme Court 3 November 2006, NJ 2007, 
155, with case note by Van Schilfgaarde, paras. 3.4-3.5.
560 Ibid., para. 3.6.
561 Art. 37a DBA.
562 See Thiele 2003.
563 Thiele 2001, pp. 456-463.
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rights for the group of creditors. In sukuk transactions the security agent can 
be a newly incorporated bankruptcy-remote SPV (the second SPV next to the 
(first) SPV that issues the sukuk). From a practical perspective, the structure 
and documentation of the collective security arrangement should be such that 
(new) creditors can enter and exit the pool of creditors without affecting the 
legal validity of the collective security arrangement.
In the Dutch literature there is debate about the form and the legal validity 
of collective security arrangements.564 A collective security arrangement can 
be structured through agency (vertegenwoordiging) under Dutch law. The sukuk 
holders can jointly hold the security rights and create a community (gemeen-
schap) within the meaning of Chapter 7 book 3 DCC. Article 3:168 DCC pro-
vides the sukuk holders the possibility to agree on an administration scheme, 
pursuant to which they can appoint a security agent. However, creating a com-
munity leads to legal uncertainty with regard to: (i) whether Article 3:170 (3) 
DCC requires all sukuk holders to agree on the enforcement of the security 
right; (ii) whether the sukuk holders as the security rights holders should be 
identified, which might not be feasible on a practical level as the pool of sukuk 
holders keeps changing due to the trade of the sukuk in capital markets; and 
(iii) whether the security rights transfer by law to new sukuk holders, who pur-
chase sukuk from existing sukuk holders.565 As a result of the addressed legal 
uncertainty, collective security arrangements based on agency are rarely used 
in conventional finance transactions in the Dutch finance practice.566
A collective security arrangement can also be structured by using a fiduci-
ary as security agent under Dutch law. The fiduciary is a security agent that 
holds the security rights in its own name. The sukuk holders do not acquire 
a joint security right. Instead, the SPV grants security directly to the security 
agent. The security agent administrates and, if need be, enforces the secu-
rity rights for the sukuk holders based on an agreement between the security 
agent and the sukuk holders. The drawbacks discussed above with regard to a 
collective security arrangement based on agency do not occur when the secu-
rity agent accepts the security rights in its own name. However, there is legal 
uncertainty in relation to the question whether a party that does not hold the 
secured claims can act as the security rights holder under Dutch law.
The group of creditors (sukuk holders) are the parties that hold the secured claims, 
while the security agent is the security rights holder. In the literature two possible 
564 See Kortmann, Rongen & Verhagen 2001a, pp. 818-823; Kortmann, Rongen & Verhagen 2001b, pp. 
840-846; Thiele 2003; Thiele (Zekerhedenrecht in ontwikkeling) 2009; Wibier 2009b, pp. 629-632; 
Wibier 2010, pp. 84-86.
565 Thiele 2003, pp. 60-83; Thiele (Zekerhedenrecht in ontwikkeling) 2009, pp. 75-85.
566 Thiele 2003, p. 106.
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impediments have been addressed in this regard.567 First, the Dutch Civil Code 
seems to assume that the secured claims and the security rights are held by the 
same party.568 Second, the dependent (afhankelijk) character of security rights 
(according to which security rights should follow rights to which they are con-
nected) has been addressed as possibly problematic.569
A parallel debt clause (parallelle vordering) is used in Dutch finance practice to 
provide the security agent with a claim in its own name against the debtor and 
this parallel debt is subsequently secured.570 Pursuant to a parallel debt clause, 
the security agent acquires a substantive and independent claim on the SPV 
that is equal to the entire amount of all payments outstanding for the sukuk. 
The claim of the security agent is parallel to the claims of the sukuk holders, 
that is, the claim of the security agent is connected to the claims of the sukuk 
holders such that each increase or decrease in the claims of the sukuk hold-
ers results in an equal increase or decrease in the claim of the security agent. 
The security agent has its own claim on the SPV and acquires security rights 
to secure that (parallel) claim. At the same time, the SPV is released from its 
obligation to pay the security agent after payment to the sukuk holders since 
each payment to the sukuk holders equally decreases the claim of the security 
agent.
In the literature other legal constructions besides the parallel debt clause have 
been discussed in relation to collective security arrangements. The security agent 
can also acquire a claim in its own name on the debtor through (i) a joint and 
several creditorship clause (actieve hoofdelijkheid) or (ii) a guarantee arrangement 
(borgtocht-constructie).571
The SPV/issuer can create security rights for the SPV/security agent to secure 
the parallel debt claim of the SPV/security agent against the SPV/issuer. The 
security rights are created over the underlying properties of the sukuk trans-
actions: shares in a BV (in the sukuk al-musharaka), claims for instalment 
567 Thiele 2001, pp. 456-463.
568 For example, see Art. 3:248 DCC.
569 See Art. 3:82 DCC.
570 There has been debate in the literature on the legal validity of a parallel debt clause. The prevail-
ing view is that the use of a parallel debt clause is valid under Dutch law. See Kortmann, Rongen & 
Verhagen 2001a, pp. 818-823; Kortmann, Rongen & Verhagen 2001b, pp. 840-846; Thiele 2001, pp. 
462-463; Thiele 2003, pp. 95-98; Thiele (Zekerhedenrecht in ontwikkeling) 2009, pp. 93-95; Polak & 
Van Mierlo 1997, pp. 26-27. Also cf. Wibier 2009b, pp. 629-632; Wibier 2010, pp. 84-86; Wibier 2011, 
pp. 39-40. For a dissenting view, see Van Achterberg & Brakel 1998, pp. 68-74.
571 For more on a joint and several creditorship clause and on a guarantee arrangement in relation to 
collective security arrangements, see Kortmann, Rongen & Verhagen 2001a, pp. 813-823; Thiele 
2003, pp. 92-102.
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payments of a purchase price (in the sukuk al-murabaha) or tangible proper-
ties (in the sukuk al-ijarah). The secured claim of the security agent is a claim 
‘parallel’ to that of the sukuk holders. A default on the payments to the sukuk 
holders will, thus, also constitute a default on the payment to the security 
agent, resulting in the claims becoming due and payable simultaneously. In 
such event, the security agent can enforce its security rights. With regard to 
the sukuk al-musharaka, the security agent is bound by the transfer restric-
tions (blokkeringsregeling) in the articles of association of the musharaka BV 
as discussed in Chapter 5.572 The security agent cannot sell and transfer the 
shares when the value of the tangible properties and the services of the mush-
araka BV is less than 30% of its total assets value based on its annual accounts 
of that year.573 The security agent may, however, request a court to declare the 
transfer restrictions partially or completely non-applicable according to Article 
2:195 (7) DCC.574
The security agent holds, administrates and enforces the security rights under 
title of trust (ten titel van beheer) for the sukuk holders.575 Nonetheless, no problems 
will arise with the fiducia prohibition of article 3:84 (3) DCC.576 The prohibition of 
the fiducia cum amico in article 3:84 (3) DCC aims to avoid the creation of propri-
etary rights in a way not provided by the law, which otherwise would be in conflict 
with the closed legal system of Dutch property law.577 However, the legal relation-
ship between the security agent and the sukuk holders is solely contractual.
The sukuk holders are not protected against a possible bankruptcy of the 
security agent, however. The (parallel) claim of the security agent and the 
security rights held by the security agent fall into the bankruptcy estate of the 
security agent in case of its bankruptcy. Although its bankruptcy trustee has 
contractual obligations towards the sukuk holders, he may default on these 
obligations. In such event, the sukuk holders have an ordinary, unsecured 
claim for payment of damages against the bankruptcy estate of the security 
agent.578 The incorporation of a security agent into a sukuk structure mitigates 
the bankruptcy risk of the SPV that issues the sukuk, but this bankruptcy risk 
as such is not eliminated completely. It is instead transferred to the SPV that 
572 See Section 5.1 of Chapter 5.
573 See Section 5.1.2 of Chapter 5.
574 For a discussion of the impact of a partial or complete non-applicability of the transfer restrictions 
on the Shari’ah compliance of the sukuk al-musharaka transaction, see Section 5.1.3 of Chapter 5.
575 Kortmann, Rongen & Verhagen 2001b, p. 840.
576 Ibid., pp. 844-845.
577 Dutch Supreme Court 19 May 1995, NJ 1996, 119, with case note by Kleijn/AA 1995, 11, with case 
note by Vriesendorp, para. 3.6.
578 See Art. 37a DBA.
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is the security agent. The bankruptcy risk of the security agent cannot be 
eliminated completely under Dutch law. The bankruptcy risk is transferred 
from one bankruptcy-remote SPV (the issuer) to another bankruptcy-remote 
SPV (the security agent).
One could question the utility of collective security arrangements in sukuk 
transactions for the following four reasons. First, the bankruptcy of the SPV 
that is the issuer of the sukuk is unlikely. The SPV is a bankruptcy-remote 
vehicle. The managing board of the SPV will not act against the restrictions in 
the objects in the articles of association of the SPV due to a significant risk of 
directors’ liability. Second, if the SPV goes bankrupt due to transgression of its 
objects by its managing board, its managing board is liable, which means that 
the sukuk holders have recourse against them.579 Third, if the SPV goes bank-
rupt due to errors in its structuring (e.g. unforeseen tax costs, miscalculations 
in payment schedules, etc.), the only substantive creditors of the SPV will 
be the sukuk holders. Fourth, the bankruptcy risks of the issuer mentioned 
above cannot be eliminated with the use of a collective security arrangement 
because the security agent is exposed to similar risks.
In practice, nonetheless, collective security arrangements will most prob-
ably be used in sukuk transactions in the Netherlands. The risk of bankruptcy 
of the security agent may not be eliminated completely. Such risk is, however, 
rather theoretical because it is only relevant if the security agent – which is 
already a bankruptcy-remote SPV – goes bankrupt at a point when the issuer 
– which is also a bankruptcy-remote SPV – also defaults on its payments.580 
From a structural perspective, the use of collective security arrangements 
further mitigates the overall bankruptcy risks to which the sukuk holders are 
exposed in sukuk transactions. Often, major financial interests are at stake. 
Each minor mitigation of the bankruptcy risks in such transactions justifies 
additional structural mechanisms. Figures 4, 5 and 6 provide an overview of 
each of the discussed sukuk structures with a collective security arrangement.
579 Cf. Dutch Supreme Court 20 June 2008, NJ 2009, 21, with case note by Maeijer & Snijders; cf. Dutch 
Supreme Court 29 November 2002, NJ 2003, 455, with case note by Maeijer.
580 It has, however, been argued that in times of financial crises this view might be too optimistic, see 
Thiele (Zekerhedenrecht in ontwikkeling) 2009, p. 101. In the literature, legislative amendments have 
been proposed, pursuant to which the proceeds collected by the security rights holder should be 
deposited in a designated account to which the creditors of the security agent have no recourse, see 
Thiele 2003, pp. 261-263.
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Figure 4 Sukuk al-musharaka with collective security arrangement under Dutch 
law
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Figure 5 Sukuk al-murabaha with collective security arrangement under Dutch 
law
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Figure 6 Sukuk al-ijarah with collective security arrangement under Dutch law
6.2.2.3 Statutory Joint Right of Pledge of Sukuk Holders in Sukuk 
al - Musharaka through Issuance of Depositary Receipts for 
Shares under Dutch Property and Corporate Law
The legal structure of sukuk transactions under Dutch law as discussed in the 
previous subsections resembles the Dutch legal concept of depositary receipt 
for properties (certifi cering van goederen). The issuance of depositary receipts 
for properties refers to a process where an administration offi  ce581 (sticht-
ing administratiekantoor) issues depositary receipts for properties entrusted 
to its management. The administration offi  ce has the right of ownership of 
581 The administration offi  ce is often referred to as a trust offi  ce. In this research I use the term ‘admin-
istration offi  ce’ in order to avoid confusion with an English law trust. An administration offi  ce is not 
an English law trust, but a Dutch foundation that is incorporated for the purpose of holding proper-
ties entrusted to its management for depositary receipt holders to whom it has issued depositary 
receipts.
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the properties. Pursuant to the administration conditions (administratievoor-
waarden), the depositary receipt holders are entitled to the financial benefits 
of the properties.582 As a result, the right of ownership of the properties is 
separated from their economic benefits.583 A possible qualification of sukuk 
transactions as depositary receipts for properties is relevant in light of Article 
3:259 DCC, which provides depositary receipt holders a statutory joint right 
of pledge (wettelijk gezamenlijk pandrecht). The statutory joint right of pledge 
can serve as an alternative to a collective security arrangement. The statu-
tory joint right of pledge has the benefit that it has a statutory basis in Article 
3:259 DCC, which provides rules for the creation and enforcement of the joint 
right of pledge, leaving no room for legal uncertainty with regard to its legal 
validity. In addition, the sukuk holders as depositary receipts holders will have 
a proprietary relationship with the issuer (the administration office) of the 
sukuk (the depositary receipts) in such case and are secured creditors in case 
of its bankruptcy, contrary to the structures described in Sections 6.2.2.1 and 
6.2.2.2 where the sukuk holders only have a contractual relationship with the 
SPV/issuer or with the SPV/security agent and are ordinary, unsecured credi-
tors in their respective bankruptcies.
The administration office acquires the ownership of the properties under title of 
trust. With regard to depositary receipts for shares, the phrase ‘under title of trust’ 
is mentioned in articles 2:336 (2) and 2:341 (6) DCC. The transfer of the properties 
to an administration office is, however, not in conflict with article 3:84 (3) DCC. 
According to the Dutch Supreme Court, a transaction where one party has the 
complete right of ownership of a property, while another party has contractual 
rights only is not in conflict with the closed legal system of Dutch property law.584 
That is the case with depositary receipts for properties: the administration office is 
the sole owner of the properties and the properties are part of its patrimony (and 
582 In the literature there is discussion on the legal character of the administration conditions. One 
of the questions is whether the administration conditions qualify as general conditions within the 
meaning of Art. 6:231 (1) (a) DCC, see Van den Ingh 1991, pp. 154-156; Uniken Venema & Eisma 
1990, p. 82; Asser/Maeijer, Van Solinge & Nieuwe Weme 2010 (2-II*), no. 664. Another question 
with regard to the legal character of the administration conditions is whether the administration 
conditions qualify as a contract of instruction (opdracht) within the meaning of Art. 7:400 ff. DCC 
(and more in particular, one of its species: a contract of mandate (lastgeving) according to Art. 7:414 
DCC), see Uniken Venema & Eisma 1990, pp. 81-82; Asser/Maeijer, Van Solinge & Nieuwe Weme 
2010 (2-II*), no. 661. However, both discussions are not relevant for the focus of this subsection: the 
security rights of the sukuk holders under Dutch property law.
583 In the case of issuing depositary receipts for shares in a stock company, it leads to a division of the 
controlling rights of the shares from their financial rights, see Asser/Maeijer, Van Solinge & Nieuwe 
Weme 2010 (2-II*), no. 658.
584 See Dutch Supreme Court 19 May 1995, NJ 1996, 119, with case note by Kleijn/AA 1995, 11, with case 
note by Vriesendorp, para. 3.6.
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bankruptcy estate in the case of its bankruptcy). The depositary receipt holders 
have only contractual claims as stipulated in the administration conditions.
The issuance of depositary receipts for properties does not have a statutory basis 
under Dutch law. The most well-known form of issuing depositary receipts for 
properties is the issuance of depositary receipts for shares. Books 2 and 3 DCC 
contain several references to the issuance of depositary receipts for shares, but 
they do not provide a statutory definition of it.585 The Dutch legislature found 
it impossible to provide an appropriate statutory definition of the issuance of 
depositary receipts for shares because the substance of this legal construction 
can vary endlessly.586 The Dutch Supreme Court acknowledged the issuance of 
depositary receipts for shares in Drukker/Drukker, where it confirmed that as a 
starting point the issuance of depositary receipts for shares in a BV where the 
depositary receipts will be non-exchangeable is not socially unacceptable.587
As addressed, Article 3:259 DCC provides depositary receipt holders a 
statutory joint right of pledge. It is applicable to depositary receipts for shares 
and to depositary receipts for debt claims. Article 3:259 (1) DCC describes the 
depositary receipts issuing process as a process where the owner (the admin-
istration office) of shares or debt claims issues depositary receipts to third 
parties (the depositary receipt holders). According to Article 3:259 (1) DCC, the 
depositary receipt holders have a claim on the issuer of the depositary receipts 
for payment of the amount promised to them. There should be a connection 
between the depositary receipts and the underlying shares or debt claims.588 
This connection is created with the administration conditions. Pursuant to 
the administration conditions, the depositary receipt holders are entitled to 
the proceeds of the shares (i.e. dividends) or the debt claims (i.e. interests). 
The Dutch legislature decided to provide the depositary receipt holders a statu-
tory joint right of pledge on the underlying shares or debt claims to secure 
585 Art. 3:259 DCC on the statutory joint right of pledge of the depositary receipt holders is a provision 
of book 3 DCC that mentions the issuance of depositary receipts for shares and debt claims. Some 
references in book 2 DCC can be found in Arts. 2:24, 2:202, 2:204a, 2:208, 2:212, 2:220, 2:223, 2:224, 
2:227, 2:230, 2:233, 2:329, 2:334dd, 2:336, 2:346 DCC for the BV and the corresponding articles for 
the NV in book 2 DCC.
586 Van den Ingh 1991, pp. 15-18.
587 Dutch Supreme Court 1 July 1988, NJ 1989, 226, with case note by Maeijer, para. 3.7. A fortiori, the 
issuance of depositary receipts for shares where the depositary receipts are exchangeable seems 
to be legally acknowledged as well, see Asser/Maeijer, Van Solinge & Nieuwe Weme 2010 (2-II*), 
no. 658. Although the issuance of depositary receipts for shares is the only form of issuance of 
depositary receipts that has a legal basis (in case law of the Dutch Supreme Court), the issuance of 
depositary receipts for (other) properties is also broadly accepted in the literature and legal prac-
tice, see Van der Grinten & Treurniet 1964, pp. 7-8; Uniken Venema & Eisma 1990, pp. 50-53; Van den 
Ingh 1991, pp. 15-18.
588 Cf. Stein (GS Vermogensrecht, Art. 3:259 DCC) 2013, no. 16.
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their position, against a possible bankruptcy of the administration office in 
particular.589
The underlying properties in the sukuk structures discussed in this book 
are shares in a BV (sukuk al-musharaka), claims for instalment payments of 
a purchase price (sukuk al-murabaha) or tangible properties (sukuk al-ijarah). 
Article 3:259 DCC is applicable to the sukuk al-musharaka if it is structured 
through the issuance of depositary receipts for shares in the musharaka BV. 
However, the underlying properties in the sukuk al-murabaha and the sukuk 
al-ijarah do not fall within the scope of the depositary receipts for proper-
ties that are encumbered with the joint right of pledge of Article 3:259 DCC. 
Article 3:259 DCC is not applicable to the issuance of depositary receipts for 
a tangible property, which is the underlying property in the sukuk al-ijarah. 
Furthermore, the claims for instalment payments of the purchase price of a 
tangible property sold by the SPV to the originator in the sukuk al-murabaha 
do not fall within the scope of ‘debt claims’ of Article 3:259 DCC. The article 
is codified for financial transactions and debt claims refer to debt claims from 
securities such as bond loans.590 Therefore, the issuance of depositary receipts 
for properties will be discussed only in relation to the sukuk al-musharaka.
One could argue that a court may apply article 3:259 DCC by way of analogy in case 
of the sukuk al-ijarah and the sukuk al-murabaha, due to their similarities with the 
sukuk al-musharaka. Furthermore, article 3:259 DCC has been codified to facilitate 
financial transactions in financial markets. The sukuk transactions discussed in 
this book are financial transactions. However, such application by a court remains 
highly uncertain. There is no indication in the Dutch Civil Code or any case law 
for such application of article 3:259 DCC by way of analogy.
In the sukuk al-musharaka the originator and the SPV (the administration 
office) hold the shares in the musharaka BV. The administration office issues 
sukuk (the depositary receipts) for the shares in the musharaka BV entrusted 
to its management, pursuant to the administration conditions of the deposi-
tary receipts. Figure 7 gives an overview of the sukuk al-musharaka structured 
through the issuance of depositary receipts for shares in the musharaka BV 
under Dutch law.
589 Parliamentary History, Book 3 DCC 1981, pp. 567-568.
590 Art. 3:259 (2) DCC explicitly refers to the ‘issuer’ of debt claims, which indicates that securities 
should be issued.
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Figure 7 Sukuk al-musharaka through issuance of depositary receipts for shares 
under Dutch law
In the sukuk al-musharaka, the sukuk holders are the depositary receipt holders 
who could acquire a statutory joint right of pledge. The joint right of pledge of 
the sukuk holders is created by operation of law, if the sukuk holders have rights 
to attend meetings (vergaderrechten) pursuant to the articles of association of 
the musharaka BV.591 As a result, the administration offi  ce acquires the shares 
of the musharaka BV encumbered with the statutory joint right of pledge of 
the sukuk holders from the outset. The incorporation of a security agent is not 
required for the administration and enforcement of the joint right of pledge of 
the sukuk holders, decreasing structuring and transaction costs compared to 
591 Art. 3:259 (2) DCC.
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a collective security arrangement. As a result, contrary to a collective security 
arrangement where the sukuk holders remain exposed to a bankruptcy risk 
which is transferred from the issuer to the security agent, the sukuk holders as 
depositary receipt holders are not exposed to such bankruptcy risk. The depos-
itary receipt holders hold the joint right of pledge in community (gemeenschap) 
within the meaning of Chapter 7 book 3 DCC.592 However, the legal uncertain-
ties addressed with regard to a collective security arrangement on the basis of 
agency do not occur because Article 3:259 DCC provides a special legal regime 
for the joint right of pledge of the depositary receipt holders.
The depositary receipt holders that have rights to attend meetings have the right 
to attend general meetings of shareholders, in person or by proxy, and to speak 
at the general meetings of shareholders.593 This also provides the statutory basis 
for the corporate law rights of the depositary receipt holders: depositary receipts 
with rights to attend meetings provide depositary receipt holders with additional 
controlling rights in the BV. Some important controlling rights that the deposi-
tary receipt holders with rights to attend meetings have are: the right to inspect 
and to receive a copy of the annual reports and accounts,594 the right to convene 
a general meeting of shareholders,595 the right to be called for a general meet-
ing of shareholders,596 the right to present agenda items for a general meeting of 
shareholders597 and the right to inspect minutes drafted by the managing board of 
resolutions taken at a general meeting of shareholders.598 The originator should be 
aware that the sukuk holders could exert influence at a general meeting of share-
holders of the musharaka BV, which could be drawback compared to a collective 
security arrangement.
Article 3:259 (3) DCC provides a special enforcement procedure for the 
enforcement of the statutory joint right of pledge of depositary receipt holders. 
The parliamentary history clarifies that the most important reason for sepa-
rate rules for the enforcement of the joint right of pledge was to avoid that one 
depositary receipt holder could enforce the joint right of pledge to fulfil pay-
ment to himself at the cost of other depositary receipt holders.599 In the event of 
default in payment of what is due to the sukuk holders as the depositary receipt 
592 Parliamentary History, Book 3 DCC 1981, p. 568.
593 See Art. 2:227 DCC.
594 Art. 2:212 DCC.
595 Art. 2:220 (2) DCC.
596 Art. 2:223 DCC.
597 Art. 2:224a (2) DCC.
598 Art. 2:230 (4) DCC. For a complete overview of the controlling rights of depositary receipt holders 
with rights to attend meetings, see Van den Ingh 1991, pp. 245-262; Van den Ingh 2003, pp. 2-6.
599 See Parliamentary History, Book 3 DCC 1981, p. 571.
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holders, each sukuk holder has the right to have the shares in the musharaka 
BV sold, in whole or in part, and to be paid by preference from the proceeds of 
the sale. The sukuk holder who wishes to enforce the joint right of pledge files 
a request for the appointment of an administrator (bewindvoerder) with the 
interlocutory judge of the district court of the domicile of the administration 
office. This results in loss of control. Unlike a collective security arrangement, 
where the parties to the sukuk transaction contractually agree on the enforce-
ment options of the security agent and on the rights of the sukuk holders to 
require the security agent to enforce the security rights, Article 3:259 (3) DCC 
provides each sukuk holder the right to file a request for the appointment of an 
administrator who will enforce the joint right of pledge.
The addressed risk of loss of control may be mitigated to some extent. Pursuant 
to the administration conditions, the sukuk holders can covenant that they will 
not file a request for the appointment of an administrator, except for in case of an 
event of default. It is, however, possible that a court deals with a request of a sukuk 
holder for the appointment of an administrator, notwithstanding that such request 
has been filed in breach of the administration conditions. The originator can also 
incorporate an SPV as a(n) (security) agent that will manage the rights of the sukuk 
holders (possibly together with other security rights over other assets than the 
shares in the musharaka BV). The (other) sukuk holders, the musharaka BV, or the 
originator can request the court to appoint the (security) agent as administrator at 
the hearing where the request of the sukuk holder who wishes to enforce the statu-
tory joint right of pledge is dealt with. The court is, however, not obliged to respect 
such request for the appointment of the (security) agent as administrator and it 
can appoint the administrator at its complete discretion.
Once appointed, the administrator sells the shares and distributes the pro-
ceeds. The administrator should respect the general rules for enforcement of 
rights of pledges.600 This means that he can sell the shares in a public auc-
tion601 or outside a public auction with approval of an interlocutory judge.602 If 
not all sukuk holders agree with the sale, only the part of the pledged shares 
corresponding to the right of the sukuk holders wishing to enforce the joint 
right of pledge is sold. The right of pledge of the sukuk holders who agree 
with the enforcement is extinguished by payment of the proceeds to them. 
The sukuk holders who do not consent with the enforcement will still hold a 
joint right of pledge on the shares of the musharaka BV remaining after the 
600 Kelterman 2009, p. 176.
601 Art. 3:250 DCC.
602 Art. 3:251 DCC.
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enforcement. Furthermore, upon request of one of the sukuk holders or ex offi-
cio, the interlocutory judge may order that measures be taken in the interest of 
sukuk holders who have not consented to the sale and the interlocutory judge 
may determine that the sale must be approved by him in order to be valid.603
Strictly speaking, the administrator is not the pledgee of the statutory joint 
right of pledge. The administrator is, nonetheless, acting for the sukuk holders 
who are the joint pledgees. Therefore, the administrator is bound by the trans-
fer restrictions (blokkeringsregeling) in the articles of association of the mush-
araka BV as discussed in Chapter 5: the administrator cannot sell and transfer 
the shares when the value of the tangible properties and the services of the 
musharaka BV is less than 30% of its total assets value based on its annual 
accounts of that year.604 The administrator may request a court to declare the 
transfer restrictions partially or completely non-applicable according to Article 
2:195 (7) DCC.605
6.2.2.4 Non-voting Shares for Sukuk Holders in Sukuk al-Musharaka under 
Dutch Corporate Law
With regard to the sukuk al-musharaka, it is also possible to provide the sukuk 
holders the economic ownership of the underlying property of the sukuk trans-
action (shares in a musharaka BV) through the issuance of non-voting shares 
(stemrechtloze aandelen). With the entry into force of the Flex BV law, the issu-
ance of non-voting shares in a BV is possible.606 Both non-voting shares and 
depositary receipts for shares provide their holders financial rights without 
substantive controlling rights. Therefore, both legal concepts have been com-
pared in the literature.607 As an alternative to the issuance of depositary receipts 
for shares to sukuk holders through an administration office, the musharaka 
BV can directly issue non-voting shares to sukuk holders. An advantage of the 
issuance of non-voting shares compared to the issuance of depositary receipts 
for shares is that the incorporation of an administration office is not required. 
As a result, the sukuk holders as holders of non-voting shares are not exposed 
to a possible bankruptcy risk of the administration office (and there is no need 
for security rights either).608
Non-voting shares, however, provide their holders different controlling 
rights compared to depositary receipts for shares. One such difference is that 
603 Art. 3:259 (3) DCC.
604 See Section 5.1.2 of Chapter 5.
605 For the impact of the partial or complete non-applicability of the transfer restrictions on the Shari’ah 
compliance of the sukuk transaction, see Section 5.1.3 of Chapter 5.
606 See Art. 2:228 (5) DCC.
607 See Portier (Het nieuwe BV-recht voor de praktijk) 2008, pp. 221-268; Van Olffen, De Kluiver & Legein 
2013, pp. 77-97 & 123-131; Salah 2013b, pp. 47-51.
608 Salah 2013b, p. 49.
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the holders of non-voting shares have no voting rights in the general meeting 
of shareholders of the BV, while the administration office has voting rights 
in the general meeting of shareholders, which it will exercise in favour of the 
depositary receipt holders.609 In the sukuk al-musharaka, such voting rights 
have significant impact because they enable the administration office as SPV 
to ensure the Shari’ah compliance of the musharaka BV. As discussed in 
Chapter 5, the objects of the musharaka BV in its articles of association should 
stipulate that it is a Shari’ah-compliant entity and its articles of association 
should have transfer restrictions.610 In addition, the articles of association of 
the musharaka BV should exclude the possibility to amend its objects and its 
transfer restrictions.611 Nonetheless, its objects or transfer restrictions can be 
amended if all shareholders accept such amendment in a general meeting 
of shareholders where all subscribed capital is represented.612 The holders of 
non-voting shares have no voting rights and cannot obstruct such amend-
ment. In the case of depositary receipts for shares, however, the administra-
tion office has voting rights in the general meeting of shareholders and it 
can obstruct amendments of the articles of association of the musharaka BV 
that affect the Shari’ah compliance of the musharaka BV from being accepted. 
Hence, the choice between the issuance of depositary receipt for shares with 
meeting rights or non-voting shares mainly depends on the amount of control 
that the sukuk holders (through an administration office) should have in the 
sukuk transaction.
Concluding, the sukuk holders can acquire the economic ownership of the 
underlying properties in the sukuk al-musharaka, the sukuk al-murabaha and 
the sukuk al-ijarah under Dutch law. Pursuant to the terms and conditions of 
the sukuk, the sukuk holders should be entitled to the financial benefits real-
ised with the underlying property of the relevant sukuk transaction. The sukuk 
holders have only contractual claims on the SPV, which means that the SPV 
remains the owner of the underlying property and the underlying property 
falls into its patrimony (or bankruptcy estate in case of its bankruptcy). The 
contractual claims of the sukuk holders can be secured with a collective secu-
rity arrangement: a security agent will hold security rights to secure a parallel 
claim (parallel to the claims of the sukuk holders), which it will administer and 
enforce for the sukuk holders. In case of the sukuk al-musharaka, the issuance 
to sukuk holders of depositary receipts with meeting rights is preferred from 
a property law perspective due to the statutory joint right of pledge of Article 
3:259 DCC.
609 Ibid., p. 50.
610 See Section 5.1.2 of Chapter 5.
611 Ibid.
612 See Art. 2:231 (1) DCC.
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6.2.3 The Rights of Sukuk Holders in the Bankruptcy of the Originator in 
Sukuk Transactions under Dutch Bankruptcy Law
In this section I assess the legal position of the sukuk holders in the event of 
bankruptcy of the originator under Dutch law. According to the Islamic finance 
rules for tawreeq, an SPV should be incorporated and the right of ownership 
of the underlying property of the relevant sukuk transaction should be trans-
ferred from the originator to the SPV.613 These two rules ensure that there is 
a separation of the underlying property from the patrimony of the originator. 
A bankruptcy is the ultimate test for the question whether property is sepa-
rated from the patrimony of the originator. A bankruptcy also illustrates what 
rights the sukuk holders have in relation to the originator. Furthermore, the 
sukuk holders in sukuk transactions will be interested in their legal position 
in the event of bankruptcy of the originator since they have provided funding 
to it. There are no specific Islamic finance law requirements that need to be 
taken into consideration for sukuk structures in this regard. In this section I 
discuss the rights of the SPV and the sukuk holders in case of bankruptcy of 
the originator under Dutch law. This means that my focus will be on the legal 
relationship between the originator, the SPV and the sukuk holders as marked 
in Figures 8, 9 and 10. Bankruptcy considerations with regard to the SPV were 
discussed in the previous subsections.614
613 See the first and second Islamic finance rules for tawreeq, as mentioned in Section 6.1 of this 
chapter.
614 See Sections 6.2.1 and 6.2.2 of this chapter.
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Figure 8 Sukuk al-musharaka under Dutch bankruptcy law
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Figure 9 Sukuk al-murabaha under Dutch bankruptcy law
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Figure 10 Sukuk al-ijarah under Dutch bankruptcy law
6.2.3.1 The Rights of Sukuk Holders in the Bankruptcy of the Originator in the 
Sukuk al-Musharaka under Dutch Bankruptcy Law
In the sukuk al-musharaka the originator and the SPV hold shares as share-
holders of the musharaka BV.615 As a starting point, the bankruptcy of the 
originator does not aff ect the position of the SPV or of the musharaka BV 
under Dutch law. The SPV holds shares in the musharaka BV and those shares 
fall into the patrimony of the SPV. The shares of the musharaka BV held by 
the originator fall into the bankruptcy estate of the originator.616 Hence, the 
musharaka BV will have a bankrupt shareholder. The musharaka BV can, 
nonetheless, continue its business and possibly pay dividends to its sharehold-
ers and, subsequently, the SPV can continue making periodic payments to the 
sukuk holders.
615 See Section 5.1 of Chapter 5.
616 Art. 20 DBA.
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The bankruptcy trustee of the originator may, however, sell and transfer 
the shares of the musharaka BV. The bankruptcy trustee is bound by the trans-
fer restrictions of the musharaka BV in such case as described in Chapter 5: 
the bankruptcy trustee cannot sell and transfer the shares when the value 
of the tangible properties and the services of the musharaka BV is less than 
30% of its total assets value based on its annual accounts of that year.617 The 
bankruptcy trustee may request a court to declare the transfer restrictions par-
tially or completely non-applicable.618 If the court declares the transfer restric-
tions partially or completely non-applicable, the bankruptcy trustee can sell 
and transfer the shares disregarding the transfer restrictions. This may affect 
the Shari’ah compliance of the sukuk al-musharaka structure, not upfront, but 
once the court declares the transfer restrictions non-applicable. As mentioned 
in Chapter 5, the addressed risk is a litigation risk.619 Such litigation risk will 
materialise in case of bankruptcy of the originator because the bankruptcy 
trustee of the originator will act in the interest of the bankruptcy estate and 
will not be interested in the Islamic law requirements of the sukuk al-mush-
araka transaction.
The bankruptcy of the originator can also trigger the bankruptcy of the 
musharaka BV: the musharaka BV may, for example, be dependent on supplies 
from the originator to continue its business. After liquidation of the origina-
tor, the supplies to the musharaka BV may end, which could result in the bank-
ruptcy of the musharaka BV. In case of bankruptcy of the musharaka BV, the 
originator and the SPV as its shareholders are entitled to payments only if the 
creditors of the musharaka BV are paid and a surplus remains thereafter.620 
The ordinary, unsecured creditors of a BV have priority over its shareholders 
in the order of ranking of creditors under Dutch law. Most Dutch bankrupt-
cies end with insufficient funds to pay ordinary, unsecured creditors (opheffing 
wegens gebrek aan baten).621 Consequently, the sukuk holders will most prob-
ably lose their investments. In the event of bankruptcy of the musharaka BV 
it becomes more evident that the SPV as shareholder ranks low in the order 
of ranking of creditors and that the sukuk holders bear the economic risks 
thereof, stressing the equity feature of the sukuk al-musharaka transaction for 
the sukuk holders. This is, in turn, in line with the concept of profit-and-loss-
sharing under Islamic finance law.
617 See Section 5.1.2 of Chapter 5.
618 Art. 2:195 (7) DCC. See Section 5.1.3 of Chapter 5.
619 See Section 5.1.3 of Chapter 5.
620 Art. 2:23b (1) DCC.
621 See Vriesendorp 2013, pp. 302-304. Art. 16 DBA provides the procedure for completion of liquida-
tion where there are insufficient funds to pay ordinary, unsecured creditors.
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6.2.3.2 The Rights of Sukuk Holders in the Bankruptcy of the Originator in the 
Sukuk al-Murabaha under Dutch Bankruptcy Law
In the event of bankruptcy of the originator in the sukuk al-murabaha, the SPV 
will have claims on the bankruptcy estate of the originator for payment of the 
outstanding instalments.622 These claims are part of the patrimony of the SPV 
and do not fall into the bankruptcy estate of the originator. It is a right of the 
SPV to receive performance of an obligation from the originator, that is, pay-
ment of the instalments. In a bankruptcy scenario where a bankrupt debtor 
(originator) is not able to (fully) perform such obligation and its bankruptcy 
trustee may default on the performance of such obligation, leaving a credi-
tor behind with an ordinary, unsecured claim for damages on the bankrupt 
estate,623 the difference between a tangible property and an intangible prop-
erty such as claims for payment of instalments is illustrated best.
Remarkably, Islamic finance law does not allow the trade of the sukuk al-murabaha 
due to the lack of an underlying tangible property in the sukuk transaction. The 
scope of Islamic property law is restricted to tangible property (ayn).624 Although 
the rationale for the impermissibility of the trade in the sukuk al-murabaha relates 
to the prohibition of riba under Islamic finance law, a bankruptcy scenario shows 
that the emphasis on tangible property is not illusive.
The claim of the SPV may, however, be secured with security rights on a tangi-
ble property in the sukuk al-murabaha. Under Dutch bankruptcy law the SPV 
can exercise its security rights as secured creditor (separatist) as if there were 
no bankruptcy.625 In the event of default on instalments by the bankruptcy 
trustee of the originator, the SPV can enforce its security rights. The rights of 
the SPV are, however, restricted in two ways. First, the bankruptcy trustee of 
the originator can request the supervisory judge (rechter-commissaris) to order 
a stay, a cooling-off period (afkoelingsperiode), of two months with a possible 
extension of two months.626 During this period of four months maximum 
the SPV cannot exercise its rights without consent of the supervisory judge. 
It cannot claim the encumbered tangible property if it is under the control of 
(in de macht van) the bankruptcy trustee of the originator and it can also not 
seek recourse against the encumbered tangible property. Second, the bank-
ruptcy trustee of the originator can impose the SPV with a reasonable period 
(redelijke termijn) within which it has to exercise its security rights in order 
622 See Section 5.2 of Chapter 5.
623 Art. 37a DBA.
624 See Section 2.3.1 of Chapter 2.
625 Art. 57 DBA.
626 Art. 63a DBA.
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to liquidate the bankruptcy estate expeditiously.627 The SPV may request the 
supervisory judge to extend such reasonable period.628 If the SPV fails to sell 
the encumbered tangible property within the period provided by the bank-
ruptcy trustee of the originator, the bankruptcy trustee may sell the tangible 
property himself and pay the proceeds to the SPV taking into account his 
rank, but after deduction of the bankruptcy costs ( faillissementskosten), which 
can be substantial.629
6.2.3.3 The Rights of Sukuk Holders in the Bankruptcy of the Originator in the 
Sukuk al-Ijarah under Dutch Bankruptcy Law
In case of bankruptcy of the originator in the sukuk al-ijarah the tangible 
property that is the subject matter of the sale and leaseback does not fall into 
the bankruptcy estate of the originator. The SPV is the owner of the tangible 
property and the tangible property forms part of its patrimony. The SPV as 
the owner of the tangible property can sell and transfer it to a third party 
and use the proceeds to redeem the sukuk. The ijarah agreement qualifies 
as a rental agreement under Dutch law.630 If the SPV sells and transfers the 
tangible property to a third party, that third party also acquires the rights and 
obligations of the SPV as lessor under the ijarah agreement.631 A third party 
may, therefore, not be interested in the purchase of a tangible property with a 
rental agreement with a bankrupt lessee (originator).
Under Dutch bankruptcy law the SPV (lessor) and the bankruptcy trustee 
of the originator (lessee) both have the right to terminate (opzeggen) the ijarah 
agreement with a notice period of three months maximum.632 The lease pay-
ments over the three months’ notice period are estate claims (boedelschulden).633 
These claims must be paid before any payments can be made to ordinary, 
unsecured creditors in bankruptcy.634 Due to the ranking of lease payments 
(over the maximum three months’ notice period) in bankruptcy, the sukuk 
holders have a rather safe position with regard to the periodic payments (dur-
ing that period). In the meantime, the SPV can search for potential lessees 
who are willing to continue the sukuk transaction. The authority of the SPV for 
such action mainly depends on the terms and conditions of the sukuk.
627 Art. 58 (1) DBA. See Dutch Supreme Court 11 April 2008, NJ 2008, 222, para. 3.6.
628 Art. 58 (1) DBA. See Dutch Supreme Court 20 December 2013, RvdW 2014, 131, paras. 4.6.1 and 
4.6.2.
629 Art. 182 DBA.
630 See Section 5.3.3.2 of Chapter 5.
631 Art. 7:226 DCC.
632 Art. 39 (1) DBA.
633 Dutch Supreme Court 19 April 2013, NJ 2013, 291, with case note by Verstijlen, para. 3.6.2.
634 Vriesendorp 2013, pp. 296-302.
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Once the SPV or the bankruptcy trustee of the originator terminates the 
ijarah agreement on the basis of Article 39 DBA, the ijarah agreement will 
end after the three months’ notice period. The SPV can sell and transfer the 
tangible property to a third party and use the proceeds to redeem the sukuk. 
The sukuk holders are exposed to the risk of depreciation in the value of the 
tangible property, which means that they could receive less than their prin-
cipal amount if the tangible property has decreased in value. Although this 
consequence is not strictly required under Islamic finance law, it is in line 
with the Shari’ah perspective on the sukuk al-ijarah transaction, according to 
which the sukuk holders act as the economic owners of the underlying tangible 
property in the sukuk al-ijarah transaction. The SPV will not be able to oblige 
the bankruptcy trustee of the originator to offer to purchase the tangible prop-
erty by exercising the unilateral obligation to offer under the promise of wa’d. 
Pursuant to the unilateral obligation to offer, the originator will be obliged to 
offer to purchase the tangible property only at the maturity date of the sukuk. 
Nonetheless, even if the originator has such obligation during the bankruptcy 
of the originator based on the contract with the unilateral obligation of the 
originator to offer to purchase the tangible property, the bankruptcy trustee 
of the originator can choose to breach the contract. In such case, the SPV 
has an ordinary, unsecured claim for payment of damages due to breach of 
contract.635
In Dutch case law the question is addressed whether a lessor is entitled to damages 
after cancellation (beëindiging) of a rental agreement in bankruptcy of its lessee. 
According to the Dutch Supreme Court the termination (opzegging) of a rental 
agreement on the basis of article 39 DBA is a regular termination of the rental 
agreement, which does not entitle the lessor to a claim for damages which it can 
enforce against the bankruptcy estate of the lessee, not even when a right to dam-
ages for the remaining lease periods is contractually stipulated.636 The foregoing 
also applies to sale and leaseback transactions.637 A contractual stipulation that 
provides the lessor the right to rescind (ontbinden) the rental agreement in case 
of bankruptcy of the lessee and a contractual stipulation that entitles the lessor 
to damages for the remaining lease periods in such case have, nonetheless, effect 
towards the bankruptcy estate of the lessee.638 The question whether the SPV is 
635 Art. 37a DBA.
636 Dutch Supreme Court 14 January 2011, NJ 2011, 114, with case note by Van Schilfgaarde, para. 3.5.2. 
Such contractual stipulation of a right to damages is valid under Dutch law, but it has no effect 
towards the bankruptcy estate of the lessee, see Dutch Supreme Court 15 November 2013, RvdW 
2013, 1361, para. 3.3.3.
637 Dutch Supreme Court 22 November 2013, RvdW 2013, 1389, para. 3.4.
638 Dutch Supreme Court 13 May 2006, NJ 2005, 406, with case note by Van Schilfgaarde, paras. 3.4.1 
and 3.4.4. A contractual right to rescind (ontbinden) the rental agreement may be obstructed in 
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entitled to damages after cancellation of the ijarah agreement in case of bank-
ruptcy of the originator is, however, not relevant in the sukuk al-ijarah because it 
is uncertain whether a clause that entitles the SPV to damages (after contractual 
rescission (contractuele ontbinding) for example) is permissible from an Islamic 
finance law perspective. Based on the Islamic finance law rules on penalty clauses 
in a murabaha transaction, a Shari’ah supervisory board could take the view that 
such clause is only permissible if the amount is paid to a charity.639 Hence, such 
clause may possibly not affect the position of the SPV and the sukuk holders.
6.3 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter I assessed the rights of the sukuk holders in the sukuk al-
musharaka, the sukuk al-murabaha and the sukuk al-ijarah under Dutch law. 
The ownership of the sukuk holders is not realised through the transfer of 
the right of ownership of the underlying properties in sukuk transactions to 
sukuk holders, but through a securitisation process called tawreeq: the proper-
ties are separated from the patrimony of the originator by way of transfer to a 
bankruptcy-remote SPV. The SPV can be incorporated as a Dutch foundation 
or as a Dutch BV under Dutch corporate law. The SPV issues sukuk that entitle 
their holders to the financial benefits of the underlying properties, pursuant 
to the terms and conditions of the sukuk. As a result, under Dutch law the 
economic ownership of the underlying properties is transferred to the sukuk 
holders, which has no proprietary effect.
In order to secure the position of the sukuk holders under Dutch property 
law, the sukuk holders can acquire security rights through a collective secu-
rity arrangement. A second SPV can be incorporated as a security agent that 
acquires, administrates and enforces the security rights for the sukuk hold-
ers. The legal relationship between the security agent and the sukuk holders 
is, however, contractual. Consequently, the sukuk holders remain exposed to 
the risk of bankruptcy of the security agent because they are ordinary, unse-
cured creditors in the bankruptcy of the security agent. Alternatively, the 
sukuk al-musharaka can be structured through the issuance of Dutch deposi-
tary receipts for shares. The articles of association of the musharaka BV could 
attach rights to attend meetings to the depositary receipts. As a result, the 
case of rental of built immovable property (gebouwde onroerende zaken) because in such case only 
a court can rescind the rental agreement, see Art. 7:231 (1) DCC. This is a mandatory provision for 
rental agreements from which parties cannot deviate to the detriment of the lessee and, conse-
quently, conditions subsequent (ontbindende voorwaarden) in rental agreements of built immovable 
property are also void (nietig), see Art. 7:231 (3) DCC; Dutch Supreme Court 8 November 2002, NJ 
2002, 623, para. 3.4.
639 See Section 5.2.3 of Chapter 5. See also Art. 6/4 AAOIFI SS 9.
153
6  The Rights of Sukuk Holders in Sukuk Transactions under Dutch Law
sukuk holders acquire a statutory joint right of pledge on the shares of the 
musharaka BV by operation of law and are secured creditors in the bankruptcy 
of the SPV.
In the event of bankruptcy of the originator in sukuk transactions, the 
result of the securitisation process called tawreeq becomes clear: the underly-
ing properties are separated from the patrimony of the originator and do not 
fall into its bankruptcy estate. In the sukuk al-musharaka the SPV holds shares 
in the musharaka BV. The bankruptcy of the originator does not directly affect 
the position of the SPV and the sukuk holders under Dutch law. It may, how-
ever, indirectly affect the position of the SPV and the sukuk holders by trigger-
ing the bankruptcy of the musharaka BV or affecting its Shari’ah compliance. 
In case of bankruptcy of the musharaka BV, the SPV as shareholder will most 
probably receive no payments and the sukuk holders will lose their investment: 
the sukuk holders bear the economic risks of the investment in the musharaka 
BV.
In the sukuk al-murabaha the claims for payment of the instalments are 
part of the patrimony of the SPV. In this study, I have assumed that the SPV 
will require security rights for the instalments. In such case, the SPV will have 
secured claims against the bankruptcy estate of the originator under Dutch 
law. The originator can, however, also contemplate the issuance of unsecured 
sukuk. In such case, the SPV will have no security rights for the instalments 
and it will have ordinary, unsecured claims against the bankruptcy estate of 
the originator under Dutch law. Hence, the sukuk holders bear the economic 
risks of the (non-) payment of the claims, which they may have secured with 
security rights.
In the sukuk al-ijarah the SPV is the owner of the underlying tangible prop-
erty of the sukuk transaction. In case of bankruptcy of the originator, the SPV 
(lessor) and the bankruptcy trustee of the originator (lessee) can terminate the 
ijarah agreement with a three months’ notice period under Dutch bankruptcy 
law. The SPV can sell and transfer the tangible property and use the proceeds 
to redeem the sukuk. The sukuk holders as the economic owners of the tangi-
ble property bear the risk of depreciation of its value: the SPV has an ordinary, 
unsecured claim for payment of damages against the bankruptcy estate of the 
originator in case of breach of contract by the bankruptcy trustee of the origi-
nator under the contract with the unilateral obligation to offer to purchase the 
tangible property.
After the assessment of the process of tawreeq under Dutch law, the follow-
ing lessons are learned about the Islamic and the Dutch legal system. With 
regard to the Islamic legal system, the legal justification for the acceptance 
of sukuk is inconsistent with the classical doctrine of Islamic property law. In 
Chapter 2 I discussed that the right of ownership (milk) is restricted to corpo-
real objects (ayn) under Islamic property law. The rules of Islamic property 
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law do not apply to claims (dayn). The trade in claims (bay’ al-dayn) results in a 
violation of the prohibition of riba and, therefore, claims can only be traded at 
face value. In this chapter I assessed the rights of the sukuk holders. The sukuk 
holders have only contractual rights to the SPV under Dutch law. The sukuk 
are debt claims and the sukuk holders trade in debt claims while trading their 
sukuk in secondary markets. From a strict classical approach to Islamic proper-
ty law, the trade in sukuk leads to a violation of the prohibition on riba, more in 
particular the bay’ al-dayn. Islamic scholars have, nonetheless, accepted these 
securities as Shari’ah-compliant by looking at the economic reality in financial 
markets: the securitisation process called tawreeq results in the transfer of 
the economic ownership of the underlying properties in sukuk transactions 
from the originator to the sukuk holders through the incorporation of an SPV 
to which the underlying properties are transferred and which holds them for 
the sukuk holders. As a result, the sukuk holders trade debt claims that entitle 
them to the economic ownership of underlying tangible properties while trad-
ing their sukuk in secondary markets.
Where, on the one hand, Islamic finance law has deviated from the clas-
sical doctrine of Islamic property law with regard to the trade in securities, 
which are in essence debt claims, the Islamic financial legal system still has 
built-in restrictions that are based on the classical doctrine of Islamic property 
law, on the other hand. It is possible to issue and trade sukuk in financial mar-
kets. It is, however, not possible to use sukuk as the underlying property for 
another sukuk issuance. In such case, the required connection with an under-
lying tangible property is disrupted and, consequently, the sukuk issued (using 
a pool of sukuk securities as its underlying properties) will not be tradable 
in secondary markets. This was reconfirmed by the AAOIFI in the AAOIFI 
Resolution of February 2008 on sukuk, as a disapproving reaction to the issu-
ance of such tradable sukuk in practice. The only exception to the rule that 
securities cannot be used as the underlying properties for a sukuk transaction 
is the sukuk al-musharaka where sukuk are issued over the shares of a mushara-
ka stock company. The sukuk al-musharaka is accepted by the AAOIFI as one 
of the 14 permissible sukuk structures. If, however, the sukuk securities of a 
sukuk al-musharaka are used as the underlying properties of a sukuk issuance, 
the required connection with underlying tangible properties is, once again, 
disrupted and such sukuk will not be tradable. As a result, the possibility for 
an abundant creation of debt claims is ceased.
With regard to the Dutch legal system, the following lesson can be learned. 
The closed system of Dutch property law does not allow the creation of pro-
prietary rights in a way not provided by the law. It does not allow the divi-
sion of the right of ownership into legal and beneficial ownership. Although 
Dutch legal practice felt the need to address a bundle of contractual rights 
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and obligations as ‘economic ownership’, this legal concept has no proprietary 




7 Legal Engineering of Sukuk: Summary and 
Conclusion
In this book I examined the possibilities to structure sukuk transactions under 
Dutch private law. The three sukuk transactions studied in this book, the sukuk 
al-musharaka, the sukuk al-murabaha and the sukuk al-ijarah, can be structured 
under Dutch private law. The structuring of sukuk required legal engineering, 
that is, the creation of innovative and creative legal structures, under both 
Islamic and Dutch law. Whereas the legal engineering under Islamic law was 
mainly conducted by Shari’ah scholars who developed the product through 
a study of fiqh, I endeavoured in this research to develop the product in the 
Netherlands through legal engineering under Dutch law. In this final chapter 
I return with an answer to my research question as formulated in Chapter 1. 
My research question is:
How can sukuk transactions be structured under Dutch private law and 
what Islamic and Dutch legal issues arise when structuring sukuk under 
Dutch private law?
In this chapter I start off with a summary of my findings and I answer the 
first part of my research question (Section 7.1): how can sukuk transactions 
be structured under Dutch private law? Next, I answer the second part of my 
research question (Section 7.2): what Islamic and Dutch legal issues arise 
when structuring sukuk under Dutch private law? Finally, I formulate sugges-
tions as how to further develop the Islamic and Dutch legal issues addressed 
in this study (Section 7.3). I close this study with some general observations 
about the future of Islamic finance in the Netherlands.
7.1 Structuring Sukuk under Dutch Private Law
Summarising, the three sukuk structures assessed in this book can be struc-
tured under Dutch private law. There are no legislative amendments needed to 
structure sukuk under current Dutch private law. An understanding of Islamic 
law and finance (Section 7.1.1) and an understanding of sukuk (Section 7.1.2) 
were imperative in order to assess the Islamic finance rules for the sukuk al-
musharaka (Section 7.1.3), the sukuk al-murabaha (Section 7.1.4) and the sukuk 
al-ijarah (Section 7.1.5) under Dutch private law.
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7.1.1 Islamic Law and Finance
Sukuk are Islamic financial products that are based on Islamic law. Shari’ah 
scholars have studied the sources of Islamic law throughout ages to formulate 
rules for new arising challenges in society. As a result, they contributed to the 
development of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh).640 Due to differences in inter-
pretation of the religious texts, there has been divergence in the practice of 
Islamic finance. Nonetheless, there is consensus on the two most important 
Islamic finance principles: (i) the prohibition of riba; and (ii) the avoidance 
of gharar.641 First, according to the majority of the Shari’ah scholars all forms 
of interest are prohibited due to the prohibition of riba. In their view, profit 
should be generated through profit- and loss-sharing arrangements, where the 
financier shares in the profits and losses of an investment. Furthermore, as a 
result of the prohibition of riba, the presence of tangible properties is required 
in transactions: the trade in intangible properties (bay’ al-dayn) resembles 
charging interest and is, thus, impermissible unless the intangible properties 
are traded at face value. Second, contractual uncertainty should be avoided 
as much as possible due to the prohibition of gharar. In addition, speculation 
(qimar or mayseer) in commercial transactions is also impermissible.
The two Islamic finance principles (riba and gharar) have determined the 
specific rules of Islamic private law.642 The rules of Islamic private law, in 
turn, determine the contents of Islamic finance contracts. The contracts can 
be divided into three categories: equity-based, sale-based and lease-based. For 
the structuring of sukuk, I mainly focused on the prototype contract of each 
category: the musharaka, the murabaha and the ijarah. The musharaka is a 
partnership contract between the financier and the party requiring funding, 
which can also be structured through the incorporation of a stock company 
the shares of which are held by the financier and the party requiring fund-
ing.643 A murabaha transaction consists of the sale of a tangible property by 
a third party to a financier, followed by its resale with a profit mark-up by the 
financier to the party requiring funding for the purchase of a tangible proper-
ty.644 The purchase price of the second sale is paid in instalments. The ijarah 
is a rental agreement relating to the lease of a tangible property.645 These con-
tracts are used to structure sukuk.
640 See Section 2.1 of Chapter 2.
641 See Section 2.2 of Chapter 2.
642 See Section 2.3 of Chapter 2.
643 See Section 3.1 of Chapter 3.
644 See Section 3.2 of Chapter 3.
645 See Section 3.3 of Chapter 3.
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7.1.2 Sukuk
Sukuk are Islamic securities. Based on the principles of riba and gharar these 
securities should represent the ownership of the sukuk holders in the under-
lying properties of the sukuk transactions. Islamic property law does not 
require the sukuk holders to become the proprietary owners of the underlying 
properties. Economically, the sukuk holders should act as the owners of the 
properties. The ownership of the sukuk holders is realised through a securiti-
sation process (tawreeq): the properties are separated from the patrimony of 
the originator by way of transfer to a bankruptcy-remote SPV, which issues 
sukuk securities that entitle their holders to the financial benefits of the under-
lying properties.646 The sukuk certificates can be traded in secondary markets 
if the underlying properties are (deemed) tangible (as opposed to intangible 
properties). The three basic sukuk structures analysed in this book are: the 
sukuk al-musharaka, the sukuk al-murabaha and the sukuk al-ijarah. On the 
basis of the Islamic finance rules for the underlying Islamic finance contracts 
and the Islamic finance rules for sukuk, I created a framework for the three 
sukuk structures.647 This framework was taken into consideration when struc-
turing sukuk under Dutch private law.
7.1.3 Sukuk al-Musharaka under Dutch Private Law
In the sukuk al-musharaka the originator can incorporate a Dutch BV. The BV 
will be a Shari’ah-compliant musharaka, which I refer to as a musharaka BV in 
this study.648 The articles of association of the musharaka BV should stipulate 
in its objects that it will be a Shari’ah-compliant entity, which means that: (i) 
it cannot issue preference shares; (ii) its activities are limited to halal activites, 
with a list of prohibited immoral industries which are haram and in which 
it cannot engage; and (iii) its main activities must relate to tangible proper-
ties. In addition, it is necessary to include transfer restrictions in relation to 
the shares issued by the musharaka BV in its articles of association. This is 
the most distinctive feature of the musharaka BV: the stipulation of transfer 
restrictions in its articles of association, pursuant to which the transfer of its 
shares is excluded when the value of the tangible properties and the services of 
the musharaka BV is less than 30% of its total assets value based on its annual 
accounts of that year.
646 See Section 4.2 of Chapter 4.
647 See Section 4.3 of Chapter 4.
648 See Section 5.1 of Chapter 5.
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The originator and an SPV hold the shares in the musharaka BV. The oper-
ations of the musharaka BV are mainly funded through the issuance of sukuk 
by the SPV. Pursuant to the terms and conditions of the sukuk, the SPV pays 
dividends received from the musharaka BV through to the sukuk holders. As 
a result, the sukuk holders can be considered to have the economic ownership 
(economische eigendom) of the shares of the musharaka BV.649 Legally, the SPV 
is the owner of the shares of the musharaka BV which means that they are part 
of its patrimony (or bankruptcy estate in case of its bankruptcy) and its credi-
tors have recourse on the shares.
In order to secure the economic ownership of the sukuk holders, a col-
lective security arrangement can be created.650 The originator incorporates a 
second SPV that will act as a security agent. Pursuant to a parallel debt clause, 
the security agent acquires an independent claim on the issuer which is paral-
lel to the claims of the sukuk holders on the issuer. The security agent acquires 
security rights to secure the parallel claim. The legal relationship between 
the security agent and the sukuk holders is yet contractual. Hence, the sukuk 
holders remain exposed to the risk of bankruptcy of the security agent, which 
cannot be eliminated completely.
Alternatively, it is also possible to incorporate an administration office 
(stichting administratiekantoor) that acts as the SPV and issues depositary 
receipts for shares (certificaten van aandelen) to the sukuk holders.651 The arti-
cles of association of the musharaka BV can attach rights to attend meetings 
(vergaderrechten) to the depositary receipts. Consequently, the sukuk holders 
acquire a statutory joint right of pledge (wettelijk gezamenlijk pandrecht) on the 
shares that the administration office holds by operation of law. As a result, the 
use of a collective security arrangement and the incorporation of a security 
agent are not required. The sukuk holders do not run a bankruptcy risk on the 
SPV because they are secured creditors (separatisten) in its bankruptcy.
A bankruptcy of the originator does not directly affect the musharaka BV, 
the SPV or the sukuk holders: the musharaka BV can continue its operations, 
the SPV remains one of its shareholders and the musharaka BV can continue 
paying dividends, if any, to the SPV which the SPV, subsequently, pays through 
to the sukuk holders.652 The bankruptcy of the originator may, however, indi-
rectly affect the position of the SPV and the sukuk holders by triggering the 
bankruptcy of the musharaka BV or by affecting its Shari’ah compliance (if the 
bankruptcy trustee of the originator wishes to sell and transfer the shares in 
the musharaka BV disregarding the transfer restrictions and a court honours 
649 See Section 6.2.2.1 of Chapter 6.
650 See Section 6.2.2.2 of Chapter 6.
651 See Section 6.2.2.3 of Chapter 6.
652 See Section 6.2.3.1 of Chapter 6.
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its request thereto). In case of bankruptcy of the musharaka BV, the SPV as 
its shareholder will most probably receive no payments and the sukuk holders 
will lose their investments: the sukuk holders as the economic owners bear the 
economic risks of the investments in the musharaka BV.
7.1.4 Sukuk al-Murabaha under Dutch Private Law
In the sukuk al-murabaha the originator is looking for Shari’ah-compliant 
funding to purchase a halal tangible property from a third-party seller. The 
originator incorporates an SPV. The third-party seller sells and transfers the 
tangible property to the SPV and the SPV, in a split second, sells and transfers 
the tangible property subject to the reservation of a security right (overdracht 
onder voorbehoud van een zekerheidsrecht) to the originator.653 The originator 
acquires the tangible property encumbered with a security right from the out-
set, which means that the SPV does not run a risk towards other creditors of 
the originator who have acquired security rights on the tangible property in 
advance. The originator pays the purchase price plus a profit mark-up to the 
SPV in instalments. The contract of sale between the SPV and the originator 
qualifies as a purchase and sale of property on instalments (koop en verkoop 
op afbetaling). The mandatory provisions of book 7A DCC are not in conflict 
with Islamic law.
The SPV funds the purchase price through the issuance of sukuk. Pursuant 
to the terms and conditions of the sukuk, the sukuk holders are entitled to pro-
ceeds generated with the underlying property. The underlying property is the 
claim against the originator for payment of the purchase price. The SPV pays 
the purchase price it receives from the originator through to the sukuk holders. 
The sukuk holders have a bundle of contractual rights and obligations against 
the SPV in relation to the underlying property and are, therefore, deemed the 
economic owners of the underlying property.654 In order to secure their con-
tractual rights towards the SPV, a collective security arrangement can be cre-
ated. However, the sukuk holders remain exposed to the risk of bankruptcy of 
the security agent that holds the security rights for them.
In case of bankruptcy of the originator, the SPV will have secured claims 
against the bankruptcy estate of the originator.655 The SPV can exercise its 
security rights as secured creditor as if there were no bankruptcy. In the event 
of default on instalments by the bankruptcy trustee of the originator, the SPV 
can enforce its security rights. The rights of the SPV are, however, restricted 
653 See Section 5.2 of Chapter 5.
654 See Section 6.2.2.1 of Chapter 6.
655 See Section 6.2.3.2 of Chapter 6.
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in two ways. First, the bankruptcy trustee of the originator can request the 
supervisory judge (rechter-commissaris) to order a stay, a cooling-off period 
(afkoelingsperiode), of four months maximum. Second, the bankruptcy trustee 
of the originator can impose the SPV with a reasonable period within which 
it has to exercise its security rights. If the SPV fails to exercise its security 
rights within such reasonable period, the bankruptcy trustee of the origina-
tor may sell the tangible property himself and pay the proceeds to the SPV 
taking into account his rank, but after deduction of the bankruptcy costs 
( faillissementskosten).
7.1.5 Sukuk al-Ijarah under Dutch Private Law
In the sukuk al-ijarah the originator sells and leases back a halal tangible prop-
erty to and from the SPV.656 The transfer of the tangible property from the 
originator to the SPV as part of the sale and leaseback in the sukuk al-ijarah 
is not invalidated by Article 3:84 (3) DCC. The originator and the SPV intend 
an ‘actual transfer’ (‘werkelijke overdracht’) of the tangible property to the SPV 
because the right of ownership of the SPV is not proprietary limited (to a right 
of recourse on the tangible property). The purpose of the originator and the 
SPV is to conclude a Shari’ah-compliant transaction. Under Islamic finance 
law, the SPV must become the owner of the tangible property and it is not 
possible to condition the right of ownership of the SPV upon an event (such as 
an event of default in payments) or to limit its right of ownership to a right of 
recourse on the tangible property.
The ijarah agreement, pursuant to which the tangible property is leased 
back, qualifies as a rental agreement under Dutch contract law. The origina-
tor and the SPV also enter into a contract, pursuant to which the originator 
has the unilateral obligation to offer to purchase the tangible property (aan-
biedingsplicht) from the SPV at the maturity date of the sukuk. The SPV is not 
obliged to accept the offer and may, at its discretion, decide to sell and transfer 
the property to a third party. The (combination of the) rental agreement (with 
the contract with the unilateral obligation to offer) does not qualify as a hire 
purchase or as an agreement with the same essence as hire purchase because 
the rental agreement (and the contract with the unilateral obligation to offer) 
do(es) not contain an obligation to transfer the right of ownership of the tan-
gible property to the originator. Thus, the mandatory provisions of book 7A 
DCC and of the IHPIPA do not have to be observed.
The SPV issues sukuk and uses the sukuk proceeds to pay the purchase 
price of the tangible property to the originator. The lease payments paid from 
656 See Section 5.3 of Chapter 5.
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the originator to the SPV are paid through to the sukuk holders. The sukuk 
holders are deemed the economic owners of the underlying tangible property 
of the sukuk transaction because they are entitled to the financial benefits of 
the underlying tangible property based on the terms and conditions of the 
sukuk. They have contractual rights and obligations against the SPV. In order 
to secure their contractual claims, a collective security arrangement can be 
created.657 The bankruptcy risk to which the sukuk holders are exposed is not 
completely eliminated in such case because it transfers from the SPV that is 
the issuer to the SPV that is the security agent.
The bankruptcy of the originator does not affect the SPV because the 
underlying tangible property of the sukuk al-ijarah transaction does not fall 
into the bankruptcy estate of the originator.658 The SPV is the owner of the tan-
gible property. The SPV and the bankruptcy trustee of the originator have the 
right to terminate (opzeggen) the ijarah agreement with a three months’ notice 
period. The claim of the SPV for the lease payments (for the three months) 
in bankruptcy are estate claims (boedelschulden). The ijarah agreement ends 
after the three months’ notice period. The SPV can then sell and transfer the 
tangible property to a third party free of the ijarah agreement. The sukuk hold-
ers as the economic owners of the tangible property bear the economic risks 
of the tangible property in such case, e.g. the risk of depreciation of its value. 
The bankruptcy trustee of the originator may breach the contract with the 
unilateral obligation of the originator to offer to purchase the tangible prop-
erty, leaving the SPV behind with an ordinary, unsecured claim for damages 
on the basis of breach of contract on the bankruptcy estate of the originator.
7.2 Islamic and Dutch Legal Issues regarding the Structuring of Sukuk 
under Dutch Law
7.2.1 Islamic Legal Issues regarding the Structuring of Sukuk under Dutch 
Law
The structuring of sukuk under Dutch law touched upon three Islamic legal 
issues. First, the centre of gravity of the prohibition of riba was revealed. 
Second, the absolute and unconditional character of the right of ownership of 
tangible properties was explored. Third, the position of securities within the 
classical doctrine of Islamic property law was addressed.
First, I illustrated the two pillars on which the prohibition of riba stands 
when structuring sukuk under Dutch private law in this book: (i) the concept 
657 See Sections 6.2.2.1 and 6.2.2.2 of Chapter 6.
658 See Section 6.2.3.3 of Chapter 6.
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of profit-and-loss-sharing; and (ii) the requirement of tangible properties in 
Islamic finance transactions. Islamic finance law is based on the understand-
ing that all forms of interest are prohibited. As a result, the financier should 
share in the profits and losses of his investment. Furthermore, profit-generat-
ing transactions are structured within Islamic finance so that profit is made 
instead of interest. The decisive distinction between the permitted profit and 
the prohibited interest relates to the trade in tangible properties, as opposed 
to the trade in intangible properties which resembles charging interest: the 
payment of money for the use of money.
The structuring of the sukuk al-musharaka under Dutch law illustrates 
best what the essence of the prohibition of riba entails. The rules for a mush-
araka BV under Islamic and Dutch law are mainly similar. Where these rules 
deviate, the differences can be ascribed to the prohibition of riba. Islamic law 
does not allow the disruption of equal profit- and loss-sharing between the 
shareholders through the issuance of preference shares by the musharaka BV. 
This stresses the significance of profit- and loss-sharing under Islamic law. 
Furthermore, the requirement that the main activities of the musharaka BV 
pertain to tangible properties and that its shares cannot be traded when the 
value of its tangible properties and services is less than 30% of its total assets 
value stresses the importance of the trade in tangible properties. In the sukuk 
al-ijarah the underlying property should be a tangible property, also stressing 
the importance of the trade in tangible properties under Islamic finance law. 
The sukuk al-murabaha, on the other hand, are not tradable because the under-
lying properties of the sukuk al-murabaha are intangible properties, i.e. claims.
Second, the right of ownership has an absolute character under Islamic 
property law. It is not possible to proprietarily condition the right of owner-
ship. Islamic property law does not acknowledge the concept of security 
ownership (zekerheidseigendom). The transfer of a tangible property with the 
reservation of ownership (eigendomsvoorbehoud) is not acknowledged under 
Islamic property law, unlike Dutch property law. The transfer of fiduciary 
security ownership (fiduciaire zekerheidseigendom) is also not acknowledged 
under Islamic property law, which is also the case under Dutch law. Under 
Islamic law a transferor can, however, transfer the right of ownership of a tan-
gible property subject to the reservation of a security right in order to create a 
valid security right on a tangible property (a so-called fiduciary pledge under 
Islamic finance law) because in such case the right of ownership of the owner 
is not contractually conditioned upon an event. The owner of a tangible prop-
erty has its complete right of ownership and a security right holder acquires 
only a security right.
Even though Islamic law has a strict approach towards the right of owner-
ship, a form of ‘derivative’ economic ownership has been accepted in financial 
markets. This brings me to the third and final issue under Islamic law. The 
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acceptance of the trade in shares and sukuk with the argument that the share-
holders and the sukuk holders are the economic owners of the tangible proper-
ties of the stock company respectively the underlying tangible properties of 
the sukuk transactions has marked a milestone in the development of Islamic 
finance law. According to the classical approach under Islamic property law, 
the trade in securities would have been practically impossible due to the rules 
for bay’ al-dayn, which allow the trade in intangible properties only at face 
value. As a result, the trade of securities, which in essence are debt claims, 
in financial markets would have been disqualified. With regard to financial 
markets, however, Shari’ah scholars accepted an approach where they consid-
ered the economic substance of the transactions over their legal form. They 
looked at the economic reality where shareholders and sukuk holders can be 
regarded as the economic owners of the assets of a stock company respectively 
the underlying properties in sukuk transactions.
The Islamic finance literature has not paid much attention to the form of 
the sukuk securities so far. This point has also not been dealt with in this book. 
The developments in financial markets with regard to the dematerialisation 
of securities, that is, in most jurisdictions securities are not traded in a paper 
form anymore but they are held by intermediaries that provide the securities 
holders only with book entries, raise the question how this fits into the clas-
sical doctrine of Islamic property law. The study in this book illustrates that 
sukuk securities are not regarded as tangible properties themselves but are 
deemed evidence of ‘economic ownership rights’ in underlying tangible prop-
erties of sukuk transactions. What follows from the debate in Islamic finance 
literature on the ownership of sukuk holders in the underlying tangible prop-
erties of sukuk transactions is the question whether for Islamic purposes such 
ownership is also transferred to sukuk holders if the sukuk securities are not 
issued in paper form and the sukuk holders have only book entries. This ques-
tion was not dealt with in this book, but it may provide inspiration for further 
research on the topic.
7.2.2 Dutch Legal Issues regarding the Structuring of Sukuk under Dutch Law
Structuring sukuk under Dutch private law brought the following three Dutch 
legal issues into light. First, Dutch private law allows for the structuring of 
Islamic finance transactions. Second, recent amendments in Dutch corporate 
law made the incorporation of a musharaka BV possible. Third, the concept of 
economic ownership under Dutch law resembles the required ownership of 
sukuk holders in sukuk transactions under Islamic law.
First, Dutch private law allows for the structuring of Islamic finance trans-
actions. The study in this book clarifies that Dutch private law is sufficiently 
flexible for contracting parties to structure sukuk transactions such as the sukuk 
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al-musharaka, the sukuk al-murabaha and the sukuk al-ijarah. While assessing 
the Islamic finance rules for these three sukuk transactions under Dutch law, 
I also assessed the Islamic finance rules for Islamic finance contracts such as 
the musharaka, the murabaha and the ijarah under Dutch private law. Hence, 
this study also shows that Dutch private law allows the conclusion of Islamic 
finance contracts such as the musharaka, the murabaha and the ijarah.
Second, recent legislative amendments with regard to the Flex BV law 
aimed to provide more flexibility for parties as to the internal organisation of 
a BV. As a result of these legislative amendments, one of the Islamic finance 
requirements for the incorporation of a musharaka BV can be met under Dutch 
corporate law: the trading of the shares of a musharaka BV can be excluded at 
times when the value of the tangible properties and the services of the mush-
araka BV is less than 30% of its total assets value. With the entry into force of 
the Flex BV law it is possible to temporarily exclude the transfer of the shares 
of a BV. Before the introduction of the Flex BV law, this was not possible under 
Dutch law.
Third, in this study the contractual rights of the sukuk holders were quali-
fied as economic ownership under Dutch law. Remarkably, the concept of eco-
nomic ownership under Dutch law resembles the ownership required for the 
sukuk holders under Islamic finance law. Under both Islamic and Dutch law a 
separation of the right of ownership into legal and beneficial ownership is not 
possible. Strictly speaking, the sukuk holders do not acquire the proprietary 
ownership of the underlying properties in sukuk transactions under (classi-
cal) Islamic property law, but they are deemed the economic owners of those 
properties. Under Dutch law economic ownership is not a form of ownership 
with any proprietary effects either. It refers to a bundle of contractual rights 
and obligations in relation to a property. The property remains, however, part 
of the patrimony of its legal owner (SPV). Consequently, the creditors of the 
legal owner (SPV) have recourse on the property and the property falls into its 
bankruptcy estate.
7.3 The Future of Dutch and Islamic Law and Finance
7.3.1 Proposals for a Different Approach to Riba in Islamic Jurisprudence 
(Fiqh)
The cornerstone principle of Islamic finance is the prohibition of riba. The 
prohibition of riba is interpreted by the majority of Shari’ah scholars as a pro-
hibition on interest and, therefore, the main focus within Islamic finance 
has been on a complete ban on interest. One may, however, wonder to what 
extent such complete ban is upheld and justified within current day Islamic 
finance. In this study I illustrated how profit is generated and paid to sukuk 
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holders through the use of alternative structures. Such structures are often 
complicated and raise transaction costs because additional structuring leads 
to additional fees for lawyers, bankers and other professional advisers of the 
parties to the sukuk transactions. The economic result of all three transactions 
discussed in this book is, nonetheless, that a borrower (originator) borrows 
money from investors in financial markets (sukuk holders) and it pays a return 
for the use of that money to those investors.
Furthermore, the strict ban on interest has resulted in a forced deviation 
from the classical approach to the concept of ownership under Islamic prop-
erty law. By accepting the ownership of shareholders and sukuk holders in 
the assets of a stock company respectively the underlying properties in sukuk 
transactions the trade in these securities remained acceptable under Islamic 
finance law. Nevertheless, from a legal perspective, the securities holders are 
trading in intangible properties (debt claims on the stock company or the 
SPV) while trading their securities in secondary markets.
At the same time, this study illustrated that there is a difference between 
interest-bearing loans and Islamic finance products. The required link 
between tradable sukuk issued in financial markets and the underlying tan-
gible properties of the relevant sukuk transaction limits the possibilities to 
pile debt on debt. The Islamic finance industry has been able to avoid the 
unchecked and excessive accumulation of debts. Therefore, it may even pro-
vide inspiration to answer the question of how to move forward after the finan-
cial crisis. The essence of the prohibition of riba may be in the creation of a 
stable financial system. If that is the case, it becomes interesting to examine 
whether the prohibition of riba could be implemented in the regulatory frame-
work of a jurisdiction to regulate the financial markets instead of prohibiting 
interest. The implementation of the essence of the prohibition of riba in the 
regulatory framework of a jurisdiction may, for example, result in restrictions 
on financial products that are highly leveraged, i.e. financial products that 
represent or are purchased with an excessive amount of debt.
In this view, the Islamic finance industry would look beyond a strict pro-
hibition of interest and focus on the true meaning of and the rationale for the 
prohibition of riba. If the essence of the prohibition of riba lies in the creation of 
a stable financial system and this is implemented in the regulatory framework 
of a jurisdiction, Shari’ah scholars may even consider allowing the payment 
and receipt of interest. As a result, the creation of complicated financial and 
legal structures with additional transaction costs would not be needed any-
more. These developments may be less far from the current Islamic finance 
industry than one might assume. In Malaysia Islamic finance principles have 
already been implemented in the regulatory framework to some extent, while 
the prohibition of interest has a less broad scope than in Middle Eastern coun-
tries, which appears from the acceptance of the trade in intangible properties 
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(bay’ al-dayn). As a leader in the world of Islamic finance, Malaysia may set an 
example for the future of Islamic finance. I do acknowledge that this requires, 
first and foremost, a different form of interpretation and ijtihad by Islamic 
scholars. Moreover, this approach also requires further examination from a 
legal perspective, for which this book can give only a glimpse.
7.3.2 Proposals for Future Legislation under Dutch Law
The structuring of sukuk under Dutch law requires no legislative amendments. 
Current Dutch private law allows for the structuring of the sukuk al-musharaka, 
the sukuk al-murabaha and the sukuk al-ijarah. In order to even better facilitate 
the structuring of sukuk transactions under Dutch law the Dutch legislature 
may, however, consider the following legislative amendment with regard to 
the economic ownership of sukuk holders under Dutch law. Sukuk holders are 
exposed to the risk of bankruptcy of the legal owner (SPV) of the underlying 
property in sukuk transactions under current Dutch law. The statutory joint 
right of pledge of Article 3:259 DCC perfectly answers to the required propri-
etary protection of the rights of economic owners (sukuk holders) in the sukuk 
al-musharaka under Dutch property law. The scope of Article 3:259 DCC is, 
however, restricted to the issuance of depositary receipts for securities, more 
specifically shares and debt claims. The Dutch legislature may consider the 
extension of the scope of Article 3:259 DCC to depositary receipts for tangible 
properties (certificering van zaken) and to depositary receipts for patrimonial 
rights (certificering van vermogensrechten). As a result, the structuring of the 
sukuk al-ijarah and the sukuk al-murabaha becomes more attractive under 
Dutch law because the sukuk holders acquire a statutory joint right of pledge 
by operation of law and are secured creditors in the bankruptcy of the legal 
owner (SPV) of the underlying properties in sukuk transactions.
7.3.3 Future for Islamic Finance in the Netherlands
This book illustrated that the three sukuk transactions discussed in this study 
can be structured under Dutch private law. When structuring sukuk under 
Dutch law, it became clear that the Islamic finance contracts discussed in this 
book can also be structured under Dutch private law. The conclusion of this 
study is, thus, broader than sukuk transactions alone: it relates to the posi-
tion of Islamic finance in the Netherlands. On the one hand, the Shari’ah is 
generally frowned upon in the Netherlands. This study demonstrated that the 
Islamic rules for Islamic finance transactions are not in conflict with Dutch 
law. The essence of some of the Islamic finance rules even showed similari-
ties with the rationale of certain rules under Dutch law. Hence, introducing 
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Islamic finance in the Netherlands may prove to be less peculiar and less exot-
ic than some may have thought.
Dutch law has, on the other hand, been disregarded in Islamic finance 
practice. Islamic finance transactions are often governed by English law. This 
study illustrated the compatibility of Dutch private law with Islamic private 
law. The legal framework is in place to structure sukuk transactions under 
Dutch law. It is now up to Dutch finance practice to commence Islamic finance 
transactions in the Netherlands.
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aqd A contract under Islamic contract law. A contract is concluded 
through an offer (idjab) and an acceptance (qaboel) under Islamic 
contract law.
ayn Ayn refers to a tangible property: an existing thing that can be 
subject to human control and that can be determined.
bay’ The contract of sale under Islamic contract law.
bay’ al-dayn The trade in claims. See riba.
bay’ al-inah See murabaha.
dayn Dayn literally means ‘debt’ and it refers to an obligation (either to 
perform an act or to pay money).
fatwa A legal advice or legal opinion issued by an Islamic scholar in 
response to a question posed by an individual. Contrary to a binding 
judgment of a judge (qadi), a fatwa issued by an Islamic scholar is a 
non-binding legal opinion.
fiqh Fiqh refers to Islamic jurisprudence. It is often divided into usul 
al-fiqh and furu al-fiqh.
furu al-fiqh Furu al-fiqh is a form of Islamic jurisprudence. It refers to 
substantive Islamic law.
genizah document Genizah documents are documents that were stored in Middle 
Eastern mosques and synagogues because the word ‘God’ was 
written either in Arabic or Hebrew. Therefore, the merchants of the 
Middle Ages were reluctant to destroy such documents.
gharar Gharar refers to contractual uncertainty. According to Islamic 
finance law gharar should be avoided as much as possible in Islamic 
finance contracts. As a result of the principle of gharar, qimar 
(gambling) and mayseer (speculation) are also discouraged.
hadith See sunnah.
halal Halal means legal or permitted under Islamic law.
haram Haram means illegal or not permitted under Islamic law.
‘ibadat ‘Ibadat refers to the rules in Islamic law that regulate the 
relationship between humans and God.
idjab See aqd.
ijarah The contract of ijarah is a lease contract, pursuant to which the 
owner of a property (lessor) provides its right of use (called manfaa) 
to another party (lessee) for an agreed period at an agreed price. It is 
often compared to an operational lease.
ijarah muntahia bittamleek See ijarah wa-iqtina.
ijarah wa-iqtina Ijarah wa-iqtina is a leasing arrangement that consists of an ijarah 
contract and an additional binding promise of the lessor to the 
lessee to offer to transfer the ownership of the property to the lessee 
at the end of the lease period. The ijarah wa-iqtina is often compared 
to a financial lease. It is also referred to as ijarah muntahia 
bittamleek.
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ijma’ Ijma’ refers to the consensus of the majority of Islamic scholars on 
a specific matter. Although preferably ijma’ refers to the consensus 
of the entire community (consensus of umma), practicality and 
pragmatism lead to the acceptance of ijma as the consensus of the 
learned in the Islamic community (consensus of ulema). Ijma’ is a 
source of Islamic law.
ijtihad Ijtihad refers to the use of one’s logical reasoning and common 
sense to deduce the true meaning of a rule in Islamic law. Ijtihad is 
a source of Islamic law. An Islamic scholar who practices ijtihad is 
called mujtahid.
istisna’ istisna’ is a future sale contract, pursuant to which the seller of a 
property will manufacture and deliver a specified property to the 
buyer at a future date.
madhahib Schools of Islamic law.
mal Property under Islamic property law. The concept of property is 
limited to ayn (tangible property) under Islamic property law.
malik The owner of the right of ownership of a property under Islamic 
property law.
manfaa See ijarah.
mayseer Speculation. See gharar.
milk The right of ownership under Islamic property law.
mu’amalat Mu’amalat refers to the rules in Islamic law that regulate the 
relationship between humans and humans.
mudarabah A partnership contract whereby one partner contributes capital 
to the partnership (called the rab al-maal), while another partner 
has the sole right to the management of the partnership (called 
the mudarib). The mudarabah is often compared to a limited 
partnership with a silent partner. The mudarabah is also referred to 






maqasad al-Shari’ah The objects of Islamic law.
murabaha The contract of murabaha was traditionally a contract of sale, 
pursuant to which the seller of a property disclosed the cost price 
of the property and the profit mark-up to the buyer. Within Islamic 
finance it is used as a transaction whereby a party sells a property 
to a financier, followed by a resale of that property by the financier 
to the ultimate buyer who pays the cost price plus a profit mark-up 
to the financier in instalments. The murabaha can be used for asset 
finance purposes only. The seller of the property and the ultimate 
buyer of the property cannot be the same party because otherwise 
there is a sale and buy-back which results in the forbidden bay’ al-
inah.
musaqa See musharaka.
musharaka A partnership contract whereby each partner (called sharik) 
contributes capital to the partnership and has a right to its 
management. The musharaka contract is often compared to a 
joint venture. The muzara’a, musaqa, and mugharasa are forms of 
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qadi See fatwa.
qimar Gambling. See gharar.
qirad See mudarabah.
qiyas Qiyas refers to reasoning based on analogy and it is a source of 
Islamic law.
Qur’an The holy book of the religion Islam. It is a source of Islamic law.
rab al-maal See mudarabah.
riba According to the majority of the contemporary Islamic scholars 
riba refers to all forms of interest. It is prohibited under Islamic 
finance law. Riba is often divided into three different forms: the 
riba al-jahiliyya, the riba al-fadl and the riba al-nasi’a. As a result 
of the prohibition of riba, the trade in claims (bay al-dayn) is also 
prohibited.
riba al-fadl Riba al-fadl refers to an excess of one of the counter values in an 
on-the-spot transaction. This form of riba is also referred to as riba 
by way of excess.
riba al-jahiliyya Riba al-jahiliyya refers to riba that was charged during the pre-
Islamic period in Arabia. When a creditor could not repay his debts 
at maturity, the debt was doubled and redoubled. This resulted in 
inhuman practices.
riba al-nasi’a Riba al-nasi’a, also known as riba by way of deferment, refers to riba 
charged when delivery of one of the counter values is delayed in a 
transaction. This form of riba is often compared with conventional 
interest.
salam The contract of salam is a future sale contract, pursuant to which 
the seller of a property undertakes to transfer the right of ownership 
of that property to the buyer at a future date in consideration of full 
payment at the moment of the conclusion of the contract of salam.
Shari’ah Shari’ah is Islamic law. The word ‘Shari’ah’ means ‘the way’ or ‘the 
path to the water source’. Islamic law within the meaning of Islamic 
finance is not codified law, but it refers to a set of rules derived from 
religious texts.
sharik See musharaka.
Shi’a There are two main divisions in Islam: Sunni and Shi’a. Three Shi’a 
schools of Islamic law are: Ithna ‘Ashari, Isma’ili and Zaydi.
shirkah Shirkah means ‘sharing’ and it refers to legal concepts where rights 
and/or obligations are shared between parties. It can be divided into 
shirkat al-aqd (sharing by contract) and shirkat al-milk (sharing in 
ownership).
shirkat al-amal See shirkat al-aqd.
shirkat al-aqd Shirkat al-aqd literally means ‘sharing by contract’. It refers to a 
partnership in business effected through a contract. The shirkat 
al-aqd is further divided into three categories: the shirkat al-wujooh 
(partnership based on good reputation in the market), the shirkat 
al-amal (partnership based on services) and the shirkat al-inan 
(partnership based on capital investment). The musharaka is a form 
of shirkat al-inan.
shirkat al-inan See shirkat al-aqd.
shirkat al-milk Shirkat al-milk literally means ‘sharing in ownership’. It refers to 
joint ownership of property by at least two persons.
shirkat al-wujooh See shirkat al-aqd.
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sukuk Sukuk are Islamic securities which are regarded as a Shari’ah-
compliant alternative to conventional bonds. The Arabic word 
‘sukuk’ is the plural of the word ‘sakk’ which means ‘certificate’ or 
‘order of payment’. The most distinctive feature of sukuk is that they 
should represent the ‘economic ownership’ of the sukuk holders in 
the underlying property that the sukuk securities represent.
sukuk al-ijarah A sukuk structure that is based on the contract of ijarah. In the 
sukuk al-ijarah structure an originator raises funds by incorporating 
an SPV, entering into a sale and leaseback with that SPV and 
requiring the SPV to issue sukuk to sukuk holders to raise funds for 
the purchase of the property that the originator sells to and leases 
back from the SPV.
sukuk al-murabaha A sukuk structure that is based on the contract of murabaha. In 
the sukuk al-murabaha an originator raises funds to purchase a 
property. It incorporates an SPV. The SPV issues sukuk and uses the 
proceeds to purchase the property from a third-party seller. Next, 
the SPV sells the property to the originator in consideration for 
payment in instalments.
sukuk al-musharaka A sukuk structure that is based on the contract of musharaka. An 
originator incorporates an SPV and it enters into a musharaka 
contract with that SPV. The SPV issues sukuk to fund its capital 
contribution to the musharaka.
sunnah Sunnah refers to the practices of the Prophet Muhammad. The 
concrete details of sunnah are described in hadith. Hadith is the 
narrative of a particular occurrence, while sunnah is the rule 
deduced from the practice of the Prophet Muhammad. It is a source 
of Islamic law.
Sunni There are two main divisions in Islam: Sunni and Shi’a. Four Sunni 
schools of Islamic law are: Hanafi’, Maliki, Shafi’i and Hanbali.
taqlid Taqlid refers to the acceptance of an Islamic rule on the authority of 
other Islamic scholars. The Islamic scholar who practices taqlid is 
called a muqallid.
tawarruq In a tawarruq contract the party who is in need of funding 
purchases a tangible property from a financier on a deferred 
payment basis. The price is often higher than the real value of the 
tangible property. Next, the party who is in need of funding sells the 
tangible property to a third party for a lower price (the real value of 
the tangible property) and this purchase price provides him money 
instantly. It is also referred to as reverse murabaha or commodity 
murabaha. In the literature and practice, the contract of murabaha 
and the contract of tawarruq are often used interchangeably. 
However, tawarruq is not permitted under Islamic law.
tawreeq A securitisation process whereby the ‘economic ownership’ of the 
underlying property in a sukuk transaction is transferred to the 
sukuk holders. The ownership of the property is divided into units of 
equal value and sukuk are issued as per their value.
ulema See ijma’.
umma See ijma’.
wa’d A wa’d is a binding promise. From an Islamic law perspective, 
the promise of wa’d is binding on the promisor and it is legally 
enforceable in court. It has the same legal effect as a contract with a 
unilateral obligation in many jurisdictions.
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wakalah The wakalah contract is a contract of agency, which is often 
compared to the contract of mudarabah. The difference with the 
contract of mudarabah is that the agent in a wakalah contract is 
entitled to a fixed fee instead of a percentage of the profit.
waqf The waqf is a legal concept whereby the ownership of a property 
is held by a party, while its management or financial benefits are 
transferred to another party. It is used for religious and charitable 
purposes.
usul al-fiqh Usul al-fiqh is a form of Islamic jurisprudence. It is procedural 
Islamic law. Usul al-fiqh refers to the main sources of Islamic law.
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English law 1.3, 4.2.2, 5.3.3.1, 6.2.2, 6.2.2.1, 7.3.3
EURIBOR see interest rates
fatwa 2.1.2, 3, 3.1.3, 3.2.1, 4.2
fiducia prohibition
actual transfer (werkelijke overdracht) 5.3.2, 5.4, 7.1.5
fiducia cum amico 5.3.2, 6.2.2, 6.2.2.2
fiducia cum creditore 5.3.2, 6.2.2
fiducia prohibition 5.3.2, 5.4, 6.2.2, 6.2.2.1, 6.2.2.2
fiduciary pledge 3.2.1, 4.3.2, 5.2.1, 5.2.2.2, 5.4, 7.2.1
financial crisis 1.2.1.1, 7.3.1
financial lease see lease contracts
financial markets 4, 4.1.2, 4.2.2, 6.3, 7.2.1, 7.3.1
financial ratio 3.1.3, 4.3.1, 5.1.1, 5.1.2
fiqh see Islamic jurisprudence
fixed income securities 4.3.1, 4.3.3
foundation (stichting) 1.2.2, 6.2.1, 6.2.2.1, 6.3
future sale (contracts) see sale contracts
gharar 1.1.1, 2.2.2, 2.2.3, 2.3, 2.3.2, 2.4, 3.1.3, 
4.4, 5.2.2.1, 5.2.3, 7.1.1, 7.1.2
hadith 2.1.1.2, 2.2.2, 2.3.2
hire purchase (huurkoop) 5.2.3, 5.3.3.2, 7.1.5
ijma’ 2.1.1, 2.1.1.3, 2.1.1.4, 2.1.1.5, 3
ijtihad 2.1.1, 2.1.1.5, 5.4, 7.3.1
instalment sale see purchase and sale of property on 
instalment (koop en verkoop op afbetaling)
interest rates 3.2.1, 3.3.1
irrevocable offer (onherroepelijk aanbod) 5.3.3.1
Islamic jurisprudence 1.2.3, 2.1, 2.1.2, 2.3.2, 2.4, 3, 3.1.1, 7.3.1
Islamic law:
Islamic contract law 2.2.2, 2.2.3, 2.3.2, 2.3.3, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3
Islamic corporate law 3.1.3
Islamic finance law 2.1.1.3, 2.1.2, 2.3, 3, 3.1.1, 3.1.2, 3.1.3, 3.2.1, 
3.2.2, 3.2.3, 3.3.1, 3.3.2, 4.2.1, 4.2.2, 4.3.1, 
4.3.2, 4.3.3
Islamic property law 2.3, 2.3.1, 2.3.3, 2.4, 4.2.1, 4.2.2, 4.4, 
5.2.2, 5.2.2.2, 5.3.2, 5.4, 6.2.3.2, 6.3, 
7.1.2, 7.2.1, 7.2.2, 7.3.1
joint venture see partnership contracts, musharaka
lease contracts:
financial lease 3.3.2
ijarah 3.3.1, 3.4, 4.3.3, 4.4, 5.3.1, 5.3.2, 5.3.3, 
5.3.3.1, 5.3.3.2, 5.4, 6.2.3.3, 6.3, 7.1.5
ijarah wa-iqtina 3.3.2, 5.3.3.2
operational lease 5.3.3.2
legal personality 3.1, 3.1.3, 4.2.1, 4.2.2, 5.4
letters of credit 4.1.1
LIBOR see interest rates
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natural obligations (natuurlijke verbintenissen) 2.2.3
objects (clause) 3.1.1, 3.1.3, 4.3.1, 5.1.1, 5.1.2, 5.4, 6.2.1, 
6.2.2.1, 6.2.2.4, 6.3
obligation to offer (aanbiedingsplicht) 5.3.3.1, 5.3.3.2, 6.2.3.3, 6.3, 7.1.5
operational lease see lease contracts
ownership:
beneficial ownership 4.2.2, 6.2.2, 6.3, 7.2.2
conditional ownership (voorwaardelijke eigendom) 2.3.2, 5.2.2.2, 5.2.3, 5.3.3.1, 5.3.3.2, 5.4, 
7.1.5, 7.2.1
economic ownership 4.2.2, 4.3.1, 4.3.2, 4.3.3, 6.1, 6.2, 6.2.2, 
6.2.2.1, 6.2.2.4, 6.3, 7.2.1, 7.2.2
fiduciary ownership (fiduciaire eigendom) 5.3.2, 5.4, 6.2.2.1, 7.2.1
legal ownership 4.2.2, 6.2.2, 6.2.2.1, 6.3, 7.2.2
reservation of ownership  (eigendomsvoorbehoud) 3.2.1, 5.2.2, 5.2.2.2, 5.2.3, 7.1.4, 7.2.1
right of ownership 1.1.2, 2.3.1, 2.3.2, 2.3.3, 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.3.1, 
3.3.2, 3.4, 4.1.2, 4.2, 4.2.1, 4.2.2,  5.2.1, 
5.2.2, 5.2.2.1, 5.3.1, 5.3.2, 5.3.3, 5.3.3.1, 
5.3.3.2, 6.2.2, 6.2.2.1, 6.2.3.3, 7.1.2, 7.1.3, 
7.1.4, 7.1.5, 7.2.1, 7.2.2, 7.3.1
security ownership (zekerheidseigendom) 3.2.1, 5.2.2, 5.2.2.2, 5.2.3, 5.3.2, 5.4, 
6.2.2.1, 7.1.4, 7.2.1
paritas creditorum 6.2.2, 6.2.2.1
partnerships:
general partnership (vennootschap onder  firma) 5.1.2
limited partnership (commanditaire vennootschap) 3.1, 5.1.2
mudarabah 3.1, 3.1.2, 3.1.3, 4.3.1
mugharasa 3.1, 4.3.1
musaqa 3.1, 4.3.1
musharaka 3.1, 3.1.1, 3.1.3, 4.3.1, 4.4, 5.1, 5.1.1, 5.1.2, 
5.1.3, 5.4, 6.2.2.2, 6.2.2.3, 6.2.2.4, 
6.2.3.1, 6.3, 7.1.3
muzara’a 3.1, 4.3.1
penalty (clauses) 3.2.1, 4.3.2, 5.2.1, 5.2.3, 6.2.3.3
profit-and-loss-sharing 2.2.1, 3.1.1, 3.1.3, 4.3.1, 4.3.3, 5.1.1, 5.1.2, 
5.3.3.2, 5.4, 6.2.3.1, 7.1.1, 7.2.1
properties (goederen):
dayn (claims) 2.3.1, 2.3.3, 6.3, 7.2.1, 7.3.1
immovable properties (onroerende zaken) 2.3.3, 4.2.2, 5.2.2.1, 5.2.2.2, 5.2.3, 5.3.2, 
5.3.3.2, 6.2.1, 6.2.2.1
movable properties (roerende zaken) 2.3.3, 5.2.2.1, 5.2.2.2, 5.2.3, 5.3.2, 5.3.3.2
patrimonial rights (vermogensrechten) 2.3.3, 7.3.2




qiyas 2.1.1, 2.1.1.4, 2.1.1.5, 2.3.2
Qur’an 2.1.1, 2.1.1.1, 2.1.1.2, 2.1.1.3, 2.1.1.4, 2.2.1, 
2.2.2, 2.3.2




rental agreements (huurovereenkomsten) 4.3.3, 5.3.3.2, 5.4, 6.2.3.3, 6.3, 7.1.5
riba 1.1.1, 1.1.2, 1.2.3, 2.2.1, 2.2.3, 2.3, 2.3.1, 
2.3.2, 2.4, 3, 3.1.3, 3.2.1, 4.1.2, 4.2, 4.3.1, 
4.4, 5.1.1, 5.2.3, 5.4, 6.2.3.2, 6.3, 7.1.1, 








murabaha 3.2.1, 3.4, 4.3.2, 4.4, 5.2, 5.2.1, 5.2.2, 




sale and leaseback 4.3.3, 4.4, 5.3.1, 5.3.2, 6.2.3.3, 7.1.5
securities leasing (effectenlease) 5.3.3.2
securitisation (conventional) 6.2.1
security rights:
right of mortgage (hypotheekrecht) 5.2.2.2, 5.3.2, 6.2.2.2
right of pledge (pandrecht) 5.1.3, 5.2.2.1, 5.2.2.2, 5.3.2, 6.2.2.2
statutory joint right of pledge (wettelijk gezamenlijk 
pandrecht)
6.2.2.3, 6.2.2.4, 6.3, 7.1.3, 7.3.2
shares:
meeting rights (vergaderrechten) 6.2.2.3, 6.2.2.4, 6.3, 7.1.3
non-voting shares (stemrechtloze aandelen) 6.2.2.4
preference shares (preferente aandelen) 3.1.3, 4.3.1, 5.1.1, 5.1.2, 5.4, 7.1.3, 7.2.1
shares 1.1.2, 3.1.3, 4.1.2, 4.2.1, 4.3.1, 5.1.1, 5.1.2, 
5.1.3, 5.4, 6.2.3.1, 6.3, 7.1.3, 7.1.3, 7.2.1, 
7.2.2
short selling 3.1.3
Shari’ah see Islamic law
Shari’ah supervisory board 2.1.2, 5, 5.1.1, 5.1.3, 5.2.1, 5.3.1, 6.1, 6.2.3.3
shirkat al-aqd 3.1.1
shirkat al-milk 3.1.1, 4.2.1
sukuk:
sukuk al-ijarah 4.3.3, 4.4, 5.3, 5.3.1, 5.3.2, 5.3.3, 5.3.3.1, 
5.3.3.2, 5.4, 6.2.2.2, 6.2.3.3, 6.3, 7.1.5
sukuk al-murabaha 4.3.2, 4.4, 5.2, 5.2.1, 5.2.2, 5.2.2.1, 
5.2.2.2, 5.2.3, 5.4, 6.2.2.2, 6.2.3.2, 6.3, 
7.1.4
sukuk al-musharaka 4.3.1, 4.4, 5.1, 5.1.1, 5.1.2, 5.1.3, 5.4, 
6.2.2.2, 6.2.2.3, 6.2.2.4, 6.2.3.1, 6.3, 
7.1.3
sunnah 2.1.1, 2.1.1.2
tawreeq 4, 4.2, 4.2.1, 4.2.2, 6, 6.1, 6.2, 6.2.3, 6.3, 
7.1.2
transfer of ownership:
constituto possessorio 5.2.2.1, 5.3.2
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delivery 2.2.2, 2.3.1, 2.3.2, 2.3.3, 3.1.3, 3.2.1, 3.3.1, 
4.3.2, 4.3.3, 5.2.2, 5.2.2.1, 5.2.2.2, 5.2.3, 
5.3.1, 5.3.2, 5.3.3.2
provision of possession (bezitsverschaffing) 5.2.2.1
right to dispose of (beschikkingsbevoegdheid) 2.3.1, 5.2.2.1, 5.2.2.2, 5.3.2
title (titel) 5.2.2.1, 5.2.2.2, 5.3.2, 6.2.2.2, 6.2.2.3
traditio longa manu 5.2.2.1, 5.2.2.2
transfer 2.2.1, 2.2.3, 2.3.1, 2.3.2, 2.3.3, 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 
3.2.3, 3.3.2, 3.4, 4.2.1, 4.2.2, 4.3.2, 4.3.3, 
5.1.1, 5.1.2, 5.1.3, 5.2.1, 5.2.2.1, 5.2.2.2, 
5.2.3, 5.3.1, 5.3.2, 5.3.3.1, 5.3.3.2, 5.4, 
6.2.2, 7.1.2, 7.1.3, 7.1.4, 7.1.5
transfer of possession (bezitsoverdracht) 5.2.2.1
transfer subject to reservation of security right 
(overdracht onder voorbehoud van een zekerheidsrecht)
5.2.2.2, 5.2.3, 7.1.4, 7.2.1
transfer restrictions (blokkeringsregeling):
temporary exclusion of transfer (tijdelijke uitsluiting 
overdracht)
5.1.2, 5.1.3, 7.2.2
transfer restrictions (blokkeringsregeling) 5.1.2, 5.1.3, 5.4, 6.2.2.2, 6.2.2.3, 6.2.2.4, 
6.2.3.1, 7.1.3, 7.2.2
transgression of objects (doeloverschrijding) 6.2.1, 6.2.2.2
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